
ANCIENT
MEDIEVAL
PETER
KREEFT
SOCRATES'
CHILDREN
AN INTRODUCTION TO
PHILOSOPHY FROM THE
100
GREATEST PHILOSOPHERS
MODERN
CONTEMPORARY
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

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INTRODUCTION

These are not primarily meant to be "review questions" to check whether you have understood the text and to prepare for tests. They are "branching out" questions rather than "focus" questions, "So what" questions (about the consequences of an idea) or "Give your own logical evaluation and argument" questions. Some of them are designed as essay questions to provoke or elicit your own individual original reflection, intuition, or puzzling out, whether brief or detailed. Many are appropriate for group discussion and controversy. Some of the questions are easy, some are hard, some are in between. Don't expect to have adequate answers to all of them.

The questions follow the order of the chapters, page by page. But don't try to answer the questions for a chapter without reading the whole chapter first, since some of the questions are about the chapter as a whole or about something later in the chapter.

When thinking individually about these questions, when discussing them in a group, and when writing personal essays about them, keep in mind the basic structure and laws of logic, especially the three "acts of the mind" (understanding, judgment, and reasoning) and their three "checkpoints": Are any terms used ambiguously, are any premises or assumptions false, and are any arguments logically invalid, such that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises? Use these "checkpoints" to evaluate philosophers' arguments and also your own.

You should take much more patient, significant time than you probably want to and habitually do do (do-do is a universal habit) to think silently about these questions before discussing them or writing about them. That will shape and deepen your thinking, and your answers will come from those deeper places rather than simply expressing whatever thoughts are on the surface of your mind.

Do not just express your opinions; find, question, and justify your implicit assumptions behind your opinions. This is why many of the questions have two parts: The first part asks for your answer, and the second part, "Why or why not?", asks for your reasons. (N.b.: "Reasons" are not just "opinions" or "personal motives.") The ubiquity of the "why" questions reflects the nature of philosophical thinking.

Think both "backward" (finding premises for your opinions) and "forward" (to their logical corollaries or consequences). Give good reasons, not just personal opinions, which are often only spontaneous feelings.

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Do not expect to be able to answer (or even to completely understand) every one of these questions. Some of them, especially the more abstract, are "stretch" questions, and some of the questions assume that you know something about the other philosophers mentioned in the question, whom you may not have studied yet, or books you may not have read yet.

Many of the questions have more than one part. It should not be necessary to answer all the parts of a given question if you have something worth saying about one part but not about another.

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VOLUME 1: ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS

What do you think is the value of studying the philosophy of people who lived over 2000 years ago? Why not study the latest, most up-to-date and sophisticated thinkers instead? Give as many good reasons as you can. What do you think you might learn from the ancients that you could not learn from later thinkers?

ON THE SAGES

If sages are like philosophers in seeking wisdom but unlike philosophers in not doing it by logical reasoning, how valuable are sages? If you had to rank sages compared with the following ten people in importance, if you had to choose which ones you would most want with you if you had to live on a deserted island for the rest of your life with them, assuming all your most essential basic survival needs were taken care of, where would you rank sages on the following alphabetical list of ten? Architect, Baker, Comedian, Doctor, Fisherman, Knight, Mathematician, Psychologist, Saint, Teller of Stories.

ON SOLOMON

1. The chapter on *Ecclesiastes* in *SC* was like an X-ray of the logical "bone structure" of the author's reasons for his final conclusion. Which do you find more persuasive, more helpful, or more delightful: the book of *Ecclesiastes* itself or this "X-ray" of its logic? Why?
2. Is there any other possible response to a logical argument such as the one here (p. 6) besides (a) "The argument fails to prove its conclusion because one of the terms is equivocal and changes its meaning in the course of the argument," (b) "The argument fails to prove its conclusion because one of its premises is false," (c) "The argument fails to prove its conclusion because the conclusion does not logically and necessarily follow from the premises," or (d) "I see no equivocal term, false premise, or logical fallacy and thus the argument proves its conclusion to be true, so I must believe it"?
3. What would most people who do not find an equivocal term, a false premise, or a logical fallacy but who nevertheless do not believe the conclusion of this argument say in response to the argument? Evaluate that response.
4. If you do not believe its conclusion, what equivocal term, false premise, or logical fallacy do you find in the argument?

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5. If you did not have a clear answer to questions 2–4 above, why didn't you take the time to think about it instead of giving up? Do you realize how important it is whether Solomon's conclusion is true or false?

ON ZOROASTER

1. Which of the first nine tenets of Zoroaster do you agree with and which do you disagree with? Why?
2. Zoroaster lived long before Christianity and Islam. If he also never met any Jews (and no one knows whether or not he did), how do you suppose he arrived at so many religious and theological points that are similar to those of Judaism and very different from those of all other cultures in the world?

ON SHANKARA

1. Probably the commonest question people in Western cultures subconsciously ask about Advaita Hinduism is: How can so many people actually believe that all plurality is really an illusion? That there is only one Being, and it is not the universe? And that deep down, I (*Atman)* am that Being (*Brahman*), "thou art that" (*tat tvam asi*)? What is the evidence, or reason, or motivation for this very non-commonsensical belief?
2. Imagine a dialogue between a monist or pantheist like Shankara and either an atheist or a theist (a believer in a God who created a real world of plurality). Do some "thought experiments" and role-playing, either between two people or, if you are alone, between two halves of your own mind. Have each side try to refute the other and have the other try to answer those attempted refutations. Then have the two sides switch positions and come up with better answers for each side.
3. Do you think a theist is closer to a pantheist or to an atheist? Why? If you did the suggested dialogue above (question 2), did that dialogue reveal to you the answer to this question? Was it surprising or expected?
4. What are some logical consequences of Shankara's monism in the area of morality?
5. How is Shankara's philosophy shown in Hermann Hesse's charming little novelette *Siddhartha*? If you have read that book, evaluate it.
6. The pre-Socratic Greeks wondered what was "the one" common to "the many," and gave many material answers such as water, air, and fire. On p. 48, the text says that "Shankara's 'one,' though reached by a very different route [mystical experience rather than philosophical reasoning], seems philosophically more tenable, since infinite *thought* (*Brahman*) can (mentally) be all things while remaining itself," while matter cannot. How is this possible? How does it work? Do I become a tree when I think a tree? Is the same form ("tree") both in the tree (materially) and in my mind (mentally)?

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ON BUDDHA

1. Evaluate (i.e., give good reasons both for and against) (a) Buddhism, as summarized in the "Four Noble Truths," (b) Stoicism, which is similar but not mystical, and (c) whether you disagree with either or both of them, what you see as a better solution to the practical problem of suffering, and why is it better?
2. (a) Buddha's denial of the reality of any substances, whether persons or things, sounds to most people in Western cultures as anti-commonsensical as Shankara's mystical monism. Do you see any argument for it? (b) Most people also find it threatening and depressing; why do you think Buddha did not find it so?
3. Both Hinduism and Buddhism are essentially mystical philosophies or religions. How do you think a non-mystic can fairly evaluate philosophies that are based on mystical experience rather than on common sense, ordinary experience, or logical reasoning?
4. (a) What are the three major Western religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) based on if not private mystical experience, common sense, ordinary experience, or logical reasoning? (Don't just say "faith"; faith in what, and why?) (b) Do you see more similarities or more differences between Western religions and Eastern religions? Why?

ON CONFUCIUS

1. (a) Confucius was a "conservative" or "traditionalist," and arguably the most successful social reformer in history (p. 24). Granted that the content of each culture's tradition differs from one to the other, do you think it is reasonable to see whatever is common to all "conservatisms" or "traditionalisms" (e.g., Jewish, pagan Roman, Christian, Muslim) as more likely to succeed than their opposites in all places and times including the future? (b) Why does the "traditionalism" that seems to work for philosophy, morality, and religion not work for science and technology?
2. What do you see as the difference between the traditions that work in making most people happy and those that do not?
3. Confucius' five basic virtues overlap more than most Western lists (e.g., the "four cardinal virtues" of Plato). Is this a plus or a minus? Does it mean they are more fundamental or more confused?
4. For each of these five virtues, find, in history or fiction, concrete examples of people who clearly practice them and of people who clearly fail to.

ON LAO TZU

1. Do the values of Taoism complement or contradict and conflict with those of Confucius? If your answer is "both," give examples of both complementarity and contradiction.
2. Why do you think Confucius called Lao Tzu a "dragon"?

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3. Compare the values of Lao Tzu with those of Jesus, especially his Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5–7).
4. Give arguments both for and against the relativity of values (yin-yang) both regarding moral good and evil and regarding physical good fortune and bad. (This is really four questions.)
5. (a) For Lao Tzu, the Tao is found in three places, or dimensions: (1) human actions, (2) nature, and (3) indefinable, transcendent "ultimate reality." Do you think it can be valid morally (1) but not cosmically (3)? In other words, must ethics be founded on metaphysics or not? (b) Why or why not? (c) This is a very fundamental question that tends to divide premodern thinkers, most of whom say yes, from modern thinkers, most of whom say no. Give what you think are the strongest reasons for each answer and then refute the arguments for the answer you disagree with.

ON MO TZU

1. In what way(s) is Mo Tzu's teaching similar to Jesus' and in which way(s) is it not?
2. Are there concrete social issues today that pit Mohism against its opposite?
3. Do you think Mencius (p. 32) is closer to Mo Tzu or to Jesus? Why?
4. Do Mo Tzu's "equality" and Mencius' "hierarchy" contradict each other? Why or why not?

ON JESUS

1. In what sense is Jesus a philosopher and in what sense is he not?
2. Why is it fair and reasonable to classify Jesus as a philosopher but not Muhammad?
3. What other practical philosophies fit the structure of Buddha's "four noble truths" besides Jesus'? (p. 34)?
4. One would think that the more popular and the more widespread a philosophy is—that is, the more common it is, and the more people agree with it, the less controversial and more "commonsensical" it is. But Jesus' philosophy is both the most popular and also the most controversial. Why do you think this is so?
5. Is Jesus' philosophy—i.e., the philosophical aspect of Jesus' teaching as summarized on p. 33—the same as that of Judaism or not? What consequences do you deduce from your answer to that question?

ON THE GREEKS

1. The Greeks (especially the Athenians) and the Jews were the two ancient peoples and cultures whose contributions lasted and benefited mankind the most; yet both peoples were tiny. (a) The Jews accounted for their outsized influence by divine intervention. If you

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do not believe that, how do you account for them? (b) How do you account for the equally outsized influence of the Greeks?

2. Which of the two do you think is more valuable and indispensable? Why?
3. Philosophy (from the Greeks) and religion (from the Jews, since both Christians and Muslims inherited the Jews' theology and morality) are both in sharp decline today in Western civilization. What is left to fill the vacuum?

ON THALES

1. Why did Thales assume that there must be some one thing that everything is?
2. Why did it take so long for mankind to raise the question Thales asked?
3. What are the poetic, intuitive, or even mystical connotations of the four elements: earth, air, fire, and water?
4. (a) Why did it take so long for mankind to distinguish the literal, physical-chemical meanings of these four elements from their mystical or poetic connotations? (b) Does that distinction necessarily come with the cost of losing the nonliteral meanings of those concepts that our ancestors had? Or did the distinction actually heighten our appreciation for the nonliteral meanings, by contrast, as supernaturalists have a heightened appreciation for nature, and as the two sexes have for each other, and as the danger of death heightens the appreciation of life? If both, how is that not self-contradictory?
5. Why was it not obvious to Thales that water was only one kind of cause, viz. the material cause? Did the ancients have a clear concept of the distinction between the material and the immaterial? Give evidence for your answer. Compare modern materialists.
6. Thales said both that "everything is water" and that "all things are full of gods," yet he did not say that water was a god or that gods were water. (a) How do you explain this apparent logical inconsistency? (b) How might Thales have had a different explanation than yours?

ON ANAXIMANDER

1. What do you see as Anaximander's single most important improvement over Thales? Is there any way you see Thales' answer as better than Anaximander's?
2. Why do you think the Greeks saw infinity as an imperfection rather than a perfection?
3. The matter that different elements like hydrogen and helium are made of is the same, but their form is different (one electron vs. two). What a bronze horse and a bronze bust of Socrates are made of is the same matter (bronze), but their form (horse vs. Socrates) is different. A bronze bust of Socrates and an ivory bust of Socrates have the same form (Socrates) but their matter is different (bronze vs. ivory). Matter is that out of which something is made and form is that into which it is made. Matter is potentiality and form is actuality. (a) If "form" is finite, determinate, and specific in its nature while "matter" is not,

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does that make matter or form superior? (b) Why would an artist, a theologian, a scientist, and a philosopher tend to give different answers to that question?

4. How can God (as conceived by the three Western religions) be infinite without being formless?
5. Is this also true for Shankara's and the Upanishads' concept of *Brahman*? Does *Brahman* have a "personality"?

ON ANAXIMENES

1. Nearly universal common sense today rejects hylozoism and accepts Aristotle's clear distinction between living things, which grow from within themselves, and nonliving things, which do not. But since "life" is analogical (divine life, angelic life, human life, animal life, and plant life are five different kinds of life), might this series of life-analogies extend down further (e.g., to the "life" of an atom)? Australian aborigines claim Ayers Rock is "alive," and in *The Lord of the Rings*, a mountain ("Cruel Caradhras") and a Ring both have a "will." Could that be true in some sense?
2. If spirits (God, ghosts, and angels) have no bodies and plants have no minds, how could both possess "life"? Are matter and mind two "clear and distinct ideas" as Descartes claimed?
3. How can the same word mean at once "soul," "breath," "life," "spirit," and "air" in both Greek and Hebrew (p. 47)? If this is this merely confusion, why was the word used meaningfully for centuries by two wise cultures?
4. How did the word "soul," which originally meant any source of life, become narrowed to "human soul" or even "mind" as one of the powers of the human soul? Do nearly all terms become narrower as language changes? Give other examples.

ON PYTHAGORAS

1. The first question on Pythagoras is similar to the last question on Anaximenes: How do we cope with the fact that philosophy, science, religion, and politics were once far more unified than they are now? (p. 50) Is it (a) simply ancient confusion? Or might it be (b) modern forgetting? Or (c) both? If (b) or (c), how do we recapture these "ancient unities"?
2. Is one such "confusion" the confusion between persons and things in the incident on p. 51? If so, was Pythagoras thingifying persons or personifying things? Was Pythagoras sacrificing persons for something less than persons? If so, should that ever be done (e.g., for an impersonal "cause" or idea)? Is that what war does?
3. Many ancient cultures, like Pythagoras, see some numbers as special, or "sacred." Can numbers have intrinsic qualitative significance independent of their mathematical and quan-

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titative relations to each other and their use in calculation? If not, why do most people subconsciously associate odd numbers with warm colors and even numbers with cold colors?

4. What is the connection among the five ideas of Pythagoras that Plato inherited (p. 51)? Is there a common assumption to all five?
5. Pythagoras is generally praised as a scientific pioneer for discovering that "the language of nature is mathematics," that nature behaves according to intelligible mathematical laws; but he is also blamed as a philosophical reductionist for thinking that "all things *are* numbers." (a) Why is it so difficult at first to make the distinction between what he is praised for (discovering surprising and unsuspected unities between two obviously different things, like numbers and sounds) and what he is criticized for (reducing one of these two connected things to the other)? (b) Can you think of a number of modern examples? (One obvious one is "mind" and "brain.")
6. One of the connections Pythagoras discovered was between mathematics and music (thus "the music of the spheres," p. 52). This is surprising because numbers seem totally impersonal, objective, and unemotional (there are no "numbers critics" as there are music critics, and no one sings numbers or teaches "number appreciation"), while music evokes deep personal emotional responses. Can you try to explain this connection?
7. Is there any truth at all to Pythagoras' classification of all things as odd or even (p. 53)? If it is simply untrue scientifically and even philosophically, why does it seem at least symbolically or poetically appropriate or fitting, not simply meaningless and arbitrary, like what Diogenes Laertius says about beans on p. 51? Why was Pythagoras' confusion powerful enough to motivate numerous prejudices (e.g., against women and left-handed people), while that of Diogenes seems simply silly?

ON HERACLITUS

1. Heraclitus and Parmenides are usually presented as the two most important of the pre-Socratic philosophers, and as opposites, Heraclitus being the champion of the many things that change ("you cannot step into the same river twice") and Parmenides being the champion of the unchanging One. In light of the fact that very few people deny either oneness or manyness, since we live in a uni-verse, with both unity and diversity, what makes these two great?
2. Could both be right?
3. How does Heraclitus account for unity or universality? How does Parmenides account for diversity or plurality?
4. How could "fire" mean to Heraclitus something both physical and literal and also something metaphysical and cosmic? How could "being" mean to Parmenides something metaphysical and also something physical ("a rounded sphere")? Are they both simply

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confused and lacking the clear distinction that is modern common sense, or are we moderns forgetting this ancient unity? Could it be both?

5. Heraclitus seems also to have used "war" in both a literal, physical sense and a cosmic sense that to us moderns is merely metaphorical. Do you think the cosmic war necessitated and justified literal war in his mind? Was that simply folly or was there any wisdom in it?
6. Why is fire a natural symbol for war and water for peace?
7. The Greek gods were not at peace but always warring with each other. Thus Heraclitus' philosophy of fire fit his religion, but Thales' philosophy of water did not. For Thales said that "everything is water" and also that "all things are full of gods," yet he never said that water was a god, nor did he say that it stood for peace, which was the opposite of the nature of the warring gods. How do you read (guess) this riddle? (This a real "stretch" question.)

ON XENOPHANES

1. Why do you think Xenophanes opposed all his contemporaries in being a monotheist instead of a polytheist? Why do you think all of his contemporaries opposed his monotheism?
2. If your answer to the first question was: "Because Xenophanes was smart," aren't you then implying that all his contemporaries were stupid? Imagine a dialogue between a monotheist and a polytheist: Can you find reasons for both sides?
3. What is the most important practical (difference-making, life-changing) difference between monotheism (Xenophanes—cf. Judaism) and pantheism (Parmenides—cf. Hinduism)? Which is farther from polytheism? Why?
4. Why doesn't Xenophanes' critique of polytheism (p. 60) lead to atheism or at least agnosticism instead of monotheism?
5. Why do you think Socrates' criticism of polytheism (summarized in the penultimate sentence on p. 60) led him to monotheism instead of either pantheism or atheism? (If you do not yet know much about Socrates, postpone this question until you read him, especially his *Apology*, then come back to it.)

ON PARMENIDES

1. Do you see any significant difference between Parmenides' monism and Shankara's?
2. Do you see any way of maintaining Parmenides' monism and improving it by accounting for change and plurality in a more positive, more complete, or more persuasive way rather than declaring them simply illusions?
3. (a) Isn't it simply true that Parmenides alone gave the correct answer to the question "What is The One?" or "What is common to all things?" (b) Isn't it a self-evident tautology

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that all that has being, has being? If not, why not? If so, why did other philosophers give alternative answers to that question? Were they so stupid that they did not recognize a tautology when one stared them in the face?

4. If Parmenides is right that Being is "the One," how can we deny that anything meaningful has being, such as Santa Claus?
5. Can "being" be defined? Why or why not?
6. What do you think Parmenides meant by "being"? Sheer existence? If so, why did he not ascribe real existence to the many things that we sense such as rocks and persons and thunderstorms?
7. Compare and contrast Parmenides' dialectic "being or non-being", which was his version of "to be or not to be, that is the question" of Hamlet's.
8. Do you think Parmenides arrived at his metaphysics of monism rather than pluralism from the assumption of his epistemology of rationalism rather than empiricism, or vice versa? Why?
9. Do you agree with the text's assumption that "if Parmenides' conclusion is false, his opponents must find a logical mistake in his argument" or not? Why?
10. What kinds of logical mistakes could occur in an argument? If you do not have a clear answer to that question, please look up "the three acts of the mind" in Aristotelian or Scholastic logic (e.g., see Peter Kreeft, *Socratic Logic* [St. Augustine's Press, 2010], 28–33, a summary outline of all commonsense logic in six pages).
11. (a) Do you think the law of noncontradiction is (I) a principle of reality itself, of all real things themselves, or (II) a principle only of our thinking, or (III) a principle only of our method when we want to be logical? In other words, is it (I) metaphysical, (II) epistemological, or (III) methodological? (b) Why? (c) Relate this to the three meanings of "logos" in Gorgias (ch. 22).
12. Of the three critiques of Parmenides on p. 64, which do you think is the primary or most important one? Why?
13. Can you imagine any answers Parmenides would give to any of these three critiques? (It is often a very useful exercise to try to invent good arguments for what you think are bad philosophies.)
14. Do you think Parmenides is the most important of the pre-Socratics or not? Why?

ON ZENO

1. What do you do when an apparently infallibly logical argument contradicts your everyday experience? Can you ignore either of these two? If so, how? (Did Parmenides and Zeno do that?) If not, why not? And if not, what do you do if you cannot reconcile them? Give two other examples of reason apparently contradicting experience besides Parmenides and Zeno arguing logically that movement and plurality are illusions.

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2. One such example is what William James called "the dilemma of determinism" vs. free will. Science seems to prove that all events are determined or caused by other events, while everyday experience seems to prove that sometimes we ourselves freely choose to cause some events (e.g., striking a match, willing to move my hand, or commanding my mind to think a certain train of thought). How do you negotiate that apparent contradiction? For an example of a modern philosopher struggling with that dilemma, see William James in vol. 4, pp. 88–91.
3. Do you agree with the basic principle of Socratic method that we must follow the argument, and the logic of the argument, no matter where it takes us, like a raft on a river? Why or why not?
4. Which of Zeno's six arguments (p. 66) do you find easiest to answer? Which seems the hardest?
5. Try to answer all of them.
6. Zeno's life and death (p. 68) were as weird as his philosophy. How closely are these two things connected? Does philosophy itself tend to make you "weird"? Why or why not?

ON EMPEDOCLES

1. (a) If you are more sympathetic to pluralism than to monism, do you prefer qualitative or quantitative pluralism? (p. 69) Why? (b) The issue becomes important for modern philosophers because of their distinction between what they called "primary qualities" (quantitatively measurable attributes—e.g., size and shape) and "secondary qualities" (which were not—e.g., color and heat). They argued about which qualities were objectively real. Aristotle had said both, Locke said primary only, Berkeley said neither, and so did Kant, for a different reason. The issue concerns whether objective reality is less than, the same as, or more than what we commonsensically think it is. What do you think?
2. Can science solve this problem, or not? If so, how, and why is there still dispute about it?
3. Why do you think earth, air, fire, and water, out of the hundreds of different physical things in the universe, are most often picked as the four fundamental elements?
4. How did these four elements mean something different for prescientific peoples than they do for us (cf. p. 70–71).
5. Would Empedocles say love is a form of gravity or gravity is a form of love?
6. Why, both in ancient and modern times, do evolutionists like Anaximander and Empedocles seem to tend toward materialism (p. 71)? Is materialism essential to evolutionism?
7. Is "the physical brain" any different, essentially, from Anaximander's "sea of blood" as a materialistic answer to the question of what mind is?

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ON ANAXAGORAS

1. Why do you think Anaxagoras saw Mind as "transcendent" to matter?
2. Why in ancient Greece did philosophers, who were primitive scientists, usually run afoul of their culture's religion, but not usually in the Middle Ages? Why did this conflict begin again in modern times? (Or did it?)
3. Does scientific intelligence imply intelligibility or rational order in the cosmos? If so, does this order imply or include what Aristotle called final causality, or movement toward a pre-set end? (Puppies always become dogs, not cats.) If so, does this imply intelligent design? If so, does that imply Mind as the designer? If so, does that imply some sort of God-like cosmic Mind? Why or why not? Don't merely express your existing opinions about science and religion; think it through philosophically.
4. Compare and contrast Xenophanes' "God," Heraclitus' "Logos," and Anaxagoras' "Mind" as the "transcendent" factor.

ON DEMOCRITUS AND LUCRETIUS

1. Immaterialists claim that matter does not exist, that everything is mind or spirit. Materialists claim that everything is matter, that mind or spirit does not exist. In the Hindu and Buddhist East, philosophers are more often immaterialists than materialists, and in the modern West they are more often materialists than immaterialists. But in both places the majority opinion, especially among ordinary people as distinct from philosophers, is that both mind and matter exist. Why do you think most non-philosophers believe that? What reasons would they give? Evaluate their reasons.
2. What is the strongest argument for materialism? For immaterialism? Compare the arguments.
3. (a) Why is Democritus' quantitative pluralism (see the questions on Empedocles for the meaning of this term) more attractive and popular than qualitative pluralism? (b) Why is Democritus' form of it, viz. atomism, the most popular and attractive form of it, even before modern science discovered atoms?
4. Why does pluralism tend toward materialism more than monism does? Why does quantitative pluralism tend to materialism more than qualitative pluralism does? (Descartes is the exception as a quantitative pluralist about matter only, but not mind.) Why does atomism tend to materialism more than other forms of quantitative pluralism do?
5. "Ockham's Razor" says that the simplest explanation that explains all the data is always to be preferred to larger or more complex ones. Do you see this as a valid principle for science? For philosophy? For common sense? Is Democritus implicitly using that principle? Is an immaterialist like Shankara or Buddha implicitly using it too?
6. Does materialism logically follow from Ockham's Razor? Why or why not?

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7. In terms of Aristotle's "four causes" (p. 42), Democritus claims to explain all the data of our experience using material causes only, not formal (qualitative) causes, and efficient causes only, not final (teleological) causes. If he succeeds in doing that, does that prove materialism or not? Why?
8. A theory must explain all the data. Is there data that is not sensory (e.g., the mental *consciousness of* unconscious material objects)? If so, how would a materialist explain this (see critique #2 on p. 79)?
9. How would a materialist explain the twelve examples of apparent immaterial data on pp. 79–81? Read and evaluate Lucretius' *On the Nature of Things* (ch. 20) for a more detailed reply.
10. Democritus was wrong about two things: Atoms are not unsplittable and not identical. Does that physical/chemical error invalidate his philosophical atomism or not? Why or why not?
11. Logically evaluate the argument about materialism and atheism in the last paragraph on p. 83.
12. Evaluate the following argument: Materialism seems to be logically self-contradictory because it is an ism, an idea. Ideas do not seem to be made of matter. So the very agent (mind) that denies the existence of mind is a mind.
13. The last pages of the two chapters on Democritus and Lucretius mention a moral and/or psychological argument about the "existential" or personal consequences of materialism. Is this fair? Why or why not?

PROTAGORAS AND THE SOPHISTS

1. Most non-philosophers, even today in modern Western civilization, disagree with both the materialism of Democritus and Lucretius and with the moral subjectivism of the Sophists, mainly because most still believe in at least some religious and moral truths. (a) Which of these two philosophies seems more threatening to religion? (b) Why? (c) Which seems more threatening to morality? (d) Why?
2. Why do you think the subjectivism of the Sophists, which is not usually materialistic, is more popular today than the materialism of Democritus and Lucretius, which is not usually subjectivistic?
3. Evaluate the following argument: Epistemological subjectivism seems to be logically self-contradictory because it claims that it is objectively true that truth is not objective but subjective.
4. Evaluate the following argument: Moral subjectivism seems to be logically self-contradictory because it claims that it is really, objectively, and universally morally good to know and teach that moral goodness is not real, objective, or universal.

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5. Skepticism claims that no one knows the truth, while subjectivism claims that everyone knows it; for skepticism, no one is right, while for subjectivism, everyone is (p. 90). How then can the Sophists be both skeptics and subjectivists?
6. Logically evaluate the case against epistemological relativism (p. 90).
7. Logically evaluate the case against moral relativism (p. 90).
8. If you are sympathetic to moral relativism but not to fascism, how and why would you disagree with Mussolini's deduction from it (p. 92)? Compare Machiavelli (vol. 3, ch. 69).

QUESTIONS ABOUT GORGIAS

1. Are Gorgias' denials of the three meanings of logos self-contradictory or not? Why?
2. Is the movement of Western philosophy toward Gorgias' threefold skepticism a natural one or not? Why?

QUESTIONS ABOUT SOCRATES

1. (a) Why is Socrates so divisive (pp. 98–100)? (b) How might the reasons given on p. 101 be inadequate? (c) Is the reason given on p. 104 better or worse? (d) What is the hidden assumption or hidden implication of that paragraph?
2. (a) Why is Jesus so divisive? (b) Buddha was probably the third most influential person who ever lived. Why do you think he is less divisive than either Socrates or Jesus?
3. (a) Why did no one of the three most influential persons who ever lived (Jesus, Socrates, and Buddha) ever write anything? (b) What are the two exceptions to that universal judgment? Why do we not have those two writings?
4. Can you find anything common to all the writers who admire Socrates that distinguishes them from all those who do not (pp. 98–100)?
5. If the Sophists had never existed, what difference would that have made to Socrates and his influence on history?
6. Explain and evaluate Socrates' religious attitude or piety as manifested in the story on pp. 102–3.
7. How many of the ten teachings of Socrates do you find questionable and why?
8. If most of these ten points seem like platitudes, why is Socrates so famous and controversial? Aren't platitudes boring and noncontroversial?
9. Compare the trials of Jesus and Socrates.
10. What is the biggest contrast between Jesus and Socrates (a) as persons and (b) as philosophers?
11. What is the most important agreement between the teachings of these two thinkers? Why is that the most important one?

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ON PLATO

1. (a) Plato is the first philosopher from whom we have complete books (twenty-six of them, in fact). Yet still today he remains philosophy's greatest author, or at least the most effective introduction to philosophy. What does the juxtaposition of these two facts tell us about "progress" in philosophy? (b) Why do science and technology almost automatically progress while philosophy does not? (c) Is there anything else that is like philosophy in this "unprogressive" way?
2. (a) Why don't most other philosophers even try to write in dialogue form as Plato did? (b) Why do those few who do try not succeed nearly as well as Plato did?
3. Most modern philosophers who focus on logic and language claim that "facts" and "values," or "what is" and "what ought to be" are to be sharply distinguished. But Plato held that they are identical; that the supreme reality, or "being," or "what is," is goodness, the supreme "value" (p. 113). (a) Who do you think is right here? (b) Why? (c) Or is the contradiction only apparent? If so, resolve it.
4. Why is it more accurate to call Plato's "Forms" or "Ideas" (a) "essences" or "natures" rather than (b) "sets" or "classes" of things, (c) "concepts," (d) "opinions," or (e) "shapes" or "appearances"? Use particular examples.
5. Gorgias denied all three meanings of "logos": (1) the metaphysical (essential natures), (2) the epistemological (our understanding of these essences by universal concepts), and (3) the linguistic (true, meaningful, and useful universal words such as true definitions). Plato affirmed all three *logoi*. (a) What attitude toward words and language, and what use of words and language in philosophy, follow from Plato's rather than Gorgias' first two assumptions about logos? (b) Can Plato's logos #3 survive without logos #2? And can #2 survive without #1? (c) If not, how can nominalists like Gorgias, who deny logos #1 and sometimes also logos #2, still philosophize and apparently use logos #3 in using universal terms like "justice" or "human nature"? And if so, if logos #3 *can* survive without logos #1 and logos #2, how?
6. (a) Explain in your own words (to make sure you understand the book's words) Plato's three arguments for his "Forms" or "Ideas," and (b) then logically evaluate each. Use particular examples. (That is especially useful when dealing with highly abstract ideas.)
7. What kind of kind of reality or being do Plato's "Ideas" have? "Where" are they?
8. Why do you think Plato's parable of the cave is the most famous passage in the entire history of philosophy?
9. An image or parable (a story meant as an image) often has many meanings, or applications, or instances. Find at least three or four for the cave. Use your imagination and your experience.

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10. Compare Plato's image of the cave with Jesus' image of being born again in John 3 in as many ways as you can, both likenesses and differences.
11. Plato's story of the cave and his four-level "divided line" map of the stage of ascent are both meant primarily to describe the education of the philosopher. Do they work also as a general theory of education? Do they work for the historical progress of the human mind? Give examples to prove your answer.
12. (a) Why does Plato not include "the Good" as one of the many other Platonic Ideas or Forms? (b) Why does he think the Ideas themselves are not adequately explained without this one supreme Idea? (c) Do you agree or disagree? (d) Why?
13. Why do you think Plato chose "the Good" as his absolute rather than "the One" or "the True"?
14. Evaluate the analogy of the sun on p. 119. What do good analogies succeed in doing and what do they not do? Why or where are they imperfect?
15. Plato believes that as our mind's subjective ideas are images of physical things, so physical things are themselves images of objective Ideas or essences; for example, as our image of a dog imperfectly resembles the dog, so the dog imperfectly resembles Pure Dogginess. Explain how the two analogies of creative art and theistic religion (God as creative artist of the universe) make sense of this idea (not prove it to be true but at least show it to be meaningful).
16. Explain and evaluate Plato's assumption that ethics must be based on anthropology and anthropology must be based on metaphysics (pp. 119–121).
17. Philosophers are divided about the cave's primary claim, that objective reality contains more rather than less than subjective reality. Many modern philosophers, like the Sophists—e.g., Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Derrida, Russell, Sartre, etc.—teach, for different reasons, that our minds' and reason's reach is much less, rather than more, than we think. Which side do you think is right (a) by instinct, (b) by common sense, and (c) by reasoning? Is there any other standard by which we should answer this question?
18. Evaluate the experiential argument for the Forms on p. 123.
19. Of the three kinds of Platonic Ideas or Forms (p. 123), why are moral ones the most controversial?
20. Why are most people surprised at the claim that the "conservative" or "traditional" belief in an objective "natural (moral) law" justifies the "liberal" or "progressive" right to rebel (p. 123)? See Sophocles' "Antigone" for an example of this.
21. (a) What are the possible relationships between Platonic "Ideas" and the "Mind of God" (p. 124)? (b) Does either or both necessitate or entail the other? (c) Does the fact that there are many atheists who are not Platonists and a few Platonists who are atheists answer this question? (d) Why or why not?

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22. Plato deduces the threefold structure of the state (the three natural classes and functions in his political philosophy are law makers, law enforcers, and law abiders) from that of the soul (the three natural powers of the soul in his psychology or anthropology: intellect, "spirited part" [will], and desires). If the two structures are identical or at least parallel, why has his psychology proved much more popular than his politics? If they are not identical, how are they different?
23. Compare Freud's three-part psychology of superego, ego, and id with Plato's intellect, will, and desires. How are they alike and how are they different?
24. Compare Plato's philosophy of education (p. 125) with today's public education.
25. Why are there four overall philosophical options rather than just two or three (p. 126)? Why is there a parallel or consistency in all four divisions of philosophy (metaphysics, anthropology, epistemology, and ethics)? Is this accidental or necessary?
26. Why do you think most premodern philosophers, with the notable exception of the Sophists and Diogenes, combine ethics and politics by seeing both as teleological and aimed at the good, the first individually and the second collectively, though Aristotle connects them less rigidly than Plato does, while most modern philosophers do not, and separate political philosophy from ethics much more (cf. vol 3, pp. 191–192)?
27. Why do you think most premodern philosophers, like Plato, see the state as natural while most modern philosophers see it as an artificial, man-made "social contract" (cf. vol. 3, p. 193a)?
28. Evaluate Plato's critique of democracy. Do you think there is anything important in it that is valid? If so, how can we learn from that without abandoning democracy?
1. Plato entitled his masterpiece the *Republic*, from *res publica*, "public things." What is common to republics and democracies and how are they different? Is their conception of "the common good" the same, different, or partly the same and partly different? Explain.

ON ARISTOTLE

1. (a) In terms of the contrast in the first paragraph (p. 127) between Platonic concentration ("come to a point") and Aristotelian wideness ("well-rounded"), which are you most attracted to by temperament? (b) If you had to choose rationally rather than temperamentally only one, which would you choose? (c) Obviously we need both, but which do you think more naturally or easily leads to the other and why?
2. Aristotle, as a pioneer in most of the particular sciences, made some wrong guesses about matters that are today settled rightly by modern science, not philosophy, mainly because he did not know the scientific method and treated scientific questions by philosophical methods; but his philosophy remained close to common sense and moderation. (a) What is the relation, if any, between scientific and philosophical wisdom and maturity? (b) It was

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common in Aristotle's time to use philosophical methods to answer scientific questions; is it equally erroneous to treat philosophical questions with scientific methods? (c) Are there examples of that in modern thought? (d) Is there a common source of both errors?

3. Evaluate Aristotle's ranking of theoretical knowledge higher than practical or productive knowledge (p. 130). (This is the essential idea behind the traditional, classical notion of "liberal education.")
4. Are there alternatives to Aristotle's basic logical principles (p. 131)? If so, what are they? If not, why not?
5. (a) Are there arguable and controversial assumptions behind Aristotle's commonsensical classification of questions and answers into four "causes" (or four "becauses") (p. 132)? (b) How useful is this scheme for writing term papers? (c) Aristotle used it to classify his predecessors by how many of the four "causes" they addressed. Where else can you use it? (d) Where is it not useful?
6. (a) Why is the final cause the most important? (b) Why is it the most questionable and controversial in modern thought?
7. Why does modern science not deal with formal causes or final causes?
8. What reasons are there for believing that potentiality is a kind of reality even though it is not actual? Give examples.
9. (a) Compare what Plato meant by "Form," what Aristotle meant by "form," and what most modern people usually mean by it. (See vol. 4, p. 12.) (b) Is Aristotle closer to Plato or to modernity?
10. (a) Can you think of any other way to explain what Aristotle called "substantial change" (essential change) without the strange and almost unthinkable idea of "prime matter" (pure potentiality)? (b) If prime matter has no form, how can it be known or defined? (c) Compare it with modern science's idea of "energy."
11. (a) Explain how the difference between what Aristotle means by the "substantial," or essential, and the "accidental" is itself a substantial difference rather than an accidental one. (b) Why is this one of the most important, practical, and necessary distinctions? Give some examples of the consequences of denying or ignoring this distinction? (c) Apply it to sex and gender. (d) Why is it one of the points in Aristotle that is least understood or accepted by most people today?
12. What is the relation between the two meanings of "substantial," viz. (I) "essential" and (II) a thing, being, or entity that has properties and attributes and relations but which exists in itself rather than in another being, as properties, attributes, and relations do; a noun rather than an adjective, verb, adverb, preposition, or conjunction.)
13. How would you improve on Aristotle's list of ten essential "categories"?

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14. (a) Do you think that some categories are objective and natural and discovered or that all are only subjective and conventional and invented? (b) Why? (c) Why is this question important? (N.b. "important" means "making a great difference.") (d) Give some specific examples.
15. Do you think metaphysics (in Aristotle's sense) is possible? Necessary? Why or why not?
16. Evaluate Aristotle's argument for a first, unmoved mover (pp. 139–140).
17. Compare and contrast this notion with the notion of a monotheistic God, as in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
18. (a) What alternative concepts of human nature are there besides Aristotle's "hylomorphism" or "psychosomatic unity"? (b) Evaluate them.
19. Can one believe both that the soul is the form of the body (Aristotle's hylomorphism) and that the soul is immortal (as Plato did but Aristotle apparently did not)? Why or why not?
20. What are the alternatives in epistemology to Aristotle's "soft empiricism"? Evaluate them.
21. Give some examples of how Aristotle's descriptive epistemology (diagram on p. 143) works.
22. (a) Are there other definitions of "truth" than Aristotle's? (p. 144) (b) If not, why not? If so, which? (c) Evaluate them.
23. Which of the following terms do you see as the most basic for ethics? Why? The terms are: good, right, duty, law, value.
24. Do you think "the end justifies the means" or not? Why?
25. What difference does it make if you define happiness, as Aristotle does, as not merely a subjective feeling (p. 146)?
26. Is there any part of Aristotle's ethics that you do not find commonsensical?
27. Evaluate Aristotle's idea that each virtue is a "golden mean" between two opposite extremes. Do you find any virtue that does not fit this pattern? Can moderation itself be excessive?
28. Evaluate the contrast between Aristotelian and Christian ethics on p. 149. Might the contrast be less stark and mutually contradictory that it seems to be? Why or why not?
29. Do you see politics as natural or artificial? Why? (p. 149)
30. If Aristotle is so non-threateningly commonsensical, why is he ignored (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant) or despised (Hobbes, Marx, Dewey) by most modern philosophers?

ON PYRRHO

1. (a) Is skepticism simply a theoretical issue in epistemology or does it have life-changing consequences? (b) If so, what are they? If not, how can one be a theoretical skeptic but not a practical or practicing skeptic without being inconsistent and even dishonest?

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2. (a) Since we do not see things as their Creator sees them, is not the premise of the argument on p. 152 true? (b) And does not skepticism logically follow from that premise? (c) Why or why not?
3. Distinguish Pyrrho's skepticism from that of Socrates, who doubted and questioned and often refuted the often-commonsensical opinions of everyone he argued with.
4. The text offers two arguments against skepticism: (a) that all forms of it are self-contradictory (p. 154) and (b) that it leads to a "low, pale, and boring" life. Which do you find more persuasive and why?
5. How would an intelligent skeptic answer these two arguments?

ON DIOGENES

1. Why is Diogenes, to many people, unenviable and repulsive, and to others, including Alexander the Great, enviable and attractive?
2. Do you find Diogenes arrogant and "elitist" or humble and earthy (doggy)? Could he be both?
3. As summarized in the two points on p. 157, is Diogenes' Cynicism not the philosophy of the great saints? If not, why not? Is there an ambiguous term here?
4. What is wrong or inappropriate about the imagined portrait of Diogenes at the beginning of the chapter? (The portraits are, of course, all guesses; there were no photographers around.)

ON EPICURUS

1. Hedonism makes two claims: first, that pleasure is in fact everyone's end and goal in all that they do, and second, that that is how it should be. (a) Does the fact that we often deliberately choose something painful (like persisting at an unpleasant task) refute the first of these two claims? Why or why not? (b) What is the logical relationship between these two claims? Does the second follow from the first?
2. If the first claim is true, can duty, loyalty, courage, and honesty be interpreted hedonistically, as giving pleasure, even though they often demand embracing pain *instead of* pleasure?
3. If the first of these claims is true, is there any alternative to the second one?
4. If the first of these two claims is true, what could motivate a hedonist to sacrifice his or her own personal pleasure for the greater pleasure of others?
5. Why is hedonism attractive and popular to many?
6. Why is it unattractive and unpopular to many others?
7. Must hedonism include materialism, as it did for Epicurus and also Freud? Can one be a spiritual hedonist?

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8. Does hedonism necessitate atheism? Why or why not?
9. How would a hedonist answer the objection that the happiest people seem to be those who pursue higher goals and that those who seek pleasure only are typically unhappy, like hypochondriacs who worry themselves sick about health?
10. Is there a purely logical rather than psychological argument against making pleasure the greatest good?
11. Is "pleasure" an ambiguous term? If so, how, and what difference does that make?

ON EPICTETUS

1. Why do you think Stoicism was the single most popular philosophy in the ancient world?
2. List a number of ways in which Epicureanism and Stoicism are opposites. Are there any ways in which they agree?
3. Why do you think most happy people are neither Epicureans nor Stoics?
4. Here is a very useful exercise in response to any philosophy, but especially one like Stoicism, which to most people is in some ways very appealing and in other ways not. Make a list of all the good, true, and beautiful things you see in Stoicism and another list of all the problems or dangers you see in it. Then ask yourself which of the good features naturally tends to lead to which of the bad features and draw lines between them. (Some of the lines will be clear, but some of the bad features may originate elsewhere.) Then think of a way to block that "leading." A first step in that thinking should be to ask *why* the good feature tends to lead to the bad one.
5. Why have there been almost no women who were Stoics? More broadly, why have there been so few women among the great philosophers?
6. (a) Do you see any problem in dividing life into what is and is not under your control? (b) Are we ever responsible for things that are not under our control? (c) If so, how can we be held accountable for what is impossible for us to change? If not, why do we feel guilty for the sins of our ancestors? (d) Are we ever not responsible for things that are under our control?
7. (a) Does Stoicism necessarily presuppose free will, or free choice? (b) Why or why not?
8. (a) Distinguish Stoicism as a psychological habit, tendency, or response to pain (the "stiff upper lip," the control of emotions) from Stoicism as a philosophical foundation for this habit or attitude. (b) Can you have either one without the other? Why or why not?
9. It seems strange that the thing Stoicism is most famous for is its advice to control our emotions, for emotions seem to be the things in us that are the *least* controllable. When we see someone whom we emotionally find very attractive, we can control our actions but not our spontaneous first-response emotion of attraction; and when we find someone very unattractive, we cannot control our first response of repulsion. (Or can we?) How would Stoics respond to that problem?

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10. Might the Stoics' focus on the need to control the emotions give too much, rather than too little, credit to them? Describe an Aristotelian "golden mean" alternative to those two extremes. Give concrete examples.
11. Stoics note the moral danger of emotions and their power; what about the profit and usefulness of them?
12. (a) If we are responsible only for what our reason and will can control, why do we find persons who are lacking in certain emotions like spontaneous affection, gratitude, or sympathy morally defective? (b) Is a mother who loves her children only out of rational and moral duty superior to one who loves them out of spontaneous natural affection? (c) Would Stoics say she is? (d) If Stoics would answer yes to that question, and if they are wrong, how can we hold people responsible for either the presence or absence of emotions, if emotions are not free choices?
13. Whether we agree or disagree with Stoicism, why do we tend to focus on the application of Stoic principles to sexual emotions more than to other emotions?
14. (a) Is the usual Stoic theoretical philosophy (metaphysics and cosmology) a necessary background for the Stoic practical philosophy (ethics and psychology)? (b) Why or why not?
15. Do you think the three Stoic virtues (p. 165) are sufficient? Why or why not?
16. Evaluate the Stoic argument against Epicureanism (p. 166).
17. Evaluate the Stoic answer to "the problem of evil" (Why do bad things happen to good people in a universe ruled by God, logos, or justice?) (p. 167).
18. Why is Epicureanism much more popular among the young than the old, and why is Stoicism much more popular among the old than among the young?
19. Which of the twelve critiques of Stoicism (pp. 168–170) do you think is the strongest? Why? Which do you think is the weakest and easiest to answer? How?
20. In terms of the two oversimplified yet useful stereotypes (dogs vs. cats, slobs vs. snobs), which of the two philosophies do you see as the farthest from a Christian morality? Why do you think others would give the opposite answer?

ON SENECA AND MARCUS AURELIUS

1. How can personalities so opposite as these two both embrace the same Stoic philosophy?
2. What do you think motivated the author to include in this book a man like Seneca who is neither a moral nor an intellectual paradigm?
3. Plato, in the *Republic*, said that "until kings become philosophers or philosophers become kings, the human race will have no relief from its ills." Why do you think Marcus Aurelius was the only successful philosopher-king in history?
4. If you had to choose between being good or being happy, which would you choose and why (cf. p. 175)?

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ON CICERO

1. Why do good men like Cicero typically elicit great hate (cf. p. 176)?
2. What do you think Cicero, if alive today, would say about America's founding principles and about its present ills?

ON PLOTINUS

1. What do you see as the primary agreement between Plotinus and Christianity? What do you see as the primary disagreement?
2. If Plotinus' absolute, "the One," transcends being, or existence, why does that not make Plotinus an atheist?
3. "The One," "the Intelligence," and "the World-Soul" are not, for Plotinus, beings, entities, or substances. Nor are they mere concepts or ideas or categories in our minds. Nor, according to Plotinus, are they abstractions mistaken for realities. What are they, then? (This may be the most nearly unanswerable question in this book.)
4. Plotinus claims to be a faithful disciple of Plato. Evaluate this claim.
5. Evaluate Plotinus' description of our experience of beauty (a) from your own experience and (b) from another point of view. (c) How is another point of view possible if it is not in our experience?.

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VOLUME 2: MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHERS

1. Evaluate the text's two (logical rather than religious) defenses of medieval philosophy's religious dimension at pp. xxxii–xxxiii. Is there a questionable inference or assumption in either of these two arguments?
2. (a) There are two kinds of beliefs that function, in different ways, as assumptions, presuppositions, or preconditions behind a thinker's philosophy. One is a set of propositions (such as the claims of a religious creed) and the other is a cosmic worldview or "big picture," especially one of the three distinguished on p. xxxiii. If the reader approaches a philosopher without sharing with him either or both of these two kinds of assumptions, is that necessarily an obstacle to understanding and fairly evaluating the philosophy? (b) Why or why not? (c) If so, can each of these two obstacles be overcome? If so, how? If not, what profit can this "alien" philosophy bring to you?
3. Why is it easer to overcome the above obstacles when trying to understand an unfamiliar and alien philosophy that you do not accept (e.g. Hinduism, Buddhism, Parmenides, or Plotinus) than when trying to understand one that is familiar and partly understood and accepted (e.g., Christianity, atheism, pacifism, or modern science)?
4. (a) Concerning the relation between theology and philosophy, or faith and reason, if "option three" on p. xxxiv (which is that of the mainline medieval philosophers, especially Aquinas) transforms philosophy by synthesizing or marrying it to Christian theology, is that a "polluting" of philosophy? (b) If not, why not? If so, why isn't the attempt by many modern philosophers to learn from and imitate modern science and its method a polluting of philosophy? (c) When two people marry, they hope to complete rather than pollute each other. What "marriages" do pollute philosophy and which do not? (d) Why? (e) Which of philosophy's potential "marriage" partners can learn some things from philosophy as well as teach it some things? What can they learn from philosophy to be more fulfilled and successful as science, psychology, religion, art, music, politics, math, war, etc.?
5. If, as Christian philosophers claimed, Christ as the "Logos" fulfilled the pagan philosophers' quest for wisdom as well as the Jewish prophets' quest for the Messiah (p. xxxiv), does that suggest that he also fulfilled the quest of the pagan poets, storytellers, and mythmakers? (The three most popular Christian writers of the twentieth century, C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien, and G.K. Chesterton, all thought so and had a high appreciation and use

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of pagan religious mythology in their stories.) But didn't Christianity oppose and eliminate paganism?

6. What do you see as the significance of the comparison between the contrast between Augustine and Aquinas and the contrast between Plato and Aristotle (p. xxxv)?

ON ST. JOHN THE EVANGELIST

1. Does what St. John means or assumes by "logos" include all three levels or areas mentioned in the chapter on Gorgias? If so, why is "word" the best translation of it rather than "essence" or "concept"? (Hint: Why do Christians call Christ "the *Word* of God"?)
2. How does what St. John means by the "logos" contrast to fideism ("faith alone" or "faith vs. reason"), to rationalism, and to irrationalism?
3. Is there an intelligible philosophical meaning to the Christian identification of the "logos," which seems to be abstract, changeless, immaterial, and transcendent, with the "flesh" (i.e., the concrete, historical, embodied, and immanent human person of Jesus)? It seems to be a confusion of mutually exclusive categories; yet it is the fundamental tenet of the world's largest religion and the one embraced by the most philosophers. How can this be?

ON JUSTIN MARTYR

1. On the three stages of his conversion (p. 6): How can a set of beliefs (Christianity) arrived at not by philosophical reason but by faith (stage 2) appear more rational (in stage 3) than any of the philosophies of the best and most rational secular philosophers whom Justin investigated and rejected (in stage 1, pp. 5–6)?
2. What did Justin mean by calling Socrates a Christian (p. 6)? If Christ is the Logos and the Logos is known by all, does that mean that Christ is known by all (cf. John 1:9)?

ON AUGUSTINE

1. What are the fundamental arguments for and against Augustine's ultimate spiritual dualism (last line on p. 7)?
2. What are the fundamental arguments for love being the determining factor in this either/or?
3. Why didn't this spiritual either/or that is inherent in Christianity contradict the both/and synthesis of faith and reason, Christianity and philosophy, that is inherent in the enterprise of medieval Christian philosophy? If it did, what accounts for the marriage of contradictory enterprises, the warrior and the pacifist?
4. How are the following four dualisms equivalent and how are they different? (a) Christianity and philosophy, (b) faith and reason, (c) heart and head, (d) Christ and Socrates (p. 8)

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5. What are the fundamental arguments for and against the claim on p. 8 about the relevance of medieval philosophy to the present crisis in Western civilization, especially the first sentence?
6. Which of the three crises on p. 8 seems the most fundamental to you and why?
7. How are Augustine's two greatest books different? How are they similar, especially in their fundamental problems or issues?
8. How does Augustine's most famous sentence (p. 9) claim to be the whole answer to the question of meaning of life? Evaluate this and give reasons.
9. Pages 10 and 11 list four possible places in reality to look for the *summum bonum*, "greatest good," or end and purpose and meaning to human life. Are there any others? Why or why not?
10. Do you think Augustine has too pessimistic an attitude toward finding the *summum bonum* in any of the other three places? Why or why not?
11. How does Augustine mean by "faith" something different from what most people today mean?
12. What is the distinction between "person" and "nature" (p. 10) (a) in us, (b) in God, and (c) in themselves as concepts?
13. Of the three crises that provoked Augustine's three masterpieces (p. 10), do you agree about which is the most important one? Why or why not?
14. Evaluate Augustine's argument against skepticism.
15. How is Augustine's doctrine of "divine illumination" Platonic and how is it not Platonic?
16. Evaluate Augustine's epistemological argument for God's existence (p. 13).
17. Evaluate Augustine's epistemology of sensation (p. 14).
18. (a) Which kind of argument for God's existence do you find more persuasive, the more typically Augustinian arguments from inner experience (mental and moral) or the more typically Thomistic arguments from outer experience of the cosmos? (b) Why? (c) Why might someone else reasonably prefer the other kind?
19. (a) How is Augustine's philosophical anthropology Platonic and how is it not Platonic? (b) Which of those two dimensions, the Platonic and the non-Platonic, seems more prominent to you and why? (c) Is there anything in Plato that is necessarily contradictory to Christianity, as there is in Plotinus? (d) If so, how could Augustine be a Christian Platonist? If not, why is Aquinas' Aristotelian anthropology more in the Christian main line than Augustine's Platonic anthropology? Or is it?
20. How, in Augustine, can God be both immanent (omnipresent) and transcendent? Can you think of any examples of simultaneous immanence and transcendence among finite creatures that are meaningful analogies or similarities to this paradox?

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21. Do you think Augustine's or Anselm's definition of God (p. 15) is the best one? Why or why not?
22. Why doesn't Augustine's (and Aquinas') teaching that God is Being itself reduce God to an abstraction? (This is not an easy question, but it is an important one!)
23. Distinguish "eternity" from "immortality."
24. How, in Augustine, can the past and the future be included in the present if the present is alive and the past is dead and the future is not yet real? (Another not-easy question!)
25. Explain and evaluate Augustine's contention that without consciousness there can be no time (p. 15).
26. (a) What are some of the specific *consequences* of seeing things as signs, as Augustine does (p. 16)? (b) What are the specific consequences of not doing so? (c) Can science do this? (d) Why or why not?
27. (a) Does Augustine's locating of the Platonic Ideas in the Mind of God (p. 16) resolve the dilemma of whether they are the Creator or creatures? (The dilemma is that they cannot be the Creator because they are finite and many, while he is infinite and one; but they cannot be creatures because creatures are created and temporal, while the Ideas are uncreated and eternal.) (b) Compare four other solutions to this dilemma: Erigena's (pp. 36–37), Aquinas' (p. 91), Scotus' (p. 106), and Ockham's (p. 116). Which seems best to you and why? (c) Which two of them are compatible? (This is a highly abstract and advanced question.)
28. Are there any other possible answers to the question of why God created the universe than Augustine's (p. 17)?
29. (a) What is the difference between conceiving and imagining? (b) Is God creating being out of nothing imaginable? (c) Is it conceivable? (d) If the answer to (b) is no and the answer to (c) is yes, is there anything else that is conceivable but not imaginable (p. 17)? What about the difference between a 103-sided polygon and a 104-sided polygon?
30. Compare and contrast the theory of evolution with Augustine's notion of God creating "seeds" that develop and mature without divine intervention. (p. 17 point 6) Would Augustine see the evolution of species as well as individual entities as problematic? Why or why not?
31. (a) Why is the question of the *summum bonum* the first and most important question in ethics for Augustine (and also for Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas)? (b) Why is it ignored by most modern ethical philosophers who never raise that question (p. 18)?
32. Is Augustine an absolutist or a relativist? Define both. Can one be both (p. 18)?
33. Explain and evaluate the notion of cosmic love as spiritual gravity (*Amor meus, pondus meum*) (p. 18). Is this a mere poetic metaphor or something more?
34. Explain and evaluate Augustine's notion of the two freedoms (p. 19).

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35. Explain and evaluate Augustine's notion of a "natural" moral law (p. 19). (What is meant by "nature" here?)
36. Explain and evaluate Augustine's notion of conscience as a knowing rather than a feeling (p. 19).
37. Explain and evaluate Augustine's notion of all sin as "disordered love." Apply this to sexual sins.
38. (a) What is your answer to the question Augustine imagines God asking him on p. 20? (b) Why would that be your answer?
39. How are the two "cities" in *The City of God* different from the Church and the State?
40. (a) What does Augustine mean by a "city"? How is a "city" identified and defined? (b) Apply this definition to America, to New York City, to medieval civilization, to modern civilization, to the family, and to God himself. Which of them are "cities"? Why or why not?
41. Is it an exaggeration to say that the reason for the creation of the universe was the City of God? Why or why not?
42. Which three of the twenty-five quotations from the *Confessions* intrigued you the most and made you think differently? How?
43. Why is it not a contradiction to say, as Augustine does, that he "burns" for God's "peace"? (the last sentence)
44. Why do most Protestants love Augustine more than Aquinas?

ON BOETHIUS

1. How do you think Boethius would have tried to reconcile Plato and Aristotle? What is the main obstacle or problem?
2. Why is the abstract logical question of the metaphysical status of universals a crucial practical or "existential" question? What difference(s) does it make?
3. Why do you think Boethius used natural reason alone and not religious faith in his *Consolation* to address the problem of evil when he was in prison facing death?
4. Why do you think this very unoriginal book, the first four-fifths of which merely synthesizes many previous sources (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics) was so famous and so popular for so long? Why is it still popular today? Why do modern students find it surprising, if it is so unoriginal?
5. Explain in your own words how God's eternity, for Boethius, solves the problem of the apparent contradiction between infallible divine foreknowledge and human free choice (p. 31)?
6. Evaluate Boethius' argument for free will (p. 31).
7. Which of the twenty-nine quotations moved you and your thought the most?
8. Why do you think Boethius said there is no such thing as chance? (p. 31)

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9. What does Boethius mean by "happy" (p. 31)?

ON PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

1. If you could read only either a rationalist or a mystic like Dionysius, which would you choose? Why?
2. "Mysticism," to most people, suggests something negative: "not rational" or "not clear." What is positive about it?
3. What are the likenesses and differences between Dionysius (p. 33) and Aquinas (pp. 90–91) on how we can know God and name God?
4. What is the relation between knowing and naming? Can we know without naming? Can we name without knowing? Do names give us knowledge? Does knowledge give us names? Can names be true or false, or are they only conventional?
5. Why was Dionysius' notion of a natural cosmic hierarchy (p. 34) taken for granted by all premodern philosophers except skeptics like the Sophists and materialists like the Epicureans, but ignored, rejected, or even feared by nearly all modern thinkers?
6. (a) Why does Dionysius equate "being" with "truth" or "light" (a symbol or analogy for knowledge or understanding) rather than existence? Isn't "knowledge" necessarily the knowledge *of being* and relative to being? (b) What if he says that intelligibility or intelligence or truth or wisdom or understanding is simply what he *means* by "being"? Is it then just a different choice of words, or is there a real difference between identifying being with truth and identifying being with existence, as Aquinas did (pp. 91–92)?
7. Which is primary for Dionysius, love or truth (intelligence, intelligibility, light, knowledge, understanding, wisdom)? Why?

ON ERIGENA

1. (a) Why did Erigena, like Plotinus, think "the One" was the absolute and "being" was subordinate to it? (b) Did this idea logically follow from, or arise from, the idea that "being" was "intelligibility"? (c) As with Dionysius, is this simply a question of how he chooses to define his terms, or does it make a real difference? Explain.
2. (a) How does Erigena's Neoplatonic metaphysics look from the perspective of Aquinas' distinction between essence and existence as the two meanings of "being," and his notion of the primacy of existence over essence as the primacy of act (the act of existing) over potency or potentiality is (essences are only possible or potential beings)? (b) How does Aquinas' metaphysics look from the perspective of Erigena's? (c) Aquinas makes essence relative to existence, while Erigena makes existence (being) relative to essence (intelligibility, truth, knowledge, understanding). Why this difference? Is it just a matter of

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defining terms? (d) Does the distinction among the three meanings of "logos" in Gorgias help to sort out this very abstract and difficult problem?

3. Common sense would seem to dictate that both oneness and intelligibility are relative to being rather than vice versa: oneness because it seems to be a property of being (each being is one being; even a group is one group), and intelligibility because it is always some *being* that is intelligible, so intelligibility, like oneness, seems also to be a property of being rather than vice versa. Why does Erigena reverse what seems to be the common-sense position?
4. What was Plato's absolute? Was it being, intelligibility, oneness, or something else? How would Plato deal with the difference between Dionysius or Erigena and Aquinas?
5. (a) Why does p. 36 call this very abstract difference in metaphysics the fundamental difference between East and West? Isn't that an absurd exaggeration? (b) How can such very abstract metaphysics be that important? (c) Might the difference be merely one of emphasis rather than an either/or? Why or why not?
6. How does Erigena's Neoplatonism redefine God's creation of the universe?
7. What are some of the theologically problematic or heretical logical consequences or corollaries of Erigena's definition of being in terms of intelligibility (p. 36; cf. p. 39)? How is Augustine (who is also a Platonist, but who does not identify being with oneness or intelligibility) more faithful to Scripture and the Creeds because he avoids the Neoplatonic metaphysics of Plotinus, Dionysius, and Erigena?
8. Evaluate Erigena's allegory of Peter and John at Jesus' empty tomb.
9. What does Erigena mean by his verb when he says that the One "descends" into the many? Is this a real act, like creating the universe, or just a timeless logical relationship among concepts?
10. (a) How does Erigena explain the paradox of God's simultaneous immanence and transcendence (p. 38)? (b) Compare Aquinas' explanation on p. 92: Which is the best one? (c) Why? (d) Are there other explanations? If so, what?

ON ST. ANSELM

1. (a) When Anselm puts faith first and understanding second (*fides quaerens intellectum*, "faith seeking understanding"), is he applying this to religion, revealed theology, natural theology, or philosophy? (b) Define those four different enterprises. (c) By "faith," does Anselm mean faith in reason, faith in God, faith in the truth of the Catholic religion, or faith as such? (c) If he means faith as such, how can faith be reasonable if faith is simply and in itself prior to reason?
2. What do you see as the primary strength or usefulness of Anselm's famous "ontological argument"? What do you see as its primary weakness?

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3. If it is logically valid, why are the vast majority of people who first hear it not convinced by it? If it is invalid, why does it seem to be valid and irrefutable to many philosophers?
4. Can you summarize it in a single sentence without unfairly oversimplifying it?
5. Why is point IV on page 44 called "the existential point of the (ontological) *argument*" and not merely the point of its *conclusion* (that God exists)? This point is not proved by the "ontological argument," is it? In fact it's not an argument at all, is it?

ON ABELARD

1. (a) Evaluate the connection drawn on p. 48 between the events in Abelard's rather striking concrete personal life and the distinctive points of his philosophy. Is it unfair? (b) Can we judge a philosophy by the philosopher's life? (c) Why or why not? (d) Can we do the reverse? (e) Why or why not?
2. Concerning the metaphysical status of universals, (a) what are the weaknesses of both the extreme realism of William of Champeaux and the extreme nominalism of Roscelin? (b) Of Abelard's "moderate nominalism"? (c) Of Aristotle's "moderate realism"? (d) Is there a fifth possible position? Why or why not?
3. Do you sense or intuit what would lead a philosopher to instinctively prefer realism or nominalism? What else seems common to all metaphysical realists besides realism and what else seems common to all nominalists besides nominalism?
4. (a) Do you think that Abelard's voluntarist or motivationist ethics logically follows from his nominalist metaphysics? (b) Can you imagine an Abelardian ethics and a non-Abelardian metaphysics that are logically consistent with each other? (c) What about an Abelardian metaphysics and a non-Abelardian ethics that are consistent with each other?
5. (a) In T.S. Eliot's famous play *Murder in the Cathedral*, St. Thomas Becket, threatened with martyrdom, faces three temptations. The first two are to avoid martyrdom, the third is to seek it out for the motive of pride and glory. He muses that "the last temptation is the greatest treason: / To do the right thing for the wrong reason." Would Abelard agree? (b) Would you? (c) Why? (d) Is it possible to prioritize subjective motive but also to accept objective moral absolutes?

ON MUSLIM AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHERS

Why are only Christian, Muslim, and Jewish philosophers mentioned for the thousand years of the Middle Ages? According to polls, 75 percent of philosophy professors in America, which is one of the most religious countries in the West, self-identify as atheists. There were atheists among pagan Greek philosophers, and most Chinese citizens are atheists, as is required for Communists. Why does the textbook discriminate against atheists?

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ON AL-KINDI

1. The three points of Al-Kindi on p. 52 on the relationship between faith and reason is also the position of Aquinas: (a) that the Scriptures, being divinely revealed, are superior to all that comes from human reason alone; (b) that everything that comes from human reason alone, including Greek philosophy, is fallible and thus a mixture of wisdom and error; and (c) that Greek philosophy in general was useful and compatible with religious faith. Why is this position so difficult to attain and so rare among religious philosophers?
2. Why do you think the above position is more difficult and rare in medieval Muslim philosophy than in Jewish and Christian philosophy?
3. (a) Which of the three points in question 1 was the most controversial in the Middle Ages? (b) Why do you think that was so? (c) Which is the most controversial today among religious believers? (d) Why do you think that is so?
4. (a) Why do you think most Muslim philosophers, beginning with Al-Kindi, interpret Aristotle's "agent intellect" as a single collective super-human mind (usually thought of as literally the mind of an angel) rather than a power of each individual mind (p. 52)? (b) Why does this sound more strange to us today than it did to them? (c) What are the practical consequences of this belief? The answer to that question in general is on p. 51; give some specific examples.

ON AL-ASH'ARI

1. If Averroes and Avicenna are greater philosophers than Al-Ash'ari, why was Al-Ash'ari the most history-changing and difference-making of all Muslim philosophers?
2. Show how the four main tenets of Al-Ash'ari on p. 54 are logically connected with each other.
3. (a) What do you think makes each of these tenets attractive? (b) What do you think makes each of them unattractive? (c) What do you think will determine whether it is the personal attachment to the attractive feature(s) or the personal attachment to the unattractive feature(s) that will be the most powerful motive (a) in anyone, (b) in a Muslim, and (c) in a philosopher?

ON AL-FARABI

1. (a) Why is the distinction between essence and existence so important? (b) If it is so important, why did it take so long to come to the surface? (c) Why was the logical source of it in Aristotle rather than Plato or Plotinus (p. 56)?
2. (a) Why do you think most Muslim philosophers, unlike most ordinary Muslim believers, ranked Aristotle as philosophically superior to the Quran and reinterpreted the Quran nonliterally whenever a conflict was found rather than arguing with and correcting Aris-

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totle in light of the Quran? (b) Why do you think this attitude was not as popular among medieval Christian philosophers as it was among Muslim philosophers? (c) Why do you think it is more popular among modern Christian philosophers than it was among medieval Christian philosophers?

3. (a) What were the main obstacles to Al-Farabi's plan to synthesize Plato and Aristotle? (b) Why is this goal so desirable despite its obstacles? (c) Do you think it is easier to synthesize Aristotle with Plato or with Plotinus? (d) Why?

ON AVICENNA

1. Do you think there is a natural relationship between one's philosophy and (a) one's intake of opium and (b) one's sex life (p. 57)? Why or why not?
2. (a) Concerning p. 57, is interpreting a passage in your Scriptures symbolically rather than literally because it contradicts Aristotle good literary criticism for a believer (Muslim, Christian, or Jew) or not? (b) Why or why not? (c) Suppose we substitute "Darwin" or "Galileo" for "Aristotle"; would that change your answer? (d) Why or why not?
3. (a) Why is Avicenna's strong distinction between the esoteric (hidden, rare, higher) and the exoteric (plain, ordinary, common) meaning of interpretation of Scriptures more typically the central position in Hinduism and Buddhism than in Judaism or Christianity? (pp. 57–58) (b) Which is it among most believers in Islam? (c) Why is the line of difference where it is? Is there a religious difference that accounts for this philosophical difference?
4. (a) Which of the nine heresies of Avicenna came from Plotinus? (b) Which came from Aristotle? (c) Which, if any, came from both? (d) Which, if any, came from neither? (e) If from neither, from where, then?
5. Which of the nine do you think the most serious and important? Why?

ON AL-GHAZALI

1. Why are there more quotes from Augustine, Boethius, and Al-Ghazali than from any other medieval philosophers?
2. Compare Al-Ghazali's spiritual journey with Augustine's in the *Confessions,* both the similarities and the differences.
3. How do you think Al-Ghazali would summarize the relationship between faith and reason?
4. (a) Al-Ghazali contrasts his Sufism with not just some but all philosophers, as superior. Evaluate this ranking. (b) Do you see a *contradiction* between mystical sanctity and philosophy? If not, why do Al-Ghazali and many others see one? If so, how do you account for philosophers like Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Bonaventure who were both philosophers and mystics?

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ON AVERROES

1. (a) Evaluate Averroes' threefold classification of thinkers (pp. 64–65). (b) Why does he want to eliminate only the middle class, the "theologians"? (c) Would Al-Ash'ari agree? (d) Which Christian philosophers would fit into this middle class?
2. (a) Galileo supposedly said to the churchmen who labelled his science heresy, "You can tell me how to go to Heaven but I will tell you how the heavens go." Can Averroes' separation of the three classes of thinkers and their authoritative books (p. 65) resolve the disputes between the scientists and the churchmen? (b) Why or why not? (c) Can it solve the problem of the relation between faith and reason? (d) Why or why not?
3. (a) Do you see anything common to all five of the main disputed issues on which Greek philosophy (which for the Muslims was a synthesis of Aristotle and Plotinus) contradicted both the Bible and the Quran (p. 65)? (b) Which of the five seems to you the most important one? (c) Why?
4. What is the logical connection between the doctrine of creation and the distinction between essence and existence (p. 66)?

ON MAIMONIDES

1. What is the main reason Aquinas saw Maimonides mainly as an ally but Avicenna and especially Averroes as his enemies?
2. How is the main overall point of Maimonides' *Guide for the Perplexed* the same as that of Aquinas' work, especially in his two *Summa*s?
3. What is the connection between the "double truth" theory and "demythologization" (p. 68)?
4. Would Maimonides agree with Aquinas (pp. 85–86) about the different kinds of truths?
5. Why do you think Muslim philosophers did not use the strategy Maimonides used in the last two paragraphs of p. 68? (What is that strategy? It is implied and shown, not stated and defined.)
6. (a) On which of the twelve specific issues mentioned on p. 69 do you think Maimonides' position is the weakest? (c) Why?
7. (a) Which of the twelve issues do you see as the most important? (b) Why?
8. Siger of Brabant's "double truth" theory (p. 74) sounds absurd, since truth, by definition, cannot contradict truth, only falsehood. (a) If it is absurd, what could be a strong enough personal motive to lead philosophers like Averroes and Siger to hold it? (b) And if it is not absurd, what could at least apparently justify it? If the answer to that is Averroes' "demythologization" (p. 74; cf. question 3 above), what could justify such an extrinsic and nonliterary answer to the question position of whether a given text in Scripture is meant literally or merely symbolically? (c) Is the parallel with contemporary views in response 3

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accurate? (See C.S. Lewis' article "Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism," or, in the UK, "Fern-seed and Elephants.")

9. Why were there no Muslim philosophers who used Aquinas' strategy (p. 74) on the issue of the relationship between faith and reason, Scripture and Aristotle?

ON BONAVENTURE

1. On what theological issues is Plato easier to synthesize with Christianity than Aristotle is (p. 74)?
2. (a) For Bonaventure, does the primacy of love solve the faith/reason question? (p. 75) (b) If so, how? If not, why not?
3. (a) Would Aquinas disagree with Bonaventure's demotion of Aristotle by four steps (pp. 75–77)? (b) Why or why not? (c) Would you? (d) Why or why not?
4. (a) The difference between Bonaventure's (relatively pessimistic) and Aquinas' (relatively optimistic) confidence in reason is a matter of degree, a matter of emphasis. When does this difference become an either/or difference about a yes-or-no, true-or-false philosophical issue? (b) How can a relative difference in degree turn into a difference in kind? (c) Apply this also to the issue of nature and grace on p. 75 and p. 78.
5. (a) Is what Bonaventure called "vertibility" (p. 76) what we call "entropy"? (b) If so, doesn't that make it true, since entropy is scientifically verified? If they are not the same, what is the difference?
6. Evaluate Bonaventure's philosophical argument for the finitude of time on p. 76.
7. Our modern science, not philosophy, has settled the issue in question 5. Has it done so also on the issue in question 6?
8. Why is "exemplarism" (pp. 76–77) not merely a personal poetic habit but a life-changing, difference-making metaphysic? What specific difference does it make?
9. What is the evidence for and against the idea that we have an innate idea of God (p. 77)?
10. (a) Is Bonaventure's synthesis-by-separation of Augustine's "divine illumination" and Aristotle's "abstraction" (p. 78) rendered successful by the principle that each of these two epistemologies claim to explain the whole of human knowing, at least in its first cause or origin, rather than only one separated part of it? (b) Why or why not?
11. Compare Bonaventure's Platonic refutation of skepticism and validation of certain knowledge (p. 78) with those of Augustine, Aquinas, and Descartes.
12. If Bonaventure is right about the need for divine grace for even natural virtue, what becomes of the distinction between grace and nature? If he is not right, does that not reduce divine grace to a partial and almost superfluous "extra"?

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ON AQUINAS

1. What do you suppose accounts for the fact that Thomism has assimilated more new philosophical methods and developments (existentialism, phenomenology, personalism, analytic philosophy) than any other philosophical tradition? (p. 80)
2. Why do you think it is so difficult and rare to combine the two philosophical ideals of clarity and profundity, common sense and wisdom, argument and intuition, careful logical analysis and "big picture" synthesis (p. 81)?
3. (a) What is "the broad, premodern sense" of the word "science" in which philosophy and theology are "sciences"? (b) Is this older definition of "science" still valid and useful today? (c) Why or why not?
4. (a) Which of the eleven anecdotes from Aquinas' life (pp. 81–83) do you think is the most important and "telling" for his mind? (b) Why?
5. (a) Augustine and Aquinas are usually seen as the medieval, Christian versions of Plato and Aristotle (p. 83). Are there two such modern philosophers? (b) If so, who? If not, why not?
6. (a) What is the difference between a "closed" and an "open" philosophical system? (p. 84) (b) Does it depend on whether its epistemology is rationalist or empiricist? (c) Why or why not?
7. Can you find all five of the structural parts of a *Summa* article (p. 84) in a Socratic dialogue? If so, do so for any one Socratic dialogue. If not, which one is missing?
8. Why isn't the fourth of the five parts (p. 84) sufficient for many other philosophers?
9. After you (a) define theology and philosophy, answer these questions: (b) Aquinas was both a theologian and a philosopher, so one can be both. Can one be a theologian without being a philosopher? (c) Can one be a philosopher without being a theologian? (d) Why or why not?
10. On the issue of the relationship between faith and reason, not as two subjective acts of the mind but as two sets of objective truths (p. 85), what alternative answers to Aquinas' are possible? (Think of the two classes of propositions as circles.)
11. Evaluate Aquinas' two arguments that there cannot, in principle, be a contradiction between any two propositions in these two circles (p. 85).
12. (a) If Aquinas (or you) were to list objections to this thesis (question 11 above), what would they be? (His thesis is a universal negative, so the objections would be particular affirmatives, examples that disprove his general principle.) (b) How would he (or you) answer these objections?
13. (a) Which of Aquinas' five "ways" do you find the clearest and most convincing? (b) Why? (c) Which do you find the least clear or convincing? (d) Why?
14. Arguments prove their conclusion if and only if there are no ambiguously used terms, false premises (explicitly stated or implicitly assumed), or logical fallacies in them. Which

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mistake do you think an intelligent atheist would most likely point to to escape Aquinas' conclusion (a) in the weakest of his five arguments? (b) In the strongest of his five arguments? (c) In the common logical structure of all five arguments?

15. Use Aristotle's "four causes" to distinguish Aquinas' "five ways."
16. (a) There are two arguments for God's existence from efficient causality rather than just one in Aquinas. How does Aquinas' distinction between essence and existence, which is not in Aristotle, explain why there are two different kinds of efficient causality for Aquinas (cf. p. 92)? (b) Why isn't this simply Aristotle's distinction between substantial change and accidental change? (N.b. (a) is much easier to answer than (b).)
17. Evaluate Aquinas' reply (p. 89) to "the problem of evil" (p. 87), which is the commonest and probably strongest argument for atheism.
18. Explain and evaluate his reply (p. 89) to his second objection (p.87).
19. Why are there only two objections? Don't atheists have many more?
20. Do you see any problems with or controversial consequences of Aquinas' teaching that God is simple and transcends all distinctions (p. 90)?
21. (a) Why do some theists disagree with the last three paragraphs on p. 90? (b) Some would say that the first credits too much to reason, the second too little, and the third seems to embrace a rational self-contradiction. Which of these three critiques sounds strongest to you? (c) How might Aquinas answer it? (For the third one, cf. p. 92.)
22. How can we "apprehend" any truth, about God, or about anything else, without "comprehending" it (p. 90)? Give examples.
23. How can we know *that* God (or anything else) is without knowing *what* it is (p. 90)? (N.b this is not the same question as question 22.)
24. Aquinas' signature teaching in metaphysics is the primacy of the act of existence. This entails the conclusion that essences are only negative, limits on existence, only potentialities for actual existence (p. 92). Why would Plato find this shocking or surprising?
25. (a) Why does Aquinas' identification of God's essence as the unlimited act of existence sound like pantheism? (b) Why isn't it (p. 92)?
26. (a) Can you put into your own words the paradox of simultaneous transcendence and immanence in the first three paragraphs of p. 92? (b) What are the practical, personal, psychological and religious consequences of this abstract metaphysical point?
27. What is the *connection* between Aquinas' concept of God as the un-caused First Cause (in the first two of his five "ways") and his use of the relation between essence and existence to distinguish between God and creatures (p. 92)?
28. How, for Aquinas, does existence solve the "problem of the one and the many" (p. 93)?
29. How does p. 93 explain why, for Aquinas, matter is the principle (source) of individuation?

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30. (a) If God's act of creating the universe was "in accordance with his nature as creative, free, and generous" (p. 93), how can it also be a free choice of his will? Compare a human choice: If it flows from the human being's nature and habits (e.g., a saint is by nature generous), how can it also flow from his free choice of the will? (b) How do we know that it does? (That question is not a rhetorical question, a way of arguing that it does not, but a request for a direct answer. You will not find the answer in this book but in your own experience and thinking.)
31. Explain and evaluate Aquinas' metaphysical solution to "the problem of evil" on p. 94.
32. Evaluate Aquinas' argument for the existence of angels on p. 94.
33. (a) Are the four philosophies of human nature on p. 95 the only four possible? (b) If Aristotle's and Aquinas' is so commonsensical, why are the other three also popular among philosophers?
34. What makes the abstract question about whether man has only one soul or three a practical and important question (p. 95)?
35. Evaluate Aquinas' three argument for the immortality of the human rational soul (pp. 95–96).
36. What is the methodological principle behind Aquinas' tricky and difficult synthesis of Platonic soul-immortality and Aristotelian hylomorphic psychosomatic unity (p. 96)?
37. How, in your own words, does Aquinas synthesize Platonic and Aristotelian epistemology (p. 96)?
38. How is Aquinas' Aristotelian summary of the three acts of the mind (p. 96) the basis for the logic of the three checkpoints of any argument? What can go wrong with each of the three?
39. Why does the "correspondence theory of truth" lead to skepticism (p. 98)?
40. (a) What, exactly, is the "natural (moral) law"? (b) Why is it so controversial in Western culture today (pp. 98–99)? (c) Has there ever been another culture the majority of whose mind-molders have denied it? (d) If not, what alternative futures are possible for our culture?
41. Why would Aquinas say that "progressive" rebels and "conservative" natural law moralists are natural allies rather than enemies (p. 99)?
42. Evaluate Aquinas' argument for free will (p. 100).
43. On the relation between reason and will: (a) Why is the question important? (b) How would Aquinas say that the relation of priority between the two is like the relationship between men and women? (c) How does Aristotle's distinction between the four causes help Aquinas to answer this question of the priority of reason or will? (d) If loving God is higher than knowing God, why is knowing things higher than loving things? (e) Which, then, would Aquinas say is higher, knowing other persons or loving them? Why?
44. Aquinas habitually places everything human within the cosmic context or "big picture" of the "great chain of being," both within and without. Thus he compares man's relationship

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to God, angels, animals, plants, and minerals. But only in his ethics does he speak of interpersonal relationships, even though he holds that "person is the highest thing in nature." Why do you think there is this lacuna, which "personalist" Thomist philosophers try to fill (cf. vol. 4, ch. 99). Why do you suppose Thomas was so relatively silent on such an important dimension?

ON SCOTUS

1. Use your philosophical imagination and intuition to answer this question. Imagine a four-way conversation with Augustine, Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Scotus. What "sides" would emerge? How much agreement and how much disagreement would emerge among them, do you think? Answer this question both in terms of different *emphases* and in terms of different teachings.
2. Aquinas almost never disagreed with Augustine, who, like Scotus, emphasized reason's limitations more than Aquinas did. To what extent do you think that that difference was justified by two different dimensions of reason, viz. the "existential," personal, subjective, or psychological dimension (which Augustine focused on) and the essential, ontological objective, cosmic dimension (which Aquinas focused on). Do you think Aquinas would treat Scotus' limitations on reason in the same relatively uncritical way as he treated Augustine's, or not? Why or why not?
3. What about Scotus' voluntarism, or emphasis on will and free choice, both in God and in us? Would Aquinas disagree with that either in general or in any specific application of it?
4. List the specific issues mentioned in the chapter on which Scotus does clearly disagree with Aquinas (they are not limited to the three on p. 106 and the three more on p. 108). For each one, how do you think Aquinas would have answered Scotus' arguments?
5. (a) Do Scotus' notion of *haecceitas* and Aquinas' notion of matter as the (first) principle of individuation contradict each other or not? (b) Why or why not? (c) Why does Scotus' position seem to describe persons better than Aquinas'? (d) Why does Aquinas' position seem to describe things better than Scotus'? (e) Which seems to describe cats and dogs better?
6. Whose arguments for God's existence seem stronger to you, Aquinas' or Scotus'? Why?
7. Which of Scotus' arguments do you think Aquinas would agree with and which would he disagree with?
8. Theists agree that the universe God created and everything in it is contingent. Which explanation of this contingency seems better to you, Aquinas' essence-existence distinction or Scotus' tracing it to God's freely willed choice? (The two ideas are not logically incompatible, but which one seems more primary to you and why?)
9. Both Aquinas and Scotus believe that "God is love," charity (unselfish love, *agape*), is God's eternal, necessary, and unchangeable nature. But love is essentially an act of will,

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or free choice, not natural necessity. How would each of these two philosophers reconcile this apparent contradiction? (Hint: Ask the same question about a saint. Is his love from his free choice or from his very nature, in which love is habitual? Can it be both? If so, how?)

10. Compare Scotus' "voluntarism" with that of Al-Ash'ari.
11. How or where or to what extent, if at all, would Scotus agree with Socrates rather than Euthyphro about the relation between a thing being morally right and God willing it?
12. Scotus is extremely intelligent, like Aquinas. Why do you suppose Aquinas has always been more popular than Scotus, especially among Catholics, for over seven hundred years?
13. Why do you think Aquinas is traditionally labelled "the Angelic Doctor (teacher)" and Scotus "the Subtle Doctor"?
14. Do you agree with Scotus that God could have willed the second table of the Law (the last seven Commandments) to have been different, but not the first three? Why of why not?

ON OCKHAM

1. There was an obvious connection or relationship between the life and the teachings of Augustine, of Abelard, and perhaps of Aquinas; is this also true of Ockham? If so, how?
2. Page 114 summarizes the declining state of philosophy after Ockham. What is the cause of this decline?
3. What is there in Aquinas' philosophy that naturally led him to be a synthesizer and to find more agreements than disagreements, and what is there in the philosophy of Ockham that led him to analysis rather than synthesis and to find more disagreements than agreements? (There are probably a number of reasonable answers to this question.)
4. Luther declared, "I am an Ockhamist." What relationship do you see between this and his three most famous teachings, "*sola scriptura*" (Scripture vs. tradition), "*sola gratia*" (divine grace vs. human free will) and "*sola fide*" (faith vs. reason)? (This question follows naturally from question 3 above.)
5. The rise of skepticism in ancient Athens among the Sophists elicited the response of Socrates, who was both a genius and a pioneer. The rise of skepticism in late medieval and early modern philosophy among the Ockhamites and Nominalists elicited the response of Descartes, who was also both a genius and a pioneer. The dispute between the Rationalists and the Empiricists in early modern philosophy elicited the response of Kant, who was also a genius and a pioneer. Why do you think this pattern has not yet recurred in contemporary philosophy?
6. How many distinct premises, or lines of thinking, can you find in Ockham that led to skepticism?
7. (a) How did the very abstract and logical question of the ontological status of universals lead to such a practical, world-and-life-shattering result of skepticism? (b) And how

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did this skepticism, which is still a very abstract doctrine in that very abstract division of philosophy called epistemology, lead to such a radically concrete, practically disunified, and problematic culture as our own? (c) More specifically, how did it lead to the divorce between faith and reason in our time? (d) Was the skepticism directed to faith, to reason, or to both? (e) If to both, why did that further separate them rather than bringing them together as equally "skeptical"? (f) How, in turn did that lead to the radical decline of religion in our time? (g) What does this reveal about the relationship between theory and practice, and between the abstract and the concrete? (h) Incidentally, why is religion more concrete than philosophy?

8. (a) Is Nominalism immediately self-contradictory (p. 116) as skepticism is? (See the chapter in vol. 1 on Pyrrho.) (b) If so, why is it so popular? If not, why not?
9. Plato's dialogues begin the history of philosophy. All of them ask the same kind of question: "What is" some essential nature (e.g., learning, or justice, or courage, or love, or death). Nominalism denies the existence of essences, or universals, either as Platonic Ideas or as Aristotelian "forms." Thus, Aristotelian logic, like Plato's dialogues, begins by demanding a definition of the universal nature that we seek to know. But modern logic ("symbolic," "propositional," or "mathematical" logic), which is now preferred and used by most philosophers in the English-speaking world, does not. It is computer logic. It cannot ask or answer the Platonic question: "What is the essential nature of this thing?" (a) Is this triumph of Ockhamist nominalism the end of philosophy as originally conceived, viz."the love of wisdom"? (b) If not, why not? If so, why is it so popular? What is attractive about it?
10. (a) Are there fields or enterprises where Ockham's Razor is useful? (b) If so, what are they? Are any of them divisions of philosophy? (c) Why is it useful there? (d) Are there fields or enterprises where it is not useful? (e) If so, what are they? (f) Why is it not useful there?
11. Is the Razor self-contradictory or self-refuting, as skepticism is? Why or why not?
12. Which of the many and varied consequences of Ockham's nominalism detailed in this chapter seem to you to be the most important? Why?
13. Evaluate Ockham's proto-Humean critique of causality on p. 117. What are the logical consequences of this critique for modern science?
14. What are the consequences (a) in theology and (b) in religious experience of Ockham's voluntarist ethics?
15. Does the textbook's charge that the decline of philosophy after Ockham is the effect of his nominalism (p. 119) assume the utilitarian principle that the end, or consequences, justifies or dis-justifies the means or cause? Why or why not?

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ON ECKHART

1. How is Eckhart a natural response to Ockham? In terms of the analogy of the traditional medieval marriage between faith and reason, how is the turn from Ockham to Eckhart analogous to Romeo divorcing Juliet when she gets a fatal disease and marrying her rival?
2. (a) Why do so many mystics, like Eckhart, seem to be pantheists? (b) Is the reason mainly language? (c) Was it Aquinas' very careful and advanced system of philosophical language that allowed him to combine a clear rejection of pantheism with an affirmation of mysticism? Or are their other reasons?
3. Is Eckhart really a pantheist or not?
4. Why does Eckhart make being relative to and subordinate to intelligence, mind, or consciousness and/or to unity, or "the One," rather than making them relative to being? Is not knowledge the knowledge of some being? Why is this Neoplatonic option so popular among philosophers (Pseudo-Dionysius, Erigena, and Nicholas of Cusa in the Middle Ages, and in modern philosophy Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, and Hegel and perhaps also Shankara and Buddha) even though it is not commonsensical?
5. How would Aquinas reply to Eckhart's arguments for his Neoplatonic metaphysics (p. 121)?
6. Do you think there is a misunderstood grain of orthodox Christian truth behind Eckhart's three apparent heresies (pp. 121–122)?
7. What is the need and purpose of dogmatic creeds in religion in general? In Christianity in particular? What rightful place do they have, if any, in Christian philosophy (cf. p. 122)?

ON NICHOLAS OF CUSA

1. Nicholas worked for unity among Eastern and Western Christianity. Is he also a synthesizer in philosophy, or a divider?
2. (a) Evaluate his preference for Plotinus over Aristotle (pp. 123–124). (b) Compare Bonaventure's preference for Augustine over Aristotle. (c) Compare almost all modern philosophers' preference for almost anyone else over Aristotle. (d) Do you see any relation between such preferences and the fact that Aristotle is the philosopher of common sense?
3. Is there a contradiction between Nicholas and Aristotle (a) in their idea of philosophy as the love of wisdom, (b) in the general tendency and upshot of their philosophies regarding reason, (c) in their most general metaphysical principles, and (d) in their specific applications of and conclusions from these principles that concern God, reason, or nature? (That's twelve comparisons, four times three.)
4. In Nicholas' mind, how is his preference for Plato and Plotinus over Aristotle connected with his Socratic principle of "learned ignorance, " Socrates' "Lesson One" (vol. 1, pp. 102–103)?

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5. If infinity is a distinctively Christian idea, and not a pagan, Greek, Aristotelian one, does it follow that arguments for God's existence based on this idea should be superior to those not based on it?
6. Compare Nicholas' version of "learned ignorance" with that of Socrates and, if you know it, Erasmus' *In Praise of Folly*.
7. Compare Nicholas' cosmology with that of Aristotle and Aquinas. How is it more modern?
8. How important is the old, Thomistic physics and cosmology for the rest of his philosophy?
9. Compare Nicholas' notion of "the coincidence of opposites" with Augustine's love of paradox like grace and free will; with Chesterton's love of both paradox and common sense (ch. 100) and with Hegel's (ch. 67) and Derrida's (ch. 95) denial of the law of non-contradiction.
10. Why does Nicholas calls *mathematics* rather than theology "the science of the infinite"?
11. Evaluate his argument that finite Aristotelian logic is inadequate to deal with infinity.
12. Why isn't "the coincidence of opposites" simply self-contradictory and inconceivable?
13. Why are analogies (e.g., p. 126) so useful? Are they arguments?
14. (a) Evaluate Nicholas' Anaxagoras-like conclusion that everything is in everything else (p. 126–127). (b) Does it logically follow from the Thomistic truth of God's total immanence and total transcendence (p. 92)? (c) Does Dostoyevsky's point that "we are each responsible for all" (in *The Brothers Karamazov*) also follow from (a) or (b) or both?

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VOLUME 3: MODERN PHILOSOPHERS

1. If philosophy is like life, we should expect neither automatic progress nor no progress at all. There is obviously progress from the pre-Socratics to Aristotle, and obviously regress from Aquinas to the late medieval Scholastics. But in comparing premodern with modern philosophy, most of us have prior sympathies toward one or the other of these significantly different options. What is yours, how strong is it, and what is it based on? Do you expect it will change when you learn more about modern philosophy?
2. (a) Which sounds more reasonable to you, the modern option of beginning with epistemology and basing metaphysics on epistemology, or the premodern option of beginning with metaphysics and basing epistemology on metaphysics (p. xxxiii)? (b) Why? (c) How would you answer the argument for the other option?
3. (a) Is the book's answer to the question of what most distinguishes the typically modern from the typically medieval approach to philosophy (p. xxxiv) the best one? (b) Why or why not?
4. (a) Is the isomorphic structure of the map of the history of consciousness on p. xxxv an accident? (b) If not, what is its significance?
5. (a) Evaluate Frank Parker's answer to the above question on pp. xxxv–xxxvi. (b) If this is accurate, does it follow that understanding Aquinas' typically premodern synthesis is the best way to understand all the different modern alternatives to it? (c) If not, why not? If so, why is Aquinas almost always totally neglected by the most important modern philosophers?
6. Compare the usefulness of Aristotle's epistemology (summarized on p. xxxix) in understanding the modern alternatives to it (pp. xxxvii–xxxviii) with the usefulness of Aquinas in understanding the modern alternatives to his synthesis in question 5 above. Aristotle is also, like Aquinas, almost always totally neglected or passionately attacked by the most important modern philosophers. Why do you suppose that is so if he is at least a useful alternative for understanding non-Aristotelian epistemologies?
7. (a) Can you give an example from your own ordinary experience of the fourfold progression in human knowing according to Aristotle's analysis? (b) If not, why not? How does your experience not conform to his analysis? If so, does that verify his analysis? (c) Which two of these four acts usually occur at the same time rather than one before the other? (d) Why?

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ON DESCARTES

Many of the questions about Descartes ask not only for your (logical) evaluations and critiques of his thoughts but also for you to try to imagine the strongest replies he would make to these critiques. This demands that you try to place yourself outside your own mind and opinions and into Descartes' mind, whether you agree with him or not—which is a very useful exercise. And since it is likely that you will not wholly agree with Descartes, that is why this exercise is especially useful in regard to him. Another reason it is especially useful with Descartes is that he demands of himself and also of those who would argue with him a logical clarity that you probably need to acquire more of. Even if you think his demand for "clear and distinct ideas" is overdone, it is likely that your error is the opposite: that you are satisfied with noncontroversial platitudes and vagueness.

1. Descartes tried to revolutionize philosophy by using the scientific method. (a) What, exactly, is the scientific method? (b) Are there any other human enterprises, other than science, in which a new method produced remarkable progress? (c) Which aspects of the scientific method do you think can and should be used in philosophy? Did great premodern philosophers use this aspect or not? Be specific and give examples. (d) Which aspects do you think cannot be used in philosophy? Why? (Cf. pp. 4–5)
2. Compare and contrast the goal and the method of Descartes with those of Socrates (cf. p. 4).
3. Evaluate the three aspects of Descartes' new philosophy listed on p. 6.
4. (a) Evaluate the first sentence in Descartes' *Discourse on Method* (pp. 6–7). (b) Answer the question on p. 7. (Remember that a proposition can be true even if a given argument for it is fallacious.)
5. Descartes hoped that the use of his new method in philosophy would produce the same universal (or nearly universal) agreement there as in science. In which fields can such agreement be reached and in which fields can it not? Mention as many as you can. What is the difference between those two fields that explains why, in some, universal or nearly universal agreement occurs and, in others, it does not?
6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing philosophy individually, as Descartes does, rather than in dialogue with and apprenticeship to the historical community of philosophers of the past (p. 8)? Do not reply merely with the platitude that there are some advantages to each approach. Be specific. Give examples.
7. Evaluate each of Descartes' four methodological steps one by one (p. 8).
8. Imagine you are Descartes. How would you answer the four objections on p. 9?
9. Give at least two or three examples of where you think that beginning with doubt is the right method and others where you think it is not.

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10. (a) Obviously, universal doubt cannot be *lived*. Can it be *thought*, logically? (b) Can a *method* begin with it? Why or why not? (c) If your answer to both (a) and (b) are no, in which circumscribed field is universal doubt possible and appropriate, if any? (d) Why?
11. How can you know your present consciousness is not asleep? Buddhism assumes that it is: the word "Buddha" means literally "the one who woke up."
12. How would Descartes answer Pascal's criticism of universal doubt as the way to certainty (p. 11)? How might Pascal reply?
13. Where do you think Descartes' demand for "clear and distinct ideas" is useful or necessary and where is it not?
14. (a) How do three of Descartes' four ethical rules (p. 12) seem to contradict three of his methodological rules? (b) Do they in fact? (c) Why or why not?
15. Compare Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum" with Anselm's "ontological argument." Think this one through slowly and carefully! Eschew vagueness.
16. (a) Summarize, as clearly and simply as you can, the text's critique of Descartes' first step, his "cogito" (p. 14). (b) How might Descartes answer this critique?
17. If you know something about existentialism (see vol. 4), you know that existentialists are very varied in content (e.g., Nietzsche vs. Kierkegaard vs. Heidegger) yet agreed in their philosophical method. How is their method very similar to that of Descartes and how is it the opposite?
18. Descartes locates personal identity in the soul, or at least in its power of the mind, not in the body. (a) Summarize and (b) evaluate his reasons for this. (c) What are the alternatives to it in locating or identifying personal identity? (d) What are their strengths and (e) weaknesses?
19. Obviously, Descartes' "location" of the soul in the pineal gland at the base of the brain contradicts his identification of the soul with thought, not matter, and his principle that thought has no material extension and that mere matter ("bodies") cannot think. Why do you think such a brilliant and logical thinker was guilty of such an obvious contradiction? Was it a (logical) contradiction or a (psychological) confusion? Do you not do the same when you point to your head (i.e. the physical organ we call the brain) as the source of your thoughts?
20. How do you solve the "mind-body problem" as defined by Descartes (pp. 11, 16, 23–24)? Before you critique it, be sure you clearly understand and define his two-substance dualism and his argument for it.
21. The "mind-body" problem (p. 11, 16, p. 23–24) can be put in this dilemma: On the one hand, these two things seem to have nothing in common, but, on the other hand, we know from immediate experience that there is mutual causality between them, that thoughts like "I shall move my arm now" do seem to cause, or help to cause, our arm to move;

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and that movements like a blow to the head cause thoughts like "He hit me," "There is pain here," and "My thoughts are now so confused that it is very difficult for me now to think of anything else than this pain." (a) Can we deny either or both of these two causal relationships? (b) If so, how? (c) If not, if mutual causality is undeniable, does this disprove the apparently self-evident difference between mind (thought without extension in space) and body (extension in space without thought or any of thought's qualities)? (d) If so, why does that difference seem self-evident? (e) If not, why not?

22. Descartes' "two-substance" dualism makes it easy to explain and justify life after death (p. 16) while Aristotelian hylomorphism, or the psychosomatic unity, makes it harder though not necessarily impossible. (a) Do you think the causal dependence of the mind on the body in this life disproves the continued existence of mental life after bodily death, or not? (b) Why or why not? (c) How can you reconcile the psychosomatic unity with continuing mental or spiritual life between bodily death and the resurrection of the body in the future? (d) Can the psychosomatic unity be reconciled with physical (material, embodied) life after death? (Cf. the Church's answer in *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 997–1001).
23. Does the fact that Descartes' successors saw some kind of "occasionalism" (p. 24) as the only possible cosmology and also as the only justification for the soul's immortality if one accepts Descartes' dualism disprove that dualism? In other words, does the intuitively absurd consequence of occasionalism refute the premise of dualism? If not, is that because occasionalism is not absurd after all or because it is not necessarily entailed by the premise of dualism? Explain, either way.
24. Which "occasionalism," that of Malebranche or that of Geulincx, seems more reasonable to you? Why?
25. If you disagree with Descartes' criterion for truth (p. 17), why and what is your alternative?
26. When Descartes demands "clear and distinct ideas," is he referring to concepts or judgments? Why?
27. How would Descartes answer Arnauld's charge of reasoning in a circle (p. 18)?
28. Which of Descartes' first two arguments for God's existence, his own causal argument or Anselm's "ontological argument" (p. 19), do you find stronger, and which one do you find weaker? Why?
29. (a) Evaluate Descartes' strangely roundabout proof of the real existence of the material world p. 20–21. (b) We all intuitively and without doubt believe in its existence. How can a logical argument, which gives logical reasons for one's belief, be a weaker certainty than a mere instinct or intuition or feeling, which does not give reasons? (c) How do you think we do know that the world really does exist, and that it is not just a dream or a hypnotic deception? Or do you think this is not knowledge but only belief or opinion? (d) What are the implicit assumptions behind your answer?

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30. Descartes' radicalism, like that of Socrates, was not (I) in the content or conclusions of his philosophy, which was in his day commonsensical and almost universally believed (that God, the soul, and the world are all real) but (II) in his demand to not just believe but *prove* these conclusions (see p. 4) and (III) in his new method for doing it (which for Socrates had been simply logic and for Descartes was the scientific method, so that both Socrates and Descartes narrowed and toughened the meaning of "reason"). But Descartes' radicalism was also (IV) in his "*summum bonum*," which, like Bacon's, was "man's conquest of nature" by science and technology rather than knowing the truth for its own sake, which was Socrates' "summum bonum", so that in this respect, Descartes' newness and radicalism was the *opposite* of Socrates'. What is the relation between (I)–(III) and (IV)? Why is Descartes so Socratic on (I)–(III) and so non-Socratic on (IV)? (b) Do you see any connection(s) between (II) and point (IV)? If so, which is the source and cause of the other? Explain.
31. (a) What psychological rather than logical problems do you see in our world and our culture today that stem from Descartes' mind-body dualism, both in general and in particular? Think about this for a while; perhaps even though Descartes is today a relatively unpopular philosopher, his ghost still haunts popular culture. Be a ghost hunter. (b) Which of the three logical alternatives do you think would solve these problems best, psychosomatic hylomorphism (Aristotle, Aquinas), materialistic monism (Democritus, Leucippus), or spiritualistic monism (Shankara, Buddha)? Why? (c) What are the problems in each?
32. What do you think Descartes would say, and why, about (a) "transhumanism"? (b) Transgenderism? (c) Cryogenics? (d) The computer revolution? (e) The sexual revolution? (f) A single world state? (g) "Brave New World"?

ON PASCAL

1. (a) Why do you think Pascal, as an early "existential" philosopher (as described in pp. 26–27), is such an "outlier" in classical modern philosophy? Why are all the influential philosophers—Bacon, Descartes, Malebranche, Geulincx, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel—all impersonal and theoretical and "scientific" philosophers instead? (b) What is their common question or concern and why does Pascal not address it? (c) What is his main concern and why do they not address that? (d) Into which class of philosophers, the "existential" or the "theoretical," did most medieval philosophers fall? Why is that a trick question?
2. (a) Pascal is also unique among the "existential" philosophers (even if we extend that adjective to Augustine and even Socrates) in being a great practicing scientist and mathematician. Does that lend credibility to his existential choice of religion rather than science as his main concern? (2) Why or why not? (3) If so, to what extent?

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3. (a) Is he closer to rationalism or empiricism? (b) Why? (c) Does he begin with ideas or with data? If ideas, which? If data, is it empirical or not? (d) Define "empirical." Are emotions, desires, hopes, and feelings empirical?
4. (a) Can you find any other more fundamental, more universal, more obvious, and more important data than Pascal's fourfold data (p. 28) to test all philosophical theories by? (b) What is the name for the method that insists on testing all theories by data? (c) Why was the answer to that question a surprise to you when considering Pascal? (d) In light of that answer, what, for Pascal, is the similarity between science and religion? (e) Why was that answer a surprise to you?
5. Why do you suppose Pascal was only the third philosopher, after Augustine and Boethius, whose own words the text quoted extensively from? (The fourth and only other one will be Chesterton.)
6. (a) From his own words, formulate Pascal's main point in a single sentence. (b) What is the relationship between his famous "wager" and that sentence?
7. Compare and contrast Descartes' method with Pascal's.
8. "Greatness" and "wretchedness" are opposites that exclude each other, like Descartes' "matter" and "mind." If Pascal affirms that both are true for everyone, why is he not contradicting himself? (Hint: Are you both visible and invisible? Both good and bad?)
9. How can these opposites, "greatness" and "wretchedness," not only be co-present but logically imply each other? (pp. 28–29)
10. Which kind of "vanity" does Pascal mean: that of Ecclesiastes or that of a "vanity mirror"? What is the difference?
11. Does what Pascal say about the vanity of human justice imply that he does not believe in a universally known natural moral law? Why or why not?
12. Why does Pascal see the power of passion and the power of imagination as two examples of "vanity"?
13. Would Pascal approve or disapprove of uniforms for policemen (p. 30)?
14. Pascal defines "dogmatism" and "skepticism" as mutually exclusive answers to the same question. What is the question?
15. As with "greatness" and "wretchedness," Pascal seems to affirm a contradiction here, since of two mutually exclusive or mutually contradictory alternatives, both cannot be true (but he says that both "greatness" and "wretchedness" are) nor can both be false (but he says that "dogmatism" and "skepticism" both are. How can he meaningfully say this? Why is he not simply abandoning logic and denying the law of noncontradiction?
16. Derrida and his "deconstructionism" will do this (vol. 4, ch. 95), but Pascal and Derrida are radically different, even though here they seem to agree. Do they really, or not? Why?
17. (a) Compare what Pascal and Marx mean by "alienation." (b) Compare their solutions to it.

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18. Spinoza, Descartes' successor in rationalism, will write that "the free man never thinks of death, only life." Why do existentialists, both religious and atheistic, write a lot about death?
19. (a) Name two or three things that Pascal thinks are worse than death. (b) Why does he think that?
20. What relationship do you see, or would Pascal see, between the spectacular success and omnipresence of technology in our world and Pascal's psychology of "diversion" and "indifference"?
21. Which, for Pascal, is worse: "diversion" or "indifference"? Why?
22. Bacon, Marx, and even Descartes would probably define "diversion" in the opposite way from Pascal. How? What is presupposed in calling *x* a diversion from *y* rather than vice versa?
23. Would Pascal classify science as a diversion? Sports? Art? Why or why not?
24. Why isn't what Pascal says about "indifference" "preachy"?
25. Compare Pascal's "three kinds of people" with Socrates' division of people into fools, who think they are wise, and the wise, who know they are fools.
26. (a) Epicurus wrote: "If there are gods, why is there evil? But if there are no gods, why is there good?" Pascal sees nature as ambiguous: evidence both for God (order, intelligence, beauty, pleasure) and against God (disorder, randomness, ugliness, pain). How would Pascal answer the question why, if God wanted to reveal himself to us, he did not give us clearer evidence in nature for his existence? Why does God hide? (b) Evaluate his answer. (c) If you were God, would you do anything differently? If so, what do you think would be the consequences of that and why?
27. (a) How do Pascal's three metaphysical levels on which to search for truth presuppose Descartes' dualistic metaphysics? (b) How do they differ from it?
28. (a) Prove that Pascal does not mean "emotion" or "feeling" by "heart." (b) What does he mean then? (c) What is the relation between "heart" and "reason," in the sense of "knowing" or "perceiving" ("understanding")? (d) What is the relation between "heart" and "reason" in the sense of "calculation"?
29. Compare Pascal's account of the relation between faith and reason with Aquinas'.
30. (a) What other, non-religious enterprises could Pascal's "wager" be used for? (b) What other religions could it be used for?
31. How does the "wager" refute agnosticism as well as atheism? Why not refuse to wager until sufficient evidence is in to prove God's existence or nonexistence?
32. (a) Is the "wager" crass and selfish, a kind of free eternal fire insurance policy? (b) If not, why not? If so, can it be reworked to be more moral?
33. Is there anything in the Bible similar to the "wager"? Is there anything in the Bible that would be disapproving of it? Be specific: Give chapter and verse.

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ON SPINOZA

1. Spinoza is one of many philosophers whose philosophy contradicts both ordinary religion, ordinary secularism, and ordinary common sense. What do you think is the source or motive or impetus for this? It does not just appear like a meteor; it grows from human roots. Which?
2. Spinoza follows Descartes—exactly how? By a logical deduction, by a reaction against Descartes, by an attempt to save what he saw as Descartes' essential point (which?) by patching up what Spinoza saw as his weak point (which?), or what?
3. Which do you see as farther from ordinary Jewish, Christian, or Muslim religion: atheism or pantheism like Spinoza's? Why?
4. What do you suppose is the perennial attraction of Spinoza's anti-supernaturalistic religion?
5. What do you think is the perennial attraction or motive behind the "dualism" theory (p. 39)?
6. Do you think Spinoza's metaphysics determines his epistemology or vice versa (p. 41)?
7. Evaluate Augustine's critique of Spinoza's "higher criticism" critique of biblical texts (p. 40), which duplicates what he found in Manichaeism (vol. 2, p. 17)
8. (a) In terms of Spinoza's metaphysics, are you a substance, an attribute, or a mode? (b) Why is this shocking? (c) How would Spinoza reply to that shock?
9. (a) How is Spinoza's definition of the word "substance" the same as Aristotle's and how is it different? (b) Which is the commonsense definition of "substance"? (Hint: Which one, Spinoza's or common sense's, puts the word "a" in front of the word "substance" and which one does not?) (c) Is this just a matter of how one chooses to define his terms or is the meaning of "substance" a "substantial" difference? (d) What is common sense's opposite for "substantial"? (d) What is Spinoza's? (e) What happens if we deny the distinction between what is substantial and what is not, when we use common sense's definition? What difference would that make? (f) What happens if we deny that distinction and use Spinoza's definition of "substance"? (g) Did you use the commonsense definition of "substance" and "substantial" in answering the question about Spinoza? (h) If so, is that apparent inconsistency avoidable? (i) Do both Spinoza's and common sense's side in answering these questions presuppose that nominalism is untrue? (j) If so, how? (k) And can that presupposition be avoided? (See the chapter on Ockham in vol. 2 for nominalism.)
10. God's personhood is for Spinoza a subjective projection (we "project" our own personhood out onto God) that we subconsciously make rather than an objective reality that we consciously discover. How can you tell what falls on one side of that line of division and what falls on the other? (This is a very important question, which makes a difference to just about everything.) (p. 40)
11. (a) Is Spinoza saying, like Buddha, that there really is no "I" at all, or just that the "I" is to matter what a lump of tapioca is to a pudding? (b) If the first, how can he deny what to

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Descartes was the absolutely most certain and self-evident thought of all? If the latter, how can consciousness or thought, which is immaterial (it cannot be described by any material categories like mass, shape, color, etc.), be "diffused" over space, which is material (p. 40)? Is Spinoza's intended pantheism really a materialism?

12. (a) What is the relation between Spinoza's ethics and his metaphysics? Is this relation between his ethics and his metaphysics (not necessarily the *content* of either the metaphysics or the ethics) a necessary one or not? (b) If it is, how can Kant and others who are skeptical of metaphysics, have an ethics without a metaphysics? If not, how can ethics ignore the metaphysical question of which things are real and which are not? (If you are ambitious and love to walk where angels fear to tread, you might want to look at the very difficult philosopher Levinas [vol. 4, ch. 94], who for the first time bases his metaphysics on his ethics rather than vice versa.)
13. Granted his definitions of "substance," "attribute," and "mode," do you see any logical mistakes or questionable assumptions in Spinoza's step-by-step metaphysics (pp. 41–42)?
14. If Spinoza's four-level epistemology (p. 43) is so similar to Plato's, how is it different?
15. Compare and contrast what Spinoza says about happiness with what Aristotle and Aquinas say about it. As with the previous question, there are both strong likenesses and strong differences.
16. How would you define a "mystic"? Is Spinoza a mystic?
17. (a) Argue for both the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth (pp. 43–44). (b) What is the natural, instinctive, or intuitive attraction of each one? (c) Which arguments seem stronger to you and why?
18. Is there a third possibility? Why or why not?
19. Can the two epistemologies be combined? Why or why not?
20. What is the most important agreement between Aristotle and Spinoza in ethics? What is the most important disagreement?
21. For Kant, but not for Spinoza, ethics is impossible without free will. Who do you think is right and why (pp. 45–46)?
22. Who do you think is right about the issue of death in the penultimate paragraph of p. 46? Why?
23. Is the last sentence of the chapter a legitimate criticism of Spinoza? Why or why not?
24. Was his excommunication (p. 38) proper or ridiculously exaggerated? Why?

ON LEIBNIZ

1. (a) Nearly everyone nowadays sees the optimistic rationalism of Leibniz and the "Enlightenment" (48) as naïve and exaggerated. Why? (b) What else is needed besides calculating reason? Why?

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2. This is definitely not meant as a sneer at Leibniz (a sneer is the very lowest possible spiritual attitude) or at rationalism or at the Enlightenment, but the question is bound to occur to most readers, at least subconsciously: Why do you suppose it seems that the more brilliant philosophers are, the more they tend to contradict common sense? (Aristotle, Aquinas, Pascal, Reid, James, Moore, and Chesterton are the only notable exceptions.) Doesn't "brilliant" mean "logical" and isn't logic eminently commonsensical?
3. (a) Do you see any mistakes in Leibniz's logic, in the first six paragraphs on p. 49? (b) In his "God's-eye point of view" metaphysics in pp. 49–50? (c) In his four "startling conclusions" on p. 50? (d) Does his rather startling metaphysics in pp. 49–50 necessarily follow from his rather commonsensical logic on p. 49? (e) If not, why not? (f) Do the four even more "startling" conclusions necessarily follow from his metaphysics? (g) If not, why not?
4. If Leibniz's logic is right, does it follow that the three questions on p. 54 are the first three questions we should ask about absolutely everything? Why or why not?
5. (a) Evaluate Leibniz's fourth principle, "the identity of indiscernibles" (p. 51). (b) What advantage does this principle seem to him to have over the more commonsensical alternative of Aristotle and/or Aquinas? (c) Compare it with Scotus' "*haecceitas*." (d) Which of these four accounts of plurality or individuality seem to you to be compatible with which other ones and which ones do not?
6. If two hydrogen atoms can be indistinguishable in every observable or measurable way, does this refute Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernables? If not, why not? If so, how would Leibniz say they could be different in any way that is not observable or measurable?
7. On the "problem of evil": (a) Even if there is in fact no such thing as "the best of all possible worlds" in terms of the ingredients in it (for God could always create another good species), yet given the existence of this finite world and of all the species and individual beings in it including man, who has, or seems to have, free will? (Let question (b) be: How does that free will make a difference to the answer to this question?) (c) Isn't it true that a totally good God would always act in it and toward it in the best way, so as to maximize its goodness? If not, why not, and if so, does it logically follow that Aquinas' answer to the "problem of evil" (vol. 2, pp. 87–89) is the correct one? (d) Does it logically follow that Romans 8:28 must be true of all things, evil as well as good? (e) If so, how to account for hell, or even unrepented sin and evil in this world? Is your answer to question (b) a necessary part of the answer to this question? Why or why not?
8. Does Leibniz make room for evil as a "mystery" rather than a "problem? See Gabriel Marcel in vol. 4.
9. Evaluate the book's criticism of Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds" theory. Is it as simple as that? Why or why not?

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10. (a) Why is the "problem of evil" the most difficult problem for a theist? (b) Compare Leibniz's answer to it with that of Augustine. Didn't Augustine, like Leibniz, say that evil was nothing but the absence of good? Or did he? (c) Why is a very strong distinction between moral evil and ontological evil a necessary part of the answer?
11. (a) Compare Leibniz's answer with Wilder's "tapestry" (p. 53). (b) Does the "tapestry" analogy fit other answers to the problem of evil than Leibniz's? (c) If so, how?
12. If, as Leibniz says, "no monads are material bodies" (p. 52), what, for him, is matter?
13. (a) How do *you* distinguish the four species of planets, pansies, pigs, and persons? (b) What is presupposed in your answer?
14. Does the last sentence of Leibniz's eighth principle on p. 52 refute his "pre-established harmony" (p. 54)? If not, why not?
15. Compare Augustine's, Boethius', and Aquinas' reconciliation of divine predestination and human freedom with Leibniz's.
16. Why did Leibniz reverse the usual distinction between man's freedom and God's (p. 54)? What assumption is behind it and what different assumption is behind the more common and usual one?
17. (a) How are free will and unpredictability rightly related (cf. p. 55)? (b) Does determinism necessarily entail predictability? (c) Does predictability entail determinism? (d) Does free will entail unpredictability? (e) Does unpredictability entail free will? (If you don't know what "entail" means, look it up. It is irresponsible for any student not to have a dictionary handy and to use it often.)

ON BACON

1. (a) Evaluate Bacon's call for a global public political organization for science (p. 56). (b) Compare this goal with that of Comte (vol. 4, ch. 81).
2. (a) Were medieval philosophers typically as disinterested in physical science and this world as modern philosophers typically were in theology and the next world? (b) Evaluate this (p. 57; cf. Matthew Becklo, *The Way of Heaven and Earth*).
3. Bacon is usually seen as very important for science but not for ethics. Evaluate this perspective in light of p. 57 and the fact that "means" and "ends" are ethical terms (the basic division of "goods").
4. (a) Is deductive logic useless for science, as Bacon says (p. 57)? (b) Why or why not? (c) Give examples. (d) Compare Mill's criticism of the syllogism in vol. 4.
5. Give some examples of Bacon's "idols of the theater" (p. 57).
6. (a) Can one be an empiricist in epistemology without prioritizing induction in method (p. 57)? (b) Can one prioritize induction in method without being an empiricist in epistemol-

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ogy? (c) Why or why not? (d) Is Socrates an example of the second possibility? (e) Why or why not?

7. (a) What, exactly, is the relation between sense observation and inductive reasoning? (2) Which is more important in the scientific method? (3) Why?
8. Scientific method requires exact, quantitative mathematical measurement and deductive prediction. So why does that not make deduction more important than induction for Bacon (p. 57–58)?
9. (a) Do you have any other candidate for "the most important discovery in the history of science" other than the scientific method (p. 58)? (b) If so, what is it and why is it more important?
10. (a) Is the critique on p. 58 of both premoderns and moderns accurate? (b) If not, why not? (c) If so, which mistake is worse? (d) Why?
11. How is the metaphysical issue of the nature of objective reality the implied but necessary premise for the ethical change Bacon makes about the *summum bonum* (p. 58)?
12. (a) What was the practical basis, reason, or justification for the pre-Baconian prioritization of theoretical science over productive science which Bacon reverses (p. 58)? (See the Aristotle chapter in vol. 1)
13. (a) Would Bacon say that technology is the single most important thing in human life, or is that a misunderstanding of him? (b) Why are we more likely to agree with that judgment when we are suffering, especially if the suffering is medical, than when we are happy (e.g., on a beautiful beach) or in love? (c) What can be logically concluded from that answer? (d) Would you rather have the world's best drugs or the world's best philosophy when you have cancer? (e) What about when you are dying? (f) What can be concluded from those answers?
14. Evaluate Bacon's threefold judgment on p. 59. Is it self-evident or are there implied assumptions to it? Do you see any exceptions to it?
15. Why is the relation between Man and Nature (p. 59) important even for people who have little love of or interest in nature?
16. (a) Does a Machiavellian ethic necessarily and logically follow from the rest of Bacon's philosophy? (b) Why or why not?
17. Bacon does not explicitly affirm either materialism or determinism (the denial of free will); why does the book imply that if he is logical, he must believe in these two ideas (p. 60)?

ON LOCKE

1. If Locke is right in saying that "the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts, beyond which the mind . . . is not able to advance one jot" (pp. 61–62), how can he speak of God, or "the reasonableness of Christianity," or of moral "rights"?

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2. Which of the two, Locke or Cudworth, unfairly misunderstands the other on "innate ideas" (p. 62)?
3. Regarding whether or not "X is not non-X" and "Do good, not evil" are "innate ideas" (pp. 62–63) what is the difference between (a) "they are innate ideas" and (b) "our minds do not permit us to think otherwise"?
4. (a) Why do you think Locke, who is very intelligent and commonsensical, did not see, as Hume did, that his premise that ideas, not real things, are the first objects of all our knowledge logically led to skepticism (p. 63)? (b) Evaluate Locke's attempt to escape skepticism in p. 63. (c) Compare Aquinas' argument in vol. 2, p. 98.
5. Is there an alternative to the "correspondence theory of truth" (p. 63)? Compare Aquinas, vol. 2, p. 98.
6. Evaluate the "diaper poo argument" against skepticism on p. 63. (N.b. "evaluate" means "give reasons, not feelings").
7. (a) Evaluate Locke's argument for the subjectivity of secondary qualities. (b) Evaluate his argument for the objectivity of primary qualities. (c) Evaluate Berkeley's argument for the subjectivity of both on p. 70. (d) Is there an argument for the objectivity of both?
8. (a) Evaluate Locke's argument against "substance." (b) Is there any way to avoid Hume's conclusion of the nonexistence of a substantial self if we accept Locke's critique of substance?
9. Why do you suppose Locke's ethics and politics are so logically inconsistent with his epistemology and metaphysics (p. 65)?
10. (a) What is the relationship between "natural law" and "natural rights" in ethics? (b) Why do you suppose Locke avoids a "natural law" in his ethics but not in his politics?
11. (a) Do you see the "social contract theory" as logically contradictory to the "natural law" theory, one of the tenets of which is that man by nature is social and political? (b) Why or why not? (c) If they are contradictory, why didn't Locke think they were? If they are not contradictory, how can they be combined? (d) How is the metaphysical question of nominalism vs. realism concerning universals or "natures" like "human nature" relevant to this ethical and political question?
12. Find examples of Locke's political philosophy in (a) the America Declaration of Independence, (b) the American Constitution, (c) the American Federalist Papers, and (d) Martin Luther King's "Letter from Birmingham Jail."
13. (a) Does Locke's concept of property make slavery acceptable, unacceptable, or neither? (b) Why? (c) If unacceptable, how did slavery's Confederate defenders defend it? (d) Did they deny Locke's principles or not?
14. (a) Does Locke's plan for a just and happy society require only education and enlightened self-interest of its citizens, or does it depend also on personal moral virtue? (b) Would Locke agree that a just and happy society cannot be based on enlightened self-interest

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alone but requires personal moral virtue in its citizens? (c) Why do those two questions, which are identical, tend to provoke different degrees of agreement or disagreement in you (i.e., why would polls reveal such a discrepancy?)?

15. (a) Does Locke have an objective, ontological concept of personhood or does he think personhood is a political and man-made ("social contract") category? (b) What would he think about abortion and why?

ON BERKELEY

1. In light of p. 67, do you see Berkeley as a bold pioneer or a quack? Why?
2. Do you think Berkeley's hope to find a wholly nonlinguistic mode of consciousness (p. 67) is a possible or an impossible hope?
3. How many other philosophers are famous for only one idea (p. 68)?
4. (a) Is this idea ("*esse est percipi*") necessarily true if God exists, since God perceives everything? (Cf. the three poems on p. 72.) (b) If so, why is it such a controversial or unpopular idea? If not, why not? (c) Berkeley says it does not entail the conclusion that matter, in the ordinary and commonsensical sense of the word, does not exist (p. 68); is that true or not? (d) Why? (e) Relate Berkeley's idea to the teaching, explicit in Aquinas and implicit in Genesis, that God "spoke" or thought or mentally "perceived" the universe into existence.
5. How can Berkeley be an empiricist yet deny the existence of matter (pp. 68–69)?
6. (a) Did Samuel Johnson refute Berkeley or not (p. 68)? (b) Prove your answer.
7. Evaluate Berkeley's three arguments for *esse est percipi* on pp. 69–70. (His *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,* like Hume's *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* is a useful challenge for an aspiring philosopher because both books contain brilliant arguments for very unpopular positions.)
8. (a) Which, if any, of Berkeley's arguments depend on the assumption of nominalism? Why? (b) Which, if any, do not? Why?
9. (a) Do Locke's premises entail Berkeley's conclusions? (b) Do Berkeley's premises entail Hume's conclusions? (c) Do Hume's premises entail his radical skepticism? (d) If the answer to all three questions is yes, how can a philosophy as seemingly non-radical and commonsensical as Locke lead to such a radical conclusion as Hume's radical skepticism (p. 71)?
10. What do you see as the relation between common sense and logic (p. 71)?
11. Does Berkeley's philosophy, if accepted, refute atheism? If so, how? If not, why not?
12. (a) Is the startling conclusion about the nonexistence of the material universe in p. 73 an unfair misunderstanding? (b) If so, why? If not, does it make Berkeley a pantheist like Shankara and Spinoza, as it seems to? (c) If not, why not? If it does, why didn't Berkeley admit this?

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ON HUME

1. Why do apparently commonsensical and innocent premises such as empiricism and nominalism logically entail such radical conclusions which undermine science and common sense as well as religion and morality (pp. 74, 100–101)? Either the logic is fallacious and the premises can be true without the conclusions being true; or the logic is valid and the truth of the premises proves the truth of the conclusions; or the logic is valid and the falsity of the conclusions proves the falsity of the premises. After reading the chapter, defend your choice of one of these three options.
2. Hume's historical situation and his predecessors obviously *explain* his philosophy, but to what extent do they *determine* it? If one picked up Hume's *Enquiry* without any historical knowledge and logically examined it in the abstract, would it maintain all its logical force or not?
3. Answer the same question above about Berkeley, and, later, about Kant. In what sense is the relation between Berkeley and Locke similar to the relation between Kant and Hume and in what sense is it not? (The question concerns their overall position, not one particular point.)
4. What light does Hume's character and his life shed on his philosophy, if any?
5. How would you answer the two great epistemological questions on p. 77?
6. (a) Emerson wrote:,"Philosophy is Plato and Plato is philosophy." If in the broad sense (cf. the "cave," p. 78) this is true, is Hume then the anti-philosopher, or the "inside-out philosopher?" Or is this a misunderstanding? (b) If Hume is the anti-philosopher, does this constitute a logical argument against him, a *reductio ad absurdum*? (c) Why or why not?
7. How does the militaristic and thus voluntaristic image of spiritual warfare (p. 78) and the parallel to Hobbes (p. 78) change or add to the proper "take" on Hume?
8. Of Hume's three basic premises (p. 79), which do you see as the most basic and determinative? Why?
9. Which of them do you see as the strongest? Why?
10. Which of them do you see as the weakest? Why?
11. Evaluate Hume's two arguments for his radical empiricism (pp. 80–81).
12. (a) How does Hume's psychology of the "association" of ideas by a kind of intuitive, immediate mental gravity compare with the logical relation of premises and conclusions in arguments? (b) *In light of your answer to this question*, how does our dependence on the internet and smartphones change our whole mode of thinking? (c) "Social media logic" has been called "the psychology of advertising." Is this true? (d) Does that mode of thinking use one, two, all, or none of Hume's three principles of connection between ideas? (e) How is "causality" much more different from both "contiguity" and "resemblance" than either of those last two are to each other? (f) Why is it more important than the other two?

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13. Evaluate and critique, using concrete examples, Hume's division of ideas into "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact": (a) Why does it seem unquestionable? (b) Why might it be questionable? (c) What is assumed in this division? (Examine Hume's choice of words carefully.)
14. (a) Does Hume mean by "ideas" (I) concepts, (II) propositions, (III) arguments, or (IV) all three? (b) Is Hume's division of ideas the same as Kant division between analytic a priori and synthetic a posteriori? (c) What difference does one's metaphysics of nominalism or realism make to one's epistemology here?
15. List seven of your own examples of what Hume calls "relations of ideas" and seven of your own examples of what Hume would call "matters of fact." Then see if you can find examples that do not fit into either of Hume's two categories. What do you think Hume would say about them?
16. From what premises does Hume's radical conclusion that we do not know any real causal relationships necessarily follow?
17. In light of his critique of causality, how would Hume defend the legal conviction of John Wilkes Booth for being the real cause of Lincoln's death if there was conclusive photographic, ballistic, and eyewitness evidence?
18. How would Hume answer the charge that his teaching that our belief in causality is *really* caused by our subjective psychological habits and customs (pp. 88–89) rather than by objectively real events is self-contradictory? Would he deny that psychological causality is just as much an example of cause and effect as physical causality?
19. Is there a significant difference between reasoning from cause to effect (e.g., from bird to egg) and reasoning from effect to cause (e.g., from egg to bird) that would refute, mitigate, or qualify Hume's critique of causality (p. 85)? Why or why not?
20. Can you find a weak step in the eight-step argument on p. 86? It seems to begin with a premise that common sense approves and end with a conclusion that common sense does not.
21. If you disagree with Hume, what is the "medium" he challenges you to find on p. 87?
22. Answer the question in the footnote on p. 87.
23. (a) Is Kant really more skeptical than Hume, as claimed on p. 88? (b) If not, why not? (c) If so, why does he seem to most philosophers less threatening and less skeptical than Hume?
24. Why is Hume's denial that there is such a thing as a substantial self or ego more shocking than his denial that we know any "substances" at all?
25. If we are only a bundle of relations or qualities, and not substances (pp. 89–90), why are these two categories, viz. "relations" and "qualities," not just as metaphysical and just as

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transcending of the purely empirical, as the category of substance? If they are, why didn't Hume see this?

26. Has Hume refuted empiricism by a *reductio ad absurdum* as p. 90 argues?
27. Is there any difference between Buddha's and Hume's notion of the self (p. 90)? If so, what is it? If not, why are Buddha and Hume so totally different—the mystic vs. the materialist?
28. How do *you* account for our knowledge of other minds (p. 91)? (See Alvin Plantinga's *God and Other Minds*.)
29. P. 92 essentially accuses Hume of being childishly and willfully unfair. Is that fair? Are all accusations of unfairness unfair? If so, is that the supreme unfairness?
30. If you have read it, elaborate and explain the parallel to C.S. Lewis' *The Silver Chair* in the footnote on p. 92.
31. Aquinas argued that if free will does not exist, all moral language (justice, praising, blaming, rewarding punishing, counseling, and commanding) become meaningless. How would Hume answer that argument? How would such a dialogue between Hume and Aquinas proceed?
32. Regarding Hobbes', Hume's, and the early analytic philosophers' use of "the linguistic ploy" (changing the common meaning of common words to avoid the conflict with common sense), compare with Orwell's analysis of the power of this technique in the long philosophical section on language in *1984*?
33. In Hume's day, his atheism was an unofficial obstacle to being hired to teach philosophy. Why in our day is strong religious faith an unofficial obstacle to being hired to teach philosophy at secular universities? What is the relation between those two obstacles?
34. Can Hume's argument on p. 93 for the irrationality of Christianity being a plus rather than a minus possibly be honest and defensible? If so, to whom? If not, why did Hume offer it? Could he have meant it as a satirical joke? But isn't that joke on him then? Who's laughing at whom?
35. Which of Hume's critiques of the usual arguments for the existence of God seems the strongest to you? How would an intelligent believer answer it?
36. Which of Hume's critiques of the usual arguments for the existence of God seems the weakest to you? Why? How would Hume answer your critique of it?
37. (a) What is the logical relationship between (I) the validity or invalidity of an argument for a controverted proposition (e.g., that God exists) and (II) the truth or falsity of that proposition? (b) What is the *psychological* relationship between (I) and (II)?
38. (a) When two opposed philosophers argue about a controversial point, they often trace back their opponent's argument to a premise (expressed or necessarily implied) that they disagree with. How would both Hume and a theist do that to each other's arguments about God? (b) Once that is done, what is the next step if we are to make any progress toward

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choosing which of the two different premises to agree with? If the answer is demanding proof for each of the two premises, then when can this process of premise-hunting and premise-proving or -disproving stop?

39. Why does Hume make an exception to his principle that we cannot be certain of any matter of fact when it comes to miracles? He did not claim to prove that God could not possibly exist, as atheists often do with the "problem of evil" (if an all-powerful and all-good God exists, evil could not exist; but evil does exist; therefore God cannot exist), only that all the arguments for His existence are weak. (Cf. question 37 above.) Why is his claim about miracles much stronger than mere agnosticism? How would he answer that question?
40. If Hume's argument against miracles logically begs the question (assumes the conclusion he claims to prove), as the text suggests, why did he not see this logical fallacy?
41. Does the penultimate paragraph on p. 97 show that atheists must be snobs ("All who disagree with us are fools") (a) irrespective of the society they live in? (b) In a society of believers? (c) In a society of unbelievers? (d) In the largest society, that of the sum total of all human beings who have ever lived?
42. Substitute "moral subjectivists" for "atheists" in question 41. Do the same answers apply? What about in a society in which the majority believe in God but not in objective morality? What about in a society in which the majority believe in objective morality but not in God?
43. (a) Many or even most people in modern Western civilization believe Hume's idea (I) that morality is subjective and man-made, but not Hume's idea (II) that reason can only be the slave of the passions and should not try to be anything else. Why? (b) Do (I) and (II) logically entail each other, as Hume believes? (c) Why or why not? Be hardheadedly logical here; try to do what Hume says is impossible: Let your honest, tough-minded logical reasoning judge your passions and desires and feelings. If you can't do that, you can't do philosophy, only propaganda and ideology.
44. How would Hume evaluate Nazism? (Put yourself into Hume's mind; do not simply judge him by your mind. The question is about Hume, not about you.)
45. What concept of "reason" is assumed in the nearly uniform premodern judgment that reason can and should govern the passions? What concept of "reason" is assumed in Hume's denial of this judgment? Where and when did "reason" change its meaning so radically?
46. What are the practical consequences of Hume's view that no human act is really either good or evil, right or wrong?
47. Hume himself admitted that he could not live his philosophy (p. 101). What would happen if someone did live it?
48. How could someone as intelligent as Hume possibly make the painfully obvious mistake in pp. 99–100? And the self-contradiction in p. 101?

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49. What is the attraction of Hume's philosophy among philosophers and philosophy students? I have asked about twelve random students from various universities that I meet who their favorite philosopher is, and Hume is the commonest answer. Why do you suppose that is?
50. (a) Just about the last person who would ever adopt Hume's philosophy would be a farmer. Why? (b) In Hume's day there were many more farmers than philosophers; today there are many more philosophers than farmers. What does that imply about our society's future?

ON REID

1. Like most famous philosophers, Hume never married or had children; Reid did. How might that fact have influenced their respective conclusions?
2. (a) What is Reid's basic *reason* for judging philosophy by common sense rather than common sense by philosophy? (b) If you expressed that reason as a logical argument, what would that argument's premises be? (c) List at least five philosophers who would agree with Reid's basic principle here and five who would agree with Hume's opposite principle. (d) Do you see anything else common to all the members of each of those two lists and different from all the members of the other list? (e) How would Hume justify his reversal of Reid's principle of judging philosophy by common sense? What premise(s) would he use? What could justify it/them?
3. For Reid, Hume's first questionable premise that leads eventually and inevitably to his skeptical conclusions comes from Locke (p. 104). Why do you suppose that neither Locke nor Berkeley nor Hume perceived this and questioned that first premise?
4. Does Reid agree with this first premise of Locke and Hume yet not draw the same conclusion from it, or does he disagree with that premise? Why is that question not easy to answer?
5. How is sense perception more tricky and mysterious than abstract mental concepts?
6. Why didn't the obvious, simple, and almost self-evident argument for epistemological realism (the position that objective reality is the object of our sense perception) on p. 107 occur to Locke, Berkeley, or Hume?
7. Why didn't the even more obvious, simple, and self-evident argument for a substantial self on p. 108 occur to Hume?
8. List a number of consequences that would ensue if one believed and lived Hume's belief that we cannot know that A really causes B (p. 108).
9. (a) Does the reason Taylor gives for belief in "agent causation" also justify "event causation" (p. 109)? (b) If not, what would? (c) How would Hume reply to Taylor's argument for "agent causation"?

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ON KANT

1. Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Rousseau, and Kant all never married. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Reid, and, later, a number of less famous philosophers like G.E. Moore, Gabriel Marcel, Jacques Maritain, Paul Ricoeur, G.K. Chesterton, and Dietrich von Hildebrand did. Do you see anything common to the married ones that distinguishes them from the unmarried ones?
2. (a) Why is Kant so important that philosophy is sometimes divided into "pre-Kantian" and "post-Kantian" eras (p. 112) (b) Is there any other philosopher who was so revolutionary that the history of philosophy is divided into *pre-* and *post-* his name?
3. (a) How is Kant's relationship to Newton in some way like medieval philosophers' relationship to Jesus (p. 113)? (b) How is it not? (c) Within Kant's philosophy itself, is his relation to Newton more like or unlike his relation to Jesus?
4. (a) How would a rationalist like Descartes answer Kant's critique of rationalist metaphysics on (p. 113)? (b) Would Plato give the same answer or a different one?
5. (a) Do you think Kant is really more skeptical of reason than Hume is, as the text claims, or not, as Kant himself would claim? (b) Why? (cf. pp. 113–114)
6. (a) If, as Kant believes, "things in themselves" are unknowable, why would he say we long to know them (p. 114)? (b) Is there any other natural desire that is forever unattainable in principle?
7. Kant's epistemology is his solution to the rationalism-vs.-empiricism dilemma. If Descartes and Hume had never lived, would Kant's philosophy possibly have come into existence from other causes, or is it totally relative to these historical contingencies?
8. (a) Which of the three radical changes in the meaning of "reason" that the text mentions, viz. Socrates', Descartes', or Kant's (p. 114), is to you the most radical? (b) Why?
9. (a) In what area(s) of human knowledge does the "perspectivism" or "subjectivism" or "relativism" of Kant's "Copernican revolution in philosophy" (cf. the three analogies on p. 116) seem to most people to be correct? (b) Do you think it really is correct in those areas or not? (c) Why or why not? (d) In what area(s) does it seem to most people to be incorrect? (e) Do you think it really is incorrect there or not? (f) Why or why not? (g) Does metaphysics (in the traditional, Aristotelian sense of the word) fit into either of these two areas? (h) If not, why not, and if so, which one and why?
10. How might Kant answer the argument that the point of his "Copernican revolution" is self-contradictory (p. 117; p. 130)?
11. Why did Kant see his "revolution" as optimistic and positive, an answer to skepticism, and a cause for rejoicing, rather than pessimistic, negative, skeptical, and cause for sorrow (p. 118)? Why does the text (at least in the image in this paragraph) see it as the opposite?

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12. (a) Is what the text calls Kant's "collective solipsism" (p. 118) really a form of solipsism or an escape from it, as he intended? (b) Why? (c) If, after discovering that you could not wake from your dream, you discovered that all others were having the same dream, would this be your escape or your prison? Joy or misery? (d) Relate this question to question 6.
13. (a) In light of the three options on p. 118, is Berkeley a Kantian idealist in epistemology? (b) Why or why not?
14. (a) Is the analogy of the Wizard of Oz (p. 119) illuminating or misleading? (b) Why?
15. (a) Can Kant's "'ought' implies 'can'" principle work in epistemology as well as ethics? (footnote on p. 119) (b) Why or why not? (c) Relate this also to question 6.
16. Are there any questions that are more important than the three Kant asks (p. 120)? If so, what are they?
17. Can there be any analytic a posteriori judgments? If so, which? If not, why not?
18. (a) Evaluate Kant's method of beginning with the actual (*x* is, *x* happens) and then asking how it is possible (what are the necessary conditions of possibility for *x*, either on the subjective side of the knowing subject or on the objective side of the known object, or both). (b) Would Leibniz agree with this method? (c) Why or why not? (d) Would Aristotle?
19. (a) Would Kant agree with Locke's first premise that all the immediate objects of knowledge are "ideas" in Locke's broad sense of that word? (b) Would Aquinas?
20. Answer the question about time in the last sentence at p. 123.
21. (a) In what way is Kant's rejection of both "hard empiricism" and "hard rationalism" a mean between two extremes like Aristotle's? (b) In what way is it different? (p. 123) (c) So if we line up Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, and Kant, which one would be more radically opposed to all three of the others than any of them is to each other?
22. (a) Aquinas taught that we cannot know God's essence, or *what* he is, only his existence, *that* he is. Is this the same as what Kant says about all things-in-themselves? If so, how can this not be a contradiction while Kant's position is? (See question 10 and pp. 124.) This is a difficult question, but one possible hint toward an answer is to ask: What *question* (i.e. a question *about what*) is each of these two philosophers asking? (b) Kant's successors (Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel) will all escape this apparent self-contradiction in Kant by simply denying that things-in-themselves exist at all. Is that also self-contradictory? (c) Is it Berkeley's idealism (cf. the footnote on p. 124)? (d) Kant clearly maintained that he was *not* a Berkelian "idealist." Try to sort out the different meanings of "idealism" here: Plato's, Locke's, Berkeley's, Kant's, and Hegel's.
23. (a) How is Kant's notion of causality less skeptical than Hume's? (b) How is it more skeptical? (c) Can it be both? If so, how?
24. (a) Is there any possibility of a fourth category other than the three "ideas of pure reason" as Kant calls them, of self, world, and God? (b) Why or why not?

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25. If, as Kant says, the self or "I" is only "psychologically necessary" but not ontologically necessary; if we cannot know that it really exists; then why is this position any less skeptical, radical, and anti-commonsensical than Hume's?
26. How can Kant base his ethics on the dignity of the person if we cannot know whether such persons even really exist (p. 125–126)?
27. Kant distinguished "the empirical ego," which is an object of knowledge, from "the transcendental ego," which is the active subject of knowledge, unconsciously projecting the two forms of perception, the twelve logical categories, and the three "ideas of pure reason" onto objects. Is it the work of the one God for Kant rather than the work of different human individuals? (That would account for its universality and necessity.) Would this then be something similar to Augustine's "divine illumination"? Or is it simply our universal human nature doing it? But how can he know this if Kant does not think we can know universal natures as objective realities, or "things-in-themselves."
28. If you want to defend the possibility of traditional metaphysics, how do you answer Kant's four antinomies (pp. 126–127)?
29. Evaluate (a) Kant's first refutation of Anselm's "ontological argument" and (b) his second one, both on p. 128. (c) Which is stronger? (Hint: In light of the "three acts of the mind," which one confuses, and which one rightly uses, the distinction between the "three acts of the mind," viz. conception, judgment, and reasoning?)
30. Evaluate Kant's assertion that the cosmological arguments necessary presuppose or involve the "ontological argument."
31. (a) Is it possible to live "as if" God existed, as Kant says, even if God does not in fact exist? (b) Why or why not? (c) What is the difference between living "as if" God existed and living because you believe, but cannot know, that God exists?
32. Evaluate Wittgenstein's critique of the unknowability of "things in themselves" at p. 130.
33. How and why has the ancient concept of logos shrunk in Descartes, Hume, and Kant (pp. 130–131)?
34. Typically modern ethical philosophies, whether Kantian, Hobbesian, Humean, or Utilitarian, are skeptical of teleology. (a) Why? What are the roots of this skepticism (p. 132)? (b) What are its consequences in both Kantian ethical absolutism and in Hobbesian, Humean, or Utilitarian ethical relativism? (c) If, as Kant contends, objective metaphysics is impossible and if the roots of the skepticism of real teleology are in metaphysics (which is impossible), how can such unreal roots have such real consequences? (d) Is it possible that the roots of our culture's very concrete and problematic modern moral skepticism may lie in the abstract arguments about the status of universal terms in the Scholastic disputations of the Middle Ages? (e) What are some other very abstract philosophical ideas that have "existential," real-life, difference-making consequences?

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35. Both Kant's epistemology and his ethics exchange receptivity to objective reality for activity of the human subject's mind or will: He says we actively shape the world of matter and the world of morality, thus not discovering but making material and moral meaning. (a) Why, then, is there no parallel in his epistemology to his second "categorial imperative" in ethics, where he says that every person *is* an end, not just a means, and must be treated as an end, an intrinsic value? Why did Kant insert this piece of objective metaphysics into his ethics? (b) Was it necessary? (c) Why or why not? (d) Could he have done the same thing in his epistemology? (e) If so, how?
36. (a) Why did Kant say that even a race of devils could make a good society if they were reasonable? (What did he mean by "reasonable"?) (b) Do you agree or not? Why? (c) Why does he make no place in his ethics for personal virtues and vices? Does it not seem obvious in experience that if wicked people enter and administrate an ideal system (a state, a school, or a church), the system will fail?
37. Kant thought he reconciled religious faith and reason by removing God from Euthyphro's "divine command theory" (the idea that a human act is morally good only because God or the gods command it) and making God the *ideal* of morality rather than its *origin*. (a) Isn't this re- introducing teleology, which his anti-metaphysical epistemology rejected? (b) Isn't it reducing God to a far-away abstraction? Can one have a personal relationship to an ideal? (c) Is there no slipping between the horns of Socrates' either/or dilemma when he asks Euthyphro: Is a thing good because the gods will it (Euthyphro's voluntarism) or do they will it because it is good (Socrates and Kant's rationalism)? (d) Is the "natural law" theory of Aquinas and Aristotle such a third alternative? If so, how? If not, why not? (e) What are the main objections to each of these three moral philosophies?
38. If the validity of Newtonian science is the assumption or the data (literally, "that which is given") behind his epistemology, what is the assumption or data behind his ethics?
39. "Moral absolutism" sounds dogmatic, fideistic, narrow-minded, and irrational. How can Kant's rationalistic, "Enlightenment" morality, which wants to reject all these things, be rightly classified as moral absolutism?
40. In what way(s) is Kant's single "categorical imperative" in ethics like the law of noncontradiction in logic (a) in structure and (b) in function? (c) In what way(s) is it not?
41. (a) Would Kant agree with the text's implied judgment that one can logically accept either his epistemology without his ethics or his ethics without his epistemology? (b) Why or why not?
42. In both his epistemology and his ethics Kant tries to transcend the dilemma between objectivism and subjectivism by making the content of the rational mind and will *universal* and logically *necessary* even though they are *subjective* (i.e. created by the rational mind and will). What is the most important way in which this common strategy works differently

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in his morality than in his epistemology? (This is an unusually tough question, as is the previous one.)

43. Does Kant's ethics at least implicitly solve, resolve, or transcend the same dilemma as his epistemology attempts to do, viz. between Cartesian rationalism and Humean empiricism? If so, how?
44. Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals* seeks "the single absolute principle of all morality." (a) What justifies Kant's assumption that there is one? (b) What are the advantages and disadvantages of having an ethical philosophy that has only one absolute? (c) Must that absolute be abstract (a principle) or could it be concrete (a reality)?
45. (a) Kant wants to free ethics from its dependence on anthropology or philosophical psychology, a philosophy of "human nature." Why? (b) Would not an extraterrestrial race of nonhuman persons (e.g., Martians or angels) with a different nature (e.g., trisexual, or asexual, double-bodied or unbodied) have a very different set of ethical laws? (c) Could it be totally different? (d) Isn't human nature and human needs (e.g., for truth, life, and property) the necessary basis for moral laws (e.g., against lying, murder, and stealing)? How would Kant respond to this objection?
46. (a) What is Kant's reason for beginning with the assertion that the only intrinsic good is a good will? (b) Why not a good *person*? It is a person who wills, after all, not a will that "persons."
47. (a) What is a moral "imperative"? (b) How can it be "morally necessary?" Isn't necessity the opposite of freedom or free will? (c) Compare this necessity with logical necessity and metaphysical or ontological necessity. (Another difficult question!)
48. (a) Is Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative the same as the "golden rule"? (b) Is it the same as the virtue of charity, or unselfish love, if this is defined as "the will to the good of the other," as Aquinas does?
49. (a) In what way(s) does Kant supply something missing in Aristotle's ethics? (b) In what way(s) does Aristotle supply something missing in Kant's ethics? (This is a fairly easy question.)
50. How are Aristotle and Kant closer to each other in ethics than either is to the Sophists, Hobbes, Hume, or Utilitarianism? (Do not be satisfied with a vague, general answer.)
51. How does Kant change the meaning of each of the following words from what it is for what most people think of as "common sense" (e.g., Aristotle)? (a) "Reason"? (b) "Truth"? (c) "Happiness"? (d) "Courage"? (e) "Duty"?
52. Evaluate Kant's answer to the common criticism that his morality is too severe, idealistic, and unattainable (p. 139).
53. How would Kant justify the Dutch lying to the Nazis about where they were hiding the Jews?
54. Would Kant allow any suicide? Why or why not?
55. Would Kant allow any assassination of a tyrant? Why or why not?

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56. Would Kant do with traditional "just war theory"? Or would he be a pacifist? Why?
57. Evaluate Kant's deduction of his second formulation of the categorical imperative from the first, and his deduction of the third from the second.
58. Evaluate Kant's argument for the three presuppositions of morality (God, freedom, and immorality).
59. (a) Which of the ten overall critiques of Kant (pp. 145–149) seems to you the weakest? (b) Why? (c) Which seems the strongest? (d) Why? (e) How would Kant answer each one?

ON FICHTE

1. Is Fichte more skeptical than Kant or less skeptical?
2. Which one is closer to solipsism and why?
3. Do you see the movement from Descartes to Locke to Hume to Kant to Fichte as progress or regress? Why? Or do you see a break in that movement so that the progress or regress begins later than Descartes? If so, where and why?
4. What is the relation between the ego and God for Fichte? If they are identical, how can God write such obscure philosophy? If not, what is the difference?
5. What is the relation between Fichte's "ego" and Kant's "transcendental ego"? (See question 26 for Kant above)
6. When (i.e., in whose philosophy) did the word "consciousness" change its meaning from a verb to a noun, from something relative to reality (consciousness *of* something) to something absolute, a kind of world of its own?
7. Do you see any connection between Fichte's metaphysics and his politics?
8. How can Fichte maintain that subordination to the state increases human freedom?
9. Why do you think Kant was literally horrified by Fichte's revision of his philosophy?
10. Compare the pantheisms of Spinoza and Fichte. Compare Fichte also with Shankara and Parmenides (vol. I).

QUESTIONS ON SCHELLING

1. (a) How do *you* solve the problem that subject and object are relative to each other (pp. 154–155)? (b) Compare the problem of "the gnoseo-ontological circle," that knowledge is relative to being *and* being is relative to knowledge (pp. 164–165); how are these two problems different? (c) In terms of inclusion, how can each of two circles surround the other?"
2. What *difference* does it make whether you are a pantheist of the Fichte, the Schelling, or the Hegel variety? In other words, what are the different consequences of these three pantheisms (p. 155)?
3. Do you think we can know God, or "the Absolute," better by reason (Hegel) or by mystical experience (Schelling) (p. 155)? Why?

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4. If Schelling's criticism of Hegel is valid (p. 155), and if most people agree with Schelling rather than Hegel, why is Hegel so much more famous, popular, and taken seriously?

QUESTIONS ON HEGEL

1. (a) The text sees a historical similarity (though not a similarity in philosophical content) among Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hegel (p. 156). What are the historical (not philosophical) dissimilarities? (b) Do you see any philosophical similarities?
2. (a) Explain Kierkegaard's joke on Hegel (p. 157). (b) How could a mere joke be so elaborately philosophical? (c) Is there any similar example? (d) Could life itself be an elaborate joke? (e) Why or why not?
3. Do you think James' Hegel joke (p. 157) was literal or not? Why?
4. Compare your intuitive reaction to Hegel with your intuitive reaction to the Brooklyn Bridge (pp. 157–158).
5. (a) Hegel's claims to completeness and finality (p. 157) seem to make him more dogmatic and less skeptical than other philosophers, but his historicism (p. 158) seems to make him more skeptical than any previous philosopher. How can that be? (b) Why could the same be said of Nietzsche (vol. 4)? (Obviously, you shouldn't do this question if you haven't read Nietzsche yet.)
6. Compare Hegel's historicism with Teilhard de Chardin's (vol. 4) evolutionism.
7. What are the consequences of Hegel's interest in politics rather than science in contrast to most of the other Enlightenment philosophers' interest in science rather than politics? (p. 158)
8. How could Hegel, a strong German (Prussian) nationalist, admire France's (Napoleon's) conquest of Prussia (p. 159)?
9. How could Hegel conceive of God, or "the Absolute," as growing and learning from history? (p. 159)
10. When and why did the passionate progressivism and optimism of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution die out?
11. (a) Must a religion share the progress or regress of the rest of its culture (p. 159)? (b) Why or why not? (c) Test your answer by the history of the "First World" (Western civilization), (d) the "Second World" (communist cultures), and (e) the "Third World" (Asia and Africa) in modern times.
12. Mention a number of areas where Hegel's dialectic seems to you to be true and a number of areas where it does not.
13. Can the form of the dialectic be extracted from the content (a) according to Hegel? (b) According to Marx (vol. 4)? (c) Why or why not? (d) Ask the same question about Aristotle's logic and Buddha's "four noble truths" (vol. 1).

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14. (a) "Relation" was only one of the nine "accidents" for Aristotle, and relative to "substance," which was what "had" relations; but for Hegel, relation is the nature of absolute reality. Who's right here? (b) Why? (c) Is there a third possibility between Aristotle's "external relations" and Hegel's "internal relations"?
15. Evaluate the two examples of Hegel's dialectic on p. 161. Do you find anything missing?
16. How, for Hegel, can thought and being be the same (p. 162) if not all beings think and not all beings are thought about (at least by man as distinct from God)? Who ever thought about the ninety-eighth largest rock on Pluto's second moon?
17. (a) Is Hegel's equation of thought and being the same as that of Parmenides? (b) Is it the same as Berkeley's "*esse est percipi*"? (c) Is It the only answer to the "gnoseo-ontological circle" (pp. 164–165)?
18. Evaluate Hegel's argument for absolute idealism on p. 162.
19. Hegel's philosophy is one solution to the problem of the "critique of reason" that is the main problem of all the classically modern philosophers (except Pascal) (p. 163). (a) What, exactly, is that problem? (b) What are the alternative solutions to it? (c) Which seems to you the best? (d) Why?
20. Compare Hegel's solution to "the gnoseo-ontological circle" (pp. 164–165) with the alternatives.
21. (a) Evaluate Hegel's teachings of "concrete universals" and "internal relations. (b) Do they imply each other or can one be true without the other? (c) What would Aristotle or Aquinas say about these two ideas?
22. (a) Why does Hegel think that the plot of his "phenomenology of spirit" is fact, not fiction? (b) Could it be called "the history of God"? If so, is Hegel God's biographer?
23. Is "sense-certainty," the first stage, a category confusion, since (I) sensation is material and certainty is mental, and since (II) sensation, like conception, concerns "the first act of the mind" while certainty concerns the second? How would Hegel see that criticism as a misunderstanding of what he means by "sense-certainty"?
24. Why are stages 7 and 8 associated with specific philosophies (Marxism and Stoicism) while the others are not?
25. (a) Why does any "master-slave relationship" enslave the master more than the slave? (Hint: Is the opposite of freedom external slavery or internal addiction?) (b) Apply this to yourself and your smartphone. (c) Which loss would threaten your identity more, losing your smartphone or losing your God?
26. (a) Hegel called himself a Christian. Why? (b) Kierkegaard called him an atheist. Why? (c) What do you call him? Why?
27. What would Hegel say about the proper place and role in life of personal religious faith?

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28. What are the likenesses and differences between the Judeo-Christian doctrine of universal divine providence and Hegel's philosophy of history?
29. How is Hegel related to the Enlightenment (p. 172)?
30. Evaluate, pro and con, the quotation on pp. 172–173.
31. How would Hegel answer the critique in p. 173?
32. (a) How convincing and how unconvincing do you find Hegel's three stages of history (pp. 173–174)? (b) Why?
33. (a) Evaluate Hegel's answer to the question of how to combine liberalism and conservatism (p. 174). (b) Apply this to his philosophy of freedom (p. 175).
34. (a) Define totalitarianism. (b) Is Hegel a totalitarian or not? (c) If so, why would he reject fascism and communism? If so, why would fascists and communists reject him?
35. Do you see any connections between (I) Hegel's glorification of war, (II) his nationalism rather than internationalism, and (III) his denial of a "natural law" morality?
36. (a) Are the thirteen criticisms of Hegel's claim to be a Christian (pp. 178–179) viable only from the perspective of traditional Christianity or also from a nonreligious, neutral, or skeptical point of view? (b) Why?
37. Why is the most frequently used word in these questions the word "why"?
38. What is the essence of Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel? (N.b. your answer to this question might be part of your answer to question 36.)
39. (a) Why do you think the whole chapter on Hegel was less neutral and more critical than almost any other? (b) Is it unfair, prejudiced, inaccurate, or full of misunderstandings?
40. Do you see any apparent borrowings from Hegel in Derrida (vol. 4, ch. 95)?

ON SCHOPENHAUER

1. Is Schopenhauer the most pessimistic philosopher who ever lived? If not, who is?
2. Why is "obit anus, abit onus" the thing you will probably remember longest about him?
3. Try to imagine a possible failure that is more complete than the one in p. 183.
4. Why is this miserable pessimist, misanthropist, and curmudgeon more interesting and even, to many readers, more beloved than many optimistic, humanistic, and happy philosophers?
5. Which is more pessimistic, Schopenhauer's substitution of Satan for God (p. 183) or Hegel's substitution of Rhett Butler's "Frankly, my dear, I just don't give a damn" in *Gone with the Wind* for God? Is it better to be hated or ignored?
6. How many people in our culture today believe the first line of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Idea*? Do they mean the same thing by it as Schopenhauer did?
7. Is Schopenhauer a good argument for atheism (cf. p. 183) or against it?

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8. (a) What does Schopenhauer's comparison of Hume and Hegel (p. 183) reveal about him? (b) What does it reveal about Hume and Hegel?
9. How can anyone teach that will is impersonal and ideas are personal instead of vice versa? (p. 185)
10. What kind of argument, if any, does Schopenhauer have for his voluntarism?
11. (a) If p. 185 is true, is it a disproof of the possibility of a heaven? (b) Why or why not?
12. How would Buddha evaluate Schopenhauer's agreements with Buddhism?

ON MACHIAVELLI

1. Answer the question on p. 190: Why do we find evil more interesting than good if it isn't?
2. Why do some philosophers' lives and personalities (Diogenes, Augustine, Al-Ghazali, Schopenhauer, Machiavelli, Rousseau) influence their philosophies more than others' (Aristotle, Aquinas, Reid, Kant, Hegel)?
3. (a) Why is Machiavelli called "the founder of modern political philosophy"? (b) Is Descartes called "the father of modern philosophy" for a similar reason? (c) Which is the more radically new founding and why?
4. (a) Why was Machiavelli the first philosopher to try to make politics a science, to reduce political success to a formula? Why was this not ever done before Machiavelli, even among the Sophists, whose views Machiavelli shared? (b) Rewrite this question substituting "Descartes" for "Machiavelli" and "philosophy" for "politics" and then answer it. (c) Compare your two answers.
5. Compare Machivelli's philosophical anthropology with Hobbes' (p. 192).
6. (a) Which of the four revolutionary and radical points at p. 192 seems to you to be the most important and making the greatest difference? (b) Why? (c) Compare the point on p. 193.
7. If metaphysics is unavoidable (p. 192), how did Hume and Kant avoid it?
8. (a) Why is Machiavelli's disagreement with Plato's idealistic politics in the *Republic* necessarily a disagreement in metaphysics? (b) The answer is not Plato's "Ideas" or "Forms" because Aristotle also disagrees with them but is essentially on Plato's side, not Machiavelli's. Why? (Cf. p. 193–194.)
9. Machiavelli never says he is a materialist; how do we know he was?
10. Machiavelli never says he is an atheist; how do we know he was?
11. Why, if one believes in Machiavelli's two italicized assumptions on p. 193 and p. 194, as most people do today in Western civilization, do they look down on Machiavelli? How do they avoid the Machiavellian logical consequences of these assumptions?
12. Compare Machiavelli's division of life into *virtù* and *fortuna* with the Stoics' equivalent division into what can and cannot be controlled. If they are the same, or at least very

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similar, why is the Stoics' philosophy so dissimilar from Machiavelli's? (This is a challenging question.)

13. How does Machiavelli's and Bacon's new *summum bonum* account for our love of technology? (Easy question? Pursue it a bit further, then.)
14. Why has Machiavelli's piece of advice on p. 195 worked better in history than his other pieces of advice?
15. The text criticizes Machiavelli for ignoring *te*. (a) Why must *te* be invisible? (b) Why is it not immediately evident, though invisible, as the wind is, from its effects? What kind of eye is necessary to be aware of its reality? (c) Why did Machiavelli, despite his extensive reading in history, not perceive it?
16. Psychologists and city policemen who deal with gangs of Satanists always say that the attraction of Satanism is power. If Machiavelli met Satan and was offered power, do you think he would accept or not? Would he reinterpret Satan as a friend, as Goethe did in *Faust*?
17. How do you refute Machiavelli's persuasive argument on pp. 198–199?
18. (a) How do you refute his argument against kindness? (b) Against generosity? (c) Against honesty?
19. If most people in our culture today believe that "there is no such thing as a natural end of human nature or human life" (p. 200), why don't they usually draw Machiavelli's logical conclusion of immorality from it?
20. (a) Why does Machiavelli's principle that "it is better to be feared than to be loved" seem very logical? (b) Why does it not work, then?
21. (a) Does his principle that "it is better to seem good than to be good" also seem very logical? (b) Does it work? If so, where? If not, why not?
22. What was Plato's basic reason for the fundamental conclusion of his *Republic*, that "justice is always more profitable than injustice"? (b) How does Machiavelli claim to refute this argument? (c) Evaluate who is right and why. (A very basic question.)
23. Why doesn't the end justify the means? Does a "means" *mean* a means *to an end*?
24. How is Machiavelli's formula for success (the conquest of *fortuna* by *virtù*), which seems self-evidently true, not only false but self-refuting (p. 201)?
25. The greatest mass murderer in human history, Mao Zedong, famously wrote that "justice comes out of the barrel of a gun." Would Machiavelli agree with that? Why or why not? (Cf. p. 200.) What is the alternative?
26. Evaluate, both logically and empirically (in your own life and in history) the critique of Machiavelli on pp. 200–201.

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ON HOBBES

1. (a) How can someone hate syllogisms (p. 202)? Isn't that like hating triangles? (b) Why was Hobbes in love with the logic of Euclid's geometry but hated Aristotle?
2. (a) Does one's evaluation of the relation between the "inner cop" and the "outer cop" at p. 202 influence whether one prefers monarchy or democracy? (b) If so, how? If not, why not?
3. (a) What is Hobbes' most important agreement with Machiavelli and what is his most important addition to him? (b) Why are they the most important ones?
4. What is the connection between Hobbes' materialistic metaphysics and his political philosophy? Could one believe either one without the other? If so, how?
5. Hobbes admired both Cromwell and the king, though they were mortal enemies. What did he see in both of them that attracted him other than the opportunity for his own personal profit? Why would he have admired George Washington less than either of those two? (If you don't know history well, especially Cromwell, you probably won't "get" this question.)
6. Hobbes would also not have admired the French Revolution if he had lived to see it. Neither did Edmund Burke, who did. Yet Hobbes and Burke were opposites, and their antipathy to the French Revolution would come from opposite premises. Explain why, if you know Burke.
7. (a) Why can't a materialist accept formal or final causes? After all, material beings like animals have species (formal causes) and material things like organs have purposes (final causes), don't they? (b) Why can't an atheist accept formal or final causes? After all, God could equally have created a mechanistic universe like Hobbes'.
8. How would Hobbes answer the charge that his metaphysics of materialism is the justification for the rest of his philosophy, yet he says that metaphysics is a mistake and an impossibility, even that the word "being" is meaningless?
9. What difference does it make if matter is pushed from behind by efficient causes or pulled from ahead by final causes (p. 208)?
10. Why does Hobbes associate efficient causes with the modern notion of matter as active and final causes with the ancient notion of matter as passive? Why isn't it the opposite, since final causes are living and dynamic, like animals, while efficient and material causes are dead, like machines?
11. (a) Can one be a materialist and not see man as a machine (and the brain as "a computer made of meat")? (b) If not, why not? If so, how?
12. Answer the question at the end of p. 204.
13. (a) Does modern science's notion of matter confirm Hobbes' anthropology of voluntarism (p. 205)? (b) Why or why not?

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14. (a) Was Hobbes simply being a hypocrite in being a materialist yet speaking favorably of religion and natural "rights"? (b) Could this have been part of a consistent strategy, as suggested on p. 207, for avoiding logical arguments and using intellectual bullying instead? After all, Hobbes considered himself at war (p. 208), and in war, which weapon works best for you, force and bullying or reasoning? (c) Or is that an unfair innuendo? (d) Is an "innuendo" an Italian suppository?
15. Why did Hobbes deliberately avoid giving reasons and logical arguments in his "debate" with Descartes? (Did it sound like one of our presidential "debates" that way?) (Preacher's marginal note to himself in a sermon: "Point weak here, holler like Hell.")
16. Why are Hobbes and most other modern philosophers more afraid of, averse to, ignoring of, or misinterpreting, Aristotle than any other philosopher? It's like being afraid of Mister Rogers. Aristotle seems so nonthreatening and commonsensical. Why was Aristotle not included in the epistemological debates among rationalists, empiricists, and idealists?
17. Hobbes is not only more interested in politics than in anything else, he makes politics the ultimate reason and standard for everything else (p. 208). Why? What do you think is behind this as its first cause? Four candidates for that answer are listed on p. 209, and a fifth on p. 208; is there a sixth? Which do you pick and why?
18. Is Hobbes arguing in the long quote on p. 208 that belief in transubstantiation would lessen the power of the sovereign and the state, *therefore* it must be false? Does he think that conclusion logically follows? Is Hobbes that deficient in logic? Or is it perfectly logically consistent for a materialist to reduce proof and perhaps even truth to the subjective, psychological power (efficient causality) of motives rather than objective logical evidence? If so, why?
19. What do you think is the psychological motive for and attractiveness of materialism?
20. Is the concept of "artificial intelligence" implicitly and inherently materialistic (p. 204)?
21. Do you think materialism is the source of nominalism, vice versa, or neither (p. 209)? Why?
22. Hobbes is usually seen as an extremist of the political right. Yet his obsession with "political correctness" is most typical of the left. Explore that apparent contradiction.
23. Evaluate Hobbes' argument against free will. If it is logically weak, why is it psychologically strong (i.e., attractive) to him?
24. Can one take reductionism a step beyond the nineteen on pp. 212–213?
25. (a) Do you see any of these nineteen reductionisms as reasonable and true? If so, why? (b) Do you see any of them as logically self-contradictory? If so, explain.
26. Why do you think Hobbes did not draw the skeptical conclusions from his materialistic and "hard empiricist" epistemology that Hume did (p. 213–215)?
27. Give at least two reasons why Hobbes must reject *analogy*, both in objective reality and in subjective thinking (cf. p. 213).

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28. Why is this chapter more full of logical criticisms of its philosopher than almost any other? If you think this is intemperate or unjust, does the last paragraph (p. 224) answer that objection?
29. How is Aristotle's ethics closer to Hobbes than Kant's is? How is it closer to Kant's than to Hobbes'?
30. (a) Is Hobbes' ethics logically self-contradictory (p. 216)? (b) If not, why not? If so, why didn't Hobbes see this? (Or, if he did, why didn't he care?)
31. Give at least three reasons why it is impossible for Hobbes to accept the notion of a natural moral law.
32. *Why* do you think Hobbes took the common good more seriously than Machiavelli did (p. 317)?
33. If materialists, reductionists, and immoralists like Hobbes ignore or deny most of the dimensions of reality that most common people believe are real, why are they commonly called "realists" (instead of "idealists")?
34. How do Hobbes' three most famous and distinctive political ideas (p. 217) imply each other, or are relative to each other?
35. How much is Hobbes' theory that man is not by nature social weakened if the "state of nature" is not historically real?
36. What do you see as Hobbes' most important inheritance from or agreement with Machiavelli and what do you see as his most important deviation from him?
37. (a) Is it inevitable that when the "inner cop" of conscience is denied, the "outer cop" of state power must fill in the vacuum? (b) If so, why? If not, why not? (c) Is there any other block, besides conscience, to totalitarianism? (d) Can there be a non-tyrannical, non-dictatorial totalitarianism? Is *Brave New World* an example of that?
38. What would Hobbes reply to the criticism on p. 220?
39. If Hobbes' politics logically follows from his metaphysics and epistemology, why are they more popular than his politics?
40. Which is more dangerous, Hobbes' "hard totalitarianism" or Rousseau's "soft totalitarianism" (p. 221)? Why?
41. How inevitable, logical, and necessary is the progression from Machiavelli to Hobbes to Locke (p. 222)?
42. Must Hobbes oppose traditional religion? Why or why not?
43. Could Hobbes possibly have been serious about and actually believed his bizarre interpretation of the Christian religion? Could his reading public possibly be serious about it? If not, is it a joke, or simply a ploy, a clumsy attempt to get a job by avoiding the label of atheism? Compare Hume's claim that only a religion that reason refutes could be the true religion (p. 93).

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44. "Traditionalists" or "conservatives" tend to believe in hierarchy and authority, as well as morality and religion, and focus on spiritual matters like God and eternal life. "Progressivists" or "modernists" tend to believe in equality and libertarianism and to be skeptical of morality and religion and focus on material matters like technology and creature comforts in this life. Hobbes is a materialist and thus a modernist, yet his political philosophy is so strongly hierarchical and authoritarian that he is almost a totalitarian. Thus he does not fit into either of the two usual categories. Is he inconsistent or are the categories wrong? (Hint: The two most powerful totalitarianisms in modern times, viz. communism and fascism or Nazism, both saw traditional religion as their enemy. How does that affect the typically modern polarization of "progressives" vs. "conservatives"?)
45. How can Hobbes, as a Nominalist, make judgments about "human nature" as essentially selfish, aggressive, and warlike if there are no such things as human nature or essences?

ON ROUSSEAU

1. Do you see any relationship between Rousseau's talents and his personal defects (p. 225)?
2. (a) What do you think is the explanation for the difference between most modern "intellectuals" like Rousseau and those of past eras, as summarized on p. 226? (b) Why do you think this difference is much greater among "intellectuals" than among any other class (e.g., the wealthy, or those in political power)?
3. Can you justify (or dis-justify) the justification for the text spending so much space on Rousseau's life (p. 231)?
4. What accounts for the public's passionate love for "a monstrous hypocrite" (p. 232)?
5. (a) What do you think is the *source* of Rousseau's reliance on emotion on nearly every issue? (b) Compare the Stoics and Aristotle as two other alternatives. (c) Does the fact that young people today typically say "I feel that" instead of "I think that" or "I believe that" mean that they also emotionalize much of what used to be matters of intellect or reason (love, conscience, religion, morality, politics, self-consciousness)? (d) If not, why not? If so, what do you think is the source of that change? (e) Do you see some of the answer to that question in Descartes, Hume, and/or Kant?
6. (a) Did Rousseau believe that (I) in the "state of nature," all men were altruistic and not egotistic, or did he believe that (II) egotism is harmless, necessary, and good, or that (III) egotism and altruism are not opposed?(b) If (I), compare Rousseau's with the Bible's answer to the question of what radical event changed man from good to evil. (c) Which answer of the three do you think explains the data of experience better? (d) Why?
7. Both Rousseau and Hobbes contrast the "state of nature" and civil society, and scholars dispute whether they meant this "state of nature" as a past historical fact or as an abstraction, "the state of nature" being simply human nature as such (i.e., what Aristotle

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would call "substantially" or Aquinas "essentially") without civil society being added to it, as what Aristotle would call an "accident." (a) For which thinker, Hobbes or Rousseau, would the historical existence of such a state be more crucial to his moral and political philosophy? (b) Why? (c) For which thinker would that concept be more metaphysically problematic as a mere abstraction or possibility? (d) Why?

8. Hobbes and Rousseau are often contrasted as pessimist vs. optimist concerning man. But there are also deep agreements between these two thinkers, however opposite their personalities and anthropologies. What are the most important ones?
9. (a) Is Rousseau an egalitarian (pro "freedom" and "democracy" and rebellion against both "throne and altar") or an elitist (only the "solitary dreamer" like himself can return to the state of nature)? (b) Could he be both? If so, how? If not, how does he seem to be?
10. (a) Compare Rousseau's answer to the question "In what are all men by nature equal and in what are they unequal?" with the answer given by common sense and experience. (b) In what, if anything, do you think are they the same and in what, if anything, are they different?
11. (a) Can the origin of society be both "natural," as Aristotle and the ancients thought, and also a "social contract," as Rousseau thought? (b) Explain: Why or why not?
12. (a) Compare the following four options: (I) Freedom makes morality possible (Kant); (II) freedom does not merely make morality possible (Aquinas, Kant) but also actually creates morality (the Sophists, Rousseau [p. 237], and Sartre); (III) in practice, morality creates freedom (Plato, Stoicism, and Augustine); (IV) the two are independent of each other (Euthyphro, Al-Ash'ari, and Ockham). (b) Are any two of these options logically compatible with each other?
13. (a) If it is true, as the text argues or implies, that a democracy without a "natural moral law" but ruled by the "General Will" (Rousseau's option) is more totalitarian than a monarchy with a natural law, what are the consequences or corollaries of this view, especially for the issues of our current era? If that is not true, why not? (b) What defenses work best against this danger?
14. If Rousseau were alive today, would he be using social media and AI to scam little old ladies, or would he be a popular pop psychologist or a televangelist? Are these three things incompatible?

ON MARX

1. Why is the political left labeled "liberal" if its leftward drift is measured by its closeness to Marx, who was in favor of totalitarianism rather than liberalism (p. 241)? (b) Why are fascism or Nazism and Marxism or communism labeled opposite extremes of "right" and "left" if they are so similarly totalitarian? (c) How did the war between the "Hegelian right" and the "Hegelian left" form a new meaning to the categories of "right" and "left" in

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modern politics (p. 242)? (d) Where did these two terms originate at the time of the French Revolution? Why is that helpful to understand the present?

2. Evaluate the claim about Marxism on p. 241: If it is true, why do intellectuals in contemporary Western culture massively lean "leftward"? If it is not true, why not?
3. If both the points in the first two paragraphs of p. 242 are true, what conclusion logically follows if you put these two together as premises?
4. (a) Do you see any connection between Marx's favorite quotation (p. 242) and his atheism? (b) What about his anti-Semitism (p. 242)? (c) Is that primarily metaphysical, historical, economic, racial, or religious?
5. (a) Since Marx is an atheist and a materialist, does it follow that he is an empiricist rather than an a priori rationalist (cf. p. 243, 246)? (b) Why or why not? (c) Is it possible to be an empiricist in theory but not in practice? (d) Why or why not? (e) Is it possible to be an empiricist in practice but not in theory? (f) Why or why not? (g) Is "ideologism" an epistemological alternative to both rationalism and empiricism (p. 245)? (h) Compare the "ideologism" of Marx with that of Hobbes.
6. What justifies the critique of Marx's personality in a book about his philosophy?
7. (a) What is the logical connection between a philosophy that denies a universal natural moral law and the use of violence rather than reason to deal with controversies? (b) Is this equally true for the political right and the left (cf. Hegel, p. 177)?
8. Why are the four philosophers that received the most direct and thorough negative criticism in this book the four most important *political* philosophers (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx)? Is this accidental?
9. Evaluate logically the claim that materialism is epistemologically self-contradictory (pp. 245–246 and also pp. 247–248).
10. (a) Why did Hegel's dialectic prove not only useful but foundational and formative to Marx and Kierkegaard, both of whom despised Hegel and would also have despised each other? (b) Does the mutually antipathetic triangle among these three philosophers disprove the adage that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"? (c) If not, why not? If so, where is that adage still true?
11. What is the connection between metaphysical materialism (or epiphenomenalism) and Marx's claim that all of history is conflict and oppression of the weak (the "have nots") by the strong (the "haves")? Hint: Think of the basic laws of physics. Can two bodies occupy the same space at the same time? But can two minds think the same thought at the same time?
12. (a) Why are there more objections (twenty-three!) to Marxism than to any other philosophy in this book? (b) Which of the twenty-three seem to you the most important? (c) Why? (d) Which seem the weakest or least important? (e) Why?

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13. This book is not about practice, what to do, but theory, what to think. (a) If its appraisal of Marx (and Hobbes and Rousseau) are true in theory, what practical advice do you think follows for individuals? (b) What follows for nations? (c) If its appraisal is not true, where and why is it mistaken?

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VOLUME 4: CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS

1. Western philosophy in the twentieth century is largely divided into the "analytic" philosophers in the English-speaking world and the phenomenologists and existentialists in continental Europe. All three are essentially *methods* of doing philosophy, thus claiming to fulfill the quest of Descartes, "the father of modern philosophy," for a better method. Do you see any connection between that fact and the fact that the three greatest practitioners of these three new methods, Wittgenstein, Husserl, and Heidegger, all considered their first and most essential tasks and books to have been failures?
2. The early Sophists and the late Skeptics in ancient philosophy, and Ockham at the end of medieval philosophy, judged the goal of metaphysics to be unattainable, viz. the first meaning of logos, objective intelligible order in being. Hume and Kant, at the end of classical modern philosophy, made the goal of epistemology impossible, viz. the second meaning of logos, certain knowledge of objective reality. Wittgenstein and Nietzsche both, from very different vantage points, declared that the third meaning of logos, viz. communication, the goal of linguistics, scientifically clear and true language, could not be attained either. So what's left for philosophy to do?
3. Why is Hegel so central to contemporary philosophy? If all roads lead away from Hegel (Marxism, positivism, logical positivism, both theistic [Kierkegaard] and atheistic [Nietzsche] existentialism), why is he so determinative? Even his dialectical method is imitated by two of his bitterest enemies, Marx (dialectical materialism) and Kierkegaard (the three stages on life's way), what gives the philosopher that nearly everyone rejects the power to determine and influence, if only negatively, all future schools of philosophy?
4. Why is it that "philosophers are less important for their culture in this time period [contemporary philosophy] than in the classical modern period, less in that period than in the Middle Ages, and less in the Middle Ages than in classical ancient times." (a) Why? (b) What comes next?

ON KIERKEGAARD

1. If existentialism is about the questions that almost everyone finds the most important (footnote on p. 3), and if its founder's (SK's) writing style was "fine, light, satirical, (and) fascinating," why do you suppose he was "untranslated and unknown outside his provincial, native Denmark for three-quarters of a century after his death"? In the whole history

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of philosophy, I can think of no other important philosopher who remained so unknown for so long. Why?

2. Another distinctive thing about SK, and another puzzle: I know of no philosopher, especially in relatively modern times, who has been so massively misunderstood or at least interpreted in a way utterly alien to his intention. His own interpretation of his own work (p. 6) has been simply ignored by philosophers and noted only by theologians and religious writers, even though the rest of his work has been very widely influential. What do you think accounts for that? (This is a question that has no one obvious answer.)
3. SK saw himself as a "Christian Socrates." How many Socratic features can you find in the one-page excerpt from SK on p. 4?
4. (a) How are SK's adjectives for his three "stages" different from what most people mean by those three words today? (b) How are all three of these differences (between SK's meaning and the popular meaning) meant to correct popular misunderstandings of them, if SK is right?
5. (a) Is the ethical stage closer to the aesthetic stage or to the religious stage? (b) Which transition is the hardest?
6. (a) The stages are teleologically ordered "upward" as stages of spiritual growth. Can they also describe three "falls" downward? (b) If so, can there be a "fall" downward into the religious? (c) Can there be a "fall" downward from the aesthetic? (Hint: see p. 9) (d) Why or why not?
7. Find at least half a dozen real historical figures and at least half a dozen fictional characters who exemplify each of the three stages.
8. (a) How is SK's method Socratic? (b) Why is this method useful for him in what he saw as his "mission" to our post-Christian culture? (c) How did he see so far ahead? (A century ago, America sent missionaries to Africa; today, Africa sends missionaries to America.)
9. (a) Why, for SK, must "the religious writer . . . begin with aesthetic achievement"? (b) Does this apply to beauty (the ordinary meaning of "aesthetic") as well as to pleasure and power (SK's meaning of "aesthetic")? (c) How does the Socratic method appeal to the interlocutor's desire for power?
10. What does "to smuggle Christianity into Christendom" (p. 7) mean today? What is most fundamentally new about "the new evangelization"?
11. (All of this question is highly speculative, and an interesting side road.) (a) Is power a fourth stage or is it the summit and center of the aesthetic stage? SK wrote in his journals, "If I had a humble spirit in my service, who, when I asked for a glass of water, brought me the world's costliest wines blended in a chalice, I should dismiss him, in order to teach him that pleasure consists not in what I enjoy, but in having my own way." Thus power transcends and transforms pleasure. (b) Is this the inner origin of Nietzsche's "will to power" (p. 30)? (c) Is this will to power the origin of communism's appeal? If so, Nietzsche, rather

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than Marx, has excavated its deeper foundations. (d) Is it the deeper origin of technology "man's *conquest* of nature"?

12. (a) In light of p. 8, SK is implying that this principle of child psychology about boredom is a much more fundamental principle for adults than we think. Why? (b) Why is that principle almost never noted in our culture? (c) How is advertising dependent on it? (d) What makes boredom more profoundly important than it seems to be? How much is war motivated by boredom? (What could be less boring than killing and being killed?) (e) Are "progressives" necessarily more bored (with the status quo) than "conservatives," and therefore more unhappy (see p. 8)?
13. (a) Is SK's satirical paragraph on p. 8 meant seriously? (b) Literally? (c) Who is speaking this paragraph, SK or his "aesthetic" opposite? (d) Or *is* that SK's opposite? If SK is writing as a religious writer, can he also write as an aesthetic one?
14. (a) How is boredom related to intelligence? (b) How is it related to what premodern philosophers called "reason"? (c) What is the difference between those two questions? (d) Why is it significant? (e) Why is it *very* significant?
15. Why does Judge William's critique of the aesthete (p. 8) work better than an appeal to ethical conscience?
16. William writes: "In fact you are nothing; you are merely a relation to others" (p. 8). (a) Is this metaphysically possible? Can there be relations without a substance? (b) Can you disappear into your Facebook page like a galaxy into a black hole? (c) Can a self lose its very self? A triangle cannot lose it triangularity and become non-triangular, but a human can become "inhuman." How is this possible? (d) What is meant by "What does it profit a man if he gain the whole world but lose his own soul (self)?" (e) Is this a more profound notion of hell than physical fire? (f) Why or why not?
17. (a) In light of the above, how does Judge William's last paragraph on p. 8 explain "the problem of evil," or "why do the righteous suffer?" (b) Can that explanation work for an atheist as well as for a theist?
18. (a) Why is the choice between the aesthetic and the ethical more important than the choice between good and evil (p. 9)? (b) Does it follow that the immoral, the very wicked, are closer to religious conversion than the amoral, the comfortable and respectable? (c) If so, then why is ethics a friend and aid to religion rather than an obstacle and a temptation?
19. (a) Is the lack of all three stages possible (p. 9)? (b) If not, why? If so, is it what Pascal called "indifference" or is it different?
20. (a) Are the three different interpretations of Genesis 11 (Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac), viz. SK's, the Jewish, and the Christian, compatible and synthesizable? (b) If so, how? If not, why not?

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21. (a) Is Abraham the unique and only example of "the teleological suspension of the ethical"? (b) If the answer is no, it is common, then does that make SK a follower of Euthyphro and the Ash'arites? If the answer is yes, how is Abraham relevant to the rest of us, for whom the religious always includes the ethical?
22. Why would SK say that having God as your absolute is better than having moral law as your absolute, as in Kant?
23. SK's "knight of faith" differs from his "knight of infinite resignation" by having the theological virtue of hope as well as faith (p. 10). Why isn't faith without hope more purely altruistic and thus more perfectly ethical?
24. (a) SK's example of the "knight of faith" is a father taking his family to a picnic. Is his point the act's ordinariness or its motivation? (b) If the latter, is SK saying that, at least in the religious stage, Abelard and Kant are right in reducing all good and evil to subjective, personal motivation rather than including also the objective deed done?
25. (a) Why, for SK, is Hegel's philosophy more dangerous than overt atheism (e.g., Nietzsche)? (b) Is it more dangerous for the philosopher himself as well as for his followers?
26. (a) How was SK closer to Nietzsche than to his fellow Christians (p. 11)? (b) Why did the two most extreme opposites unite on this question? (By "this question" I mean your answer to (a).)
27. (a) If SK had read and understood Aquinas, would he have satirized him as he satirized Hegel for being so very systematic, rational, clear, and complete? (b) Why or why not? (c) Is Aquinas closer to Hegel or to SK? (d) Why?
28. (a) Put in your own words SK's point about Hegel beginning with nothing (p. 11). (b) Is SK's point a Nietzschean voluntarism (cf. p. 326)? (c) Is faith an act of mind or of will (cf. p. 321)? (d) Why was that a trick question?
29. (a) Why do existentialists like SK always use "existence" subjectively rather than objectively, or psychologically rather than ontologically (i.e. to designate a concrete individual person and life rather than the metaphysical aspect of being that is distinct from essence), as in Aquinas? (b) Why do atheistic existentialists like Sartre follow SK in that usage?
30. (a) Concerning p. 11: Compare these four possible answers to the question: Can (human) existence be a (rational) system? (I) Yes, for both man and God; (II) no, for both man and God; (III) yes for God but not for man; (IV) yes for man but not for God. What are the consequences of these four possibilities? (b) Find one philosopher who holds each of the four. (N.b. for (IV), the philosopher would have to be both a rationalist and an atheist.)
31. (a) What is the difference between Hegel's "the real is the rational and the rational is the real" version of "the unity of thought and being" (p. 12) and those of some other philosophers who might use that same formula (e.g., Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, John the Evangelist, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley)? (This is a very demanding and difficult question, so use only a philosopher or philosophers you under-

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stand well.) (b) What is the difference between the rejection of that formula by SK, Pascal, and Marcel and the rejection of it by Nietzsche and Sartre? (You will of course not be able to answer that question until you read Nietzsche, Sartre, and Marcel.)

32. (a) How might SK have interpreted Jesus' claim, "I am the Truth" (cf. John 14:6) in light of his concept of "truth as subjectivity" (p. 12)? (b) How would one interpret it if one disagreed with SK's "truth as subjectivity"?
33. (a) Would Aquinas agree with SK's last two sentences in the excerpt on pp. 12–13 or not? (b) Why or why not? (N.b. the answer to this question is not as clear, certain, and obvious as it seems.)
34. SK's religious definition of love (p. 13) seems identical with the ethical definition of love in Kant: an act of will, not feeling. How then does religious love differ from ethical love?
35. (a) Why is the *question* of SK's *Philosophical Fragments* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (p. 13) so crucial to him? (b) What is his answer to it? (c) How is it a distinctively Protestant rather than Catholic or Orthodox answer?
36. (a) Is SK's critique of modern Western society in *The Present Age* still valid? Isn't our problem the opposite of SK's, viz. the individualistic, libertarian priority of the individual good over the common good, the lack of real community, the demand for autonomy, and the subjectivistic tendency to speak of "my truth" vs. "your truth"? (b) Might exaggerated individualism and exaggerated collectivism have a common origin and even merge into a single thing? Cf. Maritain, p. 297.

ON NIETZSCHE

1. Nietzsche called himself "The Hammer." To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Why did Nietzsche pick religion, morality, and philosophy as his three main "nails"? What unites them? Why not art, or sex, or math, or science, or technology, or war, or poetry?
2. Why was it "the will to power" that Nietzsche came to settle on as the fundamental value and the fundamental reality? There are many other alternatives to religion (God), morality (virtue), and philosophy (wisdom).
3. If Nietzsche had converted to Christianity, what kind of Christian would he look like? Pick a historical example.
4. (a) Which of the "five different takes on Nietzsche" do you see most appropriate? (b) Why? (N.b. agreeing with the author is never the default position. Neither is disagreeing.)
5. Why would a seriously religious person not automatically choose "take" #4?
6. Nietzsche tried in vain to marry the "Apollonian" and the "Dionysian" in himself. (a) Why is this so difficult? (b) Do you see any other philosopher who did this better than Nietzsche?
7. What is meant by calling Dionysius "ambiguous" (p. 18)?

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8. "The fate of his god overtook Nietzsche" (p. 18). But how can this really happen if all gods are only fictions?
9. What is the "immense lesson" referred to in the last sentence of the excerpt on p. 18?
10. (a) Why was pity the thing Nietzsche despised most (p. 18)? (b) How can something hated and rejected have more power over you than something accepted and loved? (c) Christ was the thing Nietzsche rejected most totally (p. 28); was Nietzsche overpowered by Christ (cf. p. 19)?
11. "In the end one experiences only oneself" (p. 18). What state or place is this the description of?
12. What are some of the parallels between Nietzsche's last book, *Ecce Homo,* and Kierkegaard's last book, *The Point of View for My Work as an Author?*
13. Compare Nietzsche's "I am not a man; I am dynamite" (p. 19) with Marx's favorite quotation, from Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust*: "All that exists deserves to perish."
14. Robert Nozick wrote of the thought experiment of a "happiness machine" which would deliver happiness and contentment forever with no cost, and asked his students how many would choose to enter the machine, knowing they would never know truth again. Originally, a large majority said no, but a few decades later a majority said yes. How does this show how accurate Nietzsche was as a prophet?
15. Nietzsche rejected "the will to truth" for the first time in the history of philosophy (p. 20) but he also despised the "last man's" will to happiness (p. 25) as well as its equation with reason and virtue, which meant for premoderns living according to reason (p. 26). Why was it almost impossible for any premodern philosopher to take this position and why did it make sense for Nietzsche to do so? In order to answer this question, answer this second one: How does the modern reduction of happiness ("eudaimonia"—see Aristotle [vol. 1] and Aquinas [vol. 2]) to contentment, the reduction of reason to calculation, and the reduction of truth to scientific fact, make Nietzsche's radical rejection possible?
16. Nietzsche believed that language is inherently and incorrigibly deceptive (p. 26). (a) What are the possible premises or assumptions behind that belief and (b) what are the corollaries or consequences of it, both in theory and in practice?
17. Compare this belief with the threefold rejection of logos by Gorgias (vol. 1).
18. Did Wittgenstein believe a milder version of that? If not, why not, and if so, was it the early Wittgenstein or the later Wittgenstein who believed it? Why might some disciples of Wittgenstein argue for the opposite answer?
19. What did Nietzsche mean by saying that "we [atheists] are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar" (p. 26)?
20. Nietzsche is an arch-elitist and radical anti-egalitarian (p. 26); so why do you suppose he is so popular in our anti-elitist and egalitarian culture?

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21. Why is he popular with teenage boys, radical feminists, and philosophers but not middle-class families?
22. Why is he popular with radical feminists if he wrote, "Are you going to meet a woman? Bring a whip"?
23. Explain and evaluate the psychological and philosophical motives for his despising of Socrates (pp. 26–27).
24. Does Nietzsche have an alternative morality or no morality at all? What is the moral dimension to "master morality" if "nothing is forbidden"? Does it not forbid charity, justice, compassion, altruism, etc.? Isn't Satan as much of a moralist as God, but on the other side of nearly all the battles?
25. (a) Why would Nietzsche have despised the Nazis? (b) But they did not despise him. Does he therefore bear great responsibility for their living out the dark side of his philosophy (cf. p. 27, 29)? (c) Does the fact that both fascists and their enemies saw Nietzsche as a proto-fascist (p. 27) make it impossible to be a "gentle Nietzschean"?
26. (a) Has there ever been, in all of the history of human thought, a more totally and consistently anti-Christian philosophy, at least in theory (p. 28)? (In practice, probably the Marquis de Sade, who deliberately tempted the innocent to Satanism.) (b) Does this move you to admire Nietzsche or to despise him? Why?
27. Why did Nietzsche call love "the greatest *danger*"?
28. Would Nietzsche have disagreed with the misunderstanding of, or admired the perspicacity of, both C.S. Lewis and Pope Saint John Paul II, who said that the greatest danger of modern atheism is not the abolition of God but what Lewis called "the abolition of man"?
29. (a) Which route to "the abolition of man" or "men without chests (consciences)" do you see as the most dangerous: Nietzsche's clear, consistent radicalism or modernity's slow seepage and reduction of conscience by subjectivism à la Hume, Mill, and Ayer? (b) Would Nietzsche criticize such thinkers as these as inconsistent cowards? If so, does that count for or against Nietzsche?
30. Does what Nietzsche called "the eternal return" necessarily and logically follow from the two premises Nietzsche thought it followed from (p. 29)? Ask a cosmologist.
31. (a) Since Nietzsche refuses to play the game of logic or the will to truth, how does one argue with him (p. 30)? (b) If one does not argue with him, what does one do with him? How does one use words to argue with one who uses words not as true or false labels but as verbal dynamite sticks (p. 30)?
32. How do you answer the question on p. 31?

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ON HEIDEGGER

1. Like Hegel, Heidegger is either admired as the profoundest thinker of his age, or denounced as a fake and an embarrassment, by most philosophers. (a) Why? How can this be? (b) What other similarities do you see between Hegel and Heidegger?
2. (a) Is it a power and a good, or is it a limitation and a weakness, to concentrate on a single question, as Heidegger does (p. 32)? (b) Does this exclude variety? Did it in Plato and Aristotle? (c) If so, why? If not, why not?
3. How could Heidegger ask the greatest of questions in theory (p. 32) and give the worst of answers in practice (pp. 32–33)?
4. (a) How could a philosopher, and a metaphysician to boot, possibly write the words on pp. 35–36? (That is not a rhetorical question; it demands an answer!) (b) Could the source of this be Heidegger's need and search for a concrete new god (Hitler)? Could it be the childish excitement of a radicalism that transforms every aspect of life, as religion does when actually believed and practiced (p. 35)? (c) What are some alternative, nonreligious explanations?
5. Does Heidegger's attack on Platonic rationalism amount to the voluntarism of Euthyphro, Al-Ash'ari, and Nietzsche? If not, why not?
6. (a) Does Heidegger's Nazism invalidate his philosophy? (This is the most controversial of all questions about Heidegger.) (b) Why or why not? (c) What concept of philosophy is usually behind the *yes* to that question and what concept of philosophy is usually behind the *no* to it?
7. How can the question that seems the most the abstract of all (the question of Being) be also the most life-changing, difference-making, "existential," or practical question of all and "the destiny of Western civilization" (p. 32; cf. p. 40)?
8. Why is "What is Being?" the wrong question, for Heidegger? Why is it impossible to answer?
9. What is the relationship between Heidegger's alternative formulation of "the question of Being," viz. the deliberately vague formulation "How does it stand with Being?," and the question he calls "the fundamental question of metaphysics," viz. "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?"
10. (a) How would a theist like Aquinas answer Heidegger's "fundamental question"? (b) How would Heidegger criticize that answer? (c) How would the theist respond to that critique?
11. Compare and contrast Heidegger's "fundamental question of metaphysics" with Hamlet's famous declaration: "To be or not to be, that is the question." How are the two questions different and how are they the same? (Remember Hamlet's story and context.)
12. What other "existential moods" in addition to despair, joy, and boredom (p. 33) do you see that also raise this fundamental question?
13. Why is it "fundamental?"

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14. In Heidegger's metaphysics, how is what he is looking for, viz. "the Being of beings," different from "the humanity of humans" or "the triangularity of triangles"? (This seems at first to be a very abstract and difficult question, but it has a pretty clear answer in the text. You might see it more clearly if you contrast what Heidegger is looking for with Plato's answer to those two questions.)
15. In Heidegger's metaphysics, why is proper to ask about "the Being of beings" but not about "the being of Being"? (This question too, like the last one, is not as obscure and intractable as it seems.)
16. Why are existentialists the only famous and original philosophers of post-Hegelian times to do metaphysics? Isn't existentialism about concrete, individual human life and practice while metaphysics is about abstract, universal, cosmic truth and theory?
17. (a) What or where is Being, or "how does it stand with Being," for Nietzsche? (b) Compare Sartre. In what way(s) does Sartre equal Heidegger minus Being?
18. (a) Heidegger expressly denies that Being means God. Why does he have to do this? (b) Find at least three reasons why what he means by Being seems to be the God of the great Christian philosophers and theologians like Aquinas (cf. p. 34). (c) Why would Heidegger reject these three reasons?
19. (a) *How much* of a difference does Being make for Heidegger? (b) *What* difference does it make? (This is a different question than the previous one, and a more important one, at least for an existentialist.) (c) How much of a difference does God make for a Christian saint or mystic? (d) What difference does he make? (e) Is there any difference between these two differences? (f) If so, what is it? If not, what is the difference between Being and God?
20. (a) How does Plato (or Socrates) function for Heidegger as Adam functions for Christians? (b) How are the two different in at least three ways? (c) How are they the same? (d) Why does Heidegger pick Plato (or Socrates), of all people, as his villain? (e) What difference does it make whether Heidegger picks Plato or Socrates? (f) Compare and contrast Heidegger's attack on Socrates with Nietzsche's. (g) Contrast Kierkegaard's "take" on Socrates and Plato with that of Nietzsche. Which "take" does Heidegger follow?
21. What is the connection between Heidegger's fascination with Nietzsche and his fascination with technology, since Nietzsche never writes about technology?
22. (a) Which of the following two historical facts or events (according to Heidegger) do you think is the cause and which the effect? (I) We have forgotten Being; we no longer practice the contemplative thinking, the "*Gelassenheit*" (p. 37), that allows Being to appear to us, as our "primitive" ancestors did. (II) We live a very successful "will to power" over beings, as Bacon preached (cf. p. 37.) (b) Why? (c) What evidence is there for the other answer?
23. Why is it "no accident that both rational philosophy and science arose mainly in the West, not in the East" (p. 37)?

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24. Explain and evaluate "What is great can only begin great" (p. 37). Apply to some relevant examples.
25. Compare Heidegger's, Husserl's, and Wittgenstein's repudiation of their earlier philosophical quests and masterpieces (*Being and Time*, *Cartesian Meditations*, and *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*). Do you see a common source of the admitted failures of the exemplars of the three main contemporary or postmodern methodologies, viz. existentialism, phenomenology, and analytic philosophy? So you see a single "lesson" in this unparalleled and surprising historical development?
26. Kant's three "Ideas of Pure Reason" were world, self, and God. All three, for Heidegger, transcend the category of objects, concepts, or beings. How are Kant and Heidegger similar here and how are they different? (This is definitely not an easy question.)
27. (a) "Being does not reveal itself through a concept" (p. 38). But neither does a person, an "I," a subject. Why does Heidegger not attend to this clue? Why does he never speak of persons? (b) What is the difference between a "person" and "*Dasein*"?
28. Compare and contrast Heidegger's "Being" and Aquinas' "*esse*" (the act of existing).
29. Why does Heidegger never use the word "man"? Is this Hume's denial of any substantial ego? Is it Buddha's?
30. Why do you think Heidegger calls the kind of being we have "being-there" ("*Dasein*") instead of "being-here" ("*Hiersein*"), since it is objects, like desks, that are "there" but only human subjects, like students, who are "here"?
31. Compare Heidegger's with Sartre's (later) theory of the metaphysics of interpersonal relationship (i.e., my awareness of another person).
32. Heidegger's idea of "being-toward-death" (p. 40) is his *least* original idea, at least to religious people, though not to Nietzsche's "Last Man" or Spinoza ("the free man never thinks of death"). Why, then, do you suppose this least original idea of his is also his most famous and popular one?
33. (a) Why, for Heidegger, do finitude, death, and human existence ("*Dasein*") necessarily go together? (b) Why, for Heidegger, as for Advaita Hinduism and Buddhism, could there not be an infinite Person (viz. God)? (c) Why could there not be an immortal human being (person)?
34. Why is it difficult to think of God as Being Itself and also as a Person? Why are most people shocked or confused when confronted with the idea of Augustine and Aquinas, that God (the God who is obviously a Person to a religious believer, especially to a saint) is Being Itself?
35. Evaluate Heidegger's "field theory of man" (pp. 40–41)
36. (a) Explain and evaluate "language is 'the house of Being'" (p. 41). (b) Compare Genesis 1:3 and John 1:1 with this.
37. Compare p. 41 with way we discovered the Big Bang theory.

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ON SARTRE

1. Answer the question at the end of the first paragraph on p. 43.
2. How is it possible for a man as intelligent as Sartre to so exalt "freedom" that he ignores the influence his youth and his family has had on him (p. 43)? That is not a rhetorical question; it needs an answer.
3. (a) "His whole life was words." Compare Berkeley, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein on the limitations of words. (b) Does "In the beginning was the Word" (John 1:1) make words prior to anything that might transcend words? Why or why not?
4. (a) What is significant *for his philosophy* about his personality quirk (or disorder) mentioned in the first two sentences on p. 44? (b) Why would Sartre not call this a "disorder"? Why would he not call *anything* a "disorder"? (c) Compare this to Rousseau and to Heidegger: Why are the actions and lives of these three relevant data in judging their philosophies?
5. Do the same for the next nine personality quirks on page 44.
6. (a) How do you account for his popularity, especially among women, whom he despised and abused (pp. 44–45)? (b) How do you account for the astonishing hypocrisy of both Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir (p. 45)? (This is also a serious question, not a rhetorical one.)
7. (a) Why is "absurdity" Sartre's *central* insight? (b) Distinguish this "centrality" from the "priority" of his first premise or assumption, which is either atheism or freedom (p. 47).
8. Is this philosophy more positive than suicide, or less (p. 46)?
9. (a) Has any other major philosopher ever given the same answer to the fundamental question of what is the meaning of life (p. 45)? (b) About what percentage of ordinary people in our (Western) culture today give the same answer Sartre gave? (c) Why has this never happened in any other culture in the history of the world? (d) What are the likely consequences or future of this change?
10. (a) Is Justice Kennedy's "mystery" passage (p. 45) Sartrean existentialism? (b) Why or why not? (c) Is it accidental that the concrete application of this philosophy that this passage is about was abortion? (d) Why or why not?
11. What is the connection between "listening" and "logos," both of which Sartre rejected (p. 45)?
12. (a) Do you agree with Barrett that "it is better to encounter one's existence in disgust than never to encounter it at all" (p. 47)? (b) Why or why not?
13. (a) Which of the two options on p. 47 do you think is prior for Sartre? (b) Why?
14. (a) In light of Sartre's long quotation on p. 47, why do most atheists not like him or use him? (b) Why do evangelists and missionaries to America like him and use him? (c) Why do missionaries to Africa or India not use him?
15. Evaluate the personal charge on p. 48. What would Sartre say to this charge?

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16. The penultimate paragraph on p. 48 is an argument for the existence of God. Formulate it. Then evaluate it.
17. Which of the alternatives on p. 48 do you think Sartre would opt for: Is the origin of his atheism rational, volitional, or emotional? Why?
18. Sartre's formula for his "existentialism" is that "existence is prior to essence." How does what he means by these two terms differ from that of Aquinas? Page 49 gives six other versions of or analogies to the distinction between essence and existence; how many of them would Aquinas accept and why? If none, why can Sartre use "essence and existence" in such a completely different way than this more traditional way? Why isn't it arbitrary, like calling the distinction between up and down the distinction between right and left?
19. Evaluate the long paragraph on p. 49. Does it make Sartre's distinction reasonable and accurate? Defend your answer, whether it is yes, no, or both.
20. (a) What do you find accurate and what do you find inaccurate in the point Sartre is making in his famous example of the waiter in the café (p. 50). (b) Would Sartre say that a saint is the most total impersonator, and thus the most famous example of this mistake, which he calls "bad faith"? (c) Compare and contrast Kant's third formulation of his "categorical imperative" ("the principle of autonomy") to Sartre's point or value judgment here. How are they similar and how are they different?
21. Evaluate Sartre's example or analogy of the paper-cutter (pp. 50–51); how is it accurate and how is it not?
22. (a) Argue both for and against Sartre's argument that "there is no human nature, since there is no God to conceive it" (p. 51). (b) Does Sartre's principle here entail that there is no dog nature, grass nature, or hydrogen nature too or not? Why?
23. Can you logically disprove Sartre's alternative that "man is nothing else but what he makes of himself"?
24. The text makes the surprising claim that "Sartre seems to have unwittingly invented a new argument for the existence of God" (p. 52). Evaluate the text's attempt to turn Sartre's two atheistic arguments (italicized on pp. 48, 51, 55) into *reductio ad absurdum* arguments *for* God's existence.
25. Is there any significant way in which Sartre's dualism between "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itself" is not parallel to or similar to Heidegger's distinction between "*Seiendes*" (beings) and "*Dasein*" and "human be-ing" or "existence" (p. 52)?
26. (a) Why can't perfection and personhood coincide either for Sartre or for Shankara (p. 52)? (b) Why can it and does it for Aquinas, who says that "*person* designates what is the highest in nature"? (The answer to this last question cannot be simply because God is both personal and highest, or most perfect; why is this "both-ness" possible for Aquinas but not for Sartre or Shankara?) (c) Why do Sartre and Shankara deduce opposite conclusions

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from this principle, Sartre that there is no God and Shankara that there is *nothing but* God (*Brahman*)?

27. (a) *Why* are "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itself" mutually exclusive for Sartre? (b) Evaluate this argument, this "why."
28. Which of the two alternatives on p. 52 do you think is most likely? Why?
29. (a) We have at least four candidates for Sartre's first premise: freedom, atheism, "absurdity," and the dualism between "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itself." (b) Which does he deduce from which, if the answer is that any one of these four can be deduced from any other one? (That requires twelve distinct arguments; work it out.) (d) The fundamental question about priority is the one in p. 52. Which do you think is true?
30. Is the juxtaposition of Sartre with Augustine (p. 53) a mistake, a confusion, or an insight? Why?
31. Why can Sartre not admit any *potentialities* in man (p. 53)?
32. Some think that Sartre's point that we cannot transcend and judge our lives (p. 53) is self-evidently true; others think it is self-evidently false. Why this enormous divide?
33. (b) If Sartre is right here, how many radical consequences follow? (b) Compare Hume (vol 3, p. 100). (c) Which one is more radical? (d) Why? (e) Why would both Sartre and Hume say that his skepticism is more radical than that of the other?
34. Does Sartre agree with the essential contrast between masculinity and femininity, which every culture before our own has called two natural archetypes but which our own has called artificial, socially constructed stereotypes, or not (cf. p. 54)?
35. How are femininity, poetry, wonder, contemplation, mystery, receptivity, grace, family, children, altruism, childbirth, life, and religion all united and connected in Sartre?
36. If Sartre rejects all these things, why is he not a pure scientistic reductionist and materialist or a pure Gnostic immaterialist (as in p. 54)? (b) Why do both of these two extreme opposites reject all thirteen things mentioned in question 35?
37. (a) Do the two previous questions make Sartre even more consistently the Antichrist than Nietzsche? (b) Does it make Christianity the most erotic and romantic alternative?
38. Formulate and evaluate the argument in the paragraph connecting pages 54–55.
39. Substitute "condemn" for "justify" in this sentence; is it the same argument or not?
40. (a) Why is it empirically, or at least phenomenologically, necessary to make the radical judgment that "Sartre has no ethics at all" (p. 55) of any kind? (b) Does this make him an a priori rationalist?
41. If "we judge values; values do not judge us" (p. 55), by what standard can we judge values?
42. Is there a parallel between the will creating rather than discovering values and the mind creating rather than discovering truth? Is there is difference?

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43. The argument against epistemological skepticism is that "it is true that there is no truth" is self-contradictory. Is it equally self-contradictory to say "we can never choose evil [or objectively true good]" (p. 55) as it is to say "we can never discover truth (or expose objective error)"? Or can one say one of these two things without the other?
44. (a) How would Sartre respond to the *reductio ad absurdum* argument about the Holocaust (p. 55)? (b) Does Sartre or Heidegger have a more dark and compromised relationship with Nazism?
45. "What Nietzsche did to power (changing it from a means to an end, *the* end) Sartre does to freedom" (p. 55). (a) Not everything can become an absolute end; what enables these two things, which most people take to be neutral means, to become ends or absolute goods in themselves for some philosophers? (b) Are they that, also, for many ordinary people or not? (c) What are some similarities or even identities between power and freedom? (d) How are they different? (e) Which is more significant, the differences or the identities? (f) Why?
46. (a) Is "we do not believe in progress" (p. 55) a logical consequence of Sartre's "ethics"? (b) If so, how? What premise entails this conclusion? (c) Is it self-contradictory? (d) If not, why not, and if so, how, and why do you think Sartre did not see this self-contradiction?
47. Evaluate the argument that the admission of relative goods entails the existence of an absolute good at p. 55.
48. Evaluate Sartre's attempt to overcome pure individualism in p. 56. How would he answer the question "why" in that paragraph?
49. How would you answer Sartre's argument that "if values are objective, they are imposed on me . . . and then am not free" (p. 56).
50. How would Sartre answer the argument about "the freedom to say yes" (p. 56)?
51. Some mystics, saints, and theologians say that hell is best described in Sartre's words "There can be no 'we,' only 'I.'" (Cf. the "Mine!" of the seagulls in "Nemo" [p. 58].) Explain and evaluate this.
52. (a) Why does Sartre see religion, altruistic love, and family as his three main enemies? (b) In light of the fact that they are most human beings' three main friends, does this make Sartre a snob? A misanthropist? (c) If so, is that an argument against him? If so, what kind of argument?
53. Why did such a small minority of great philosophers ever have families (p. 57)?
54. (a) Why does unselfish love seem to be metaphysically impossible for Sartre? (b) Why isn't it? That is, what questionable premise to the argument for its impossibility rest on?
55. (a) Why does the meaning of the word "I" seem to entail Sartre's darkest conclusions (p. 58)? (b) Why doesn't it? (I.e., how do you escape Sartre's argument?)

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56. Sartre died before "black holes" were discovered. How are they a perfect image for Sartre's metaphysics (p. 58)?
57. Find a positive point in Sartre's analysis of interpersonal relationships that is summarized by the infamous line from *No Exit* that "Hell is other people."
58. Why do Daniel in *Le Sursis* and David in Psalm 139 have the opposite reaction to God's existence and omniscience than Sartre has?
59. Do you think that Sartre would choose hell over heaven if he saw what both really were? (Cf. the terrifying statement and Marcel's critique on p. 59.)
60. How do you solve the problem of the apparent mutual contradiction between being known and being loved (p. 59)? If the unknowable cannot be known, how can the unlovable be loved?
61. How can the self give away itself to another self (p. 59)? How can gift and giver be identical? Must not the hand that gives a gift transcend the gift given? (This is a very important, very difficult, and very profound question.)
62. Explain and evaluate the argument at p. 59 that exalting freedom over love destroys freedom.
63. If there were five "takes" on Sartre parallel to the five "takes" on Nietzsche, which one would you take and why? (Cf. p. 60 ["Yet . . ."])
64. How does the text profoundly agree with a central positive insight of Sartre's (p. 60)?
65. Explain in your own words the last sentence of the chapter.

ON MARCEL

1. The three descriptions of Marcel on p. 61 seem inconsistent. The first seems negative ("one never gets the sense of finality and finished clarity in reading Marcel"), the second ambiguous ("architecture" rather than "spelunking"), and the third positive ("one gets a stronger sense of assurance and authenticity and fidelity to experience from Marcel than from nearly any other philosopher"). How might these three things fit together rather than contradicting each other?
2. Why is it significant that "the music of Bach was the deepest source of his religious life, until his conversion" (p. 61)? I know three ex-atheists or ex-agnostics, now two philosophers and one a monk, who were converted by Bach's *St. Matthew Passion*. All three were tough-minded thinkers, not sentimentalists. How does music have that power?
3. Why is Marcel's distinction between "problems" and "mysteries" so widely helpful?
4. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all said that "philosophy begins in wonder." What is wonder? How are the wonder of surprise, the wonder of curiosity and questioning, and the wonder of appreciation and adoration related? Is there another kind of wonder which is involved in what Marcel calls "mysteries"?

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5. What is meant by "I do not have my body; I am my body" (p. 62)?
6. (a) What is "participation" (p. 62)? (b) Why is it so "pervasive" in Marcel? (c) How does Sartre explain it by contrast? How is its denial presupposed in nearly every distinctively Sartrean thesis?
7. (a) What is meant by saying that "the 'I' emerges from the 'we' as much as the 'we' from the 'I'" (p. 63) and that "I become a self only in relationship to other selves" (p. 62)? (b) Test this by your experience.
8. When persons relate to each other by fidelity (trust), hope, and communion (love), Marcel's three modes of personal "participation," what are they participating in? (b) Compare and contrast what Marcel means by these three things with the three "theological virtues" in Christian theology.
9. Why can't Marcel define "being" (p. 62)? How is the answer to this question both the same as and different from the answer to the question why Heidegger can't define "being"?
10. (a) Why does Marcel identify "being" with "intrinsic value"? (b) Compare Plato's notion of "the Good." (c) If only persons have intrinsic value, does it not follow that only persons have being? (d) In that case, is Marcel's "being" the same as Heidegger's "*Dasein*"? (e) Would Marcel say that rocks, plants, animals, and the universe do not have being? If so, why does he use the word "being" in such an unusual and misleading sense (for he does not deny that these things also exist)?
11. (a) Evaluate the syllogism (enthymeme) in the sentence at pp. 62–63. (b) If persons are indefinable, how then does Marcel answer the question "What is a person?"
12. Analyze and "riff" on the two images of musical themes vs. dialectical arguments (p. 63) as two different methods or expressions or styles of philosophy. Can they be combined? If so, who does that?
13. How is each of Marcel's seven basic themes clarified best by contrast with its opposite?
14. (a) What are some other examples of what Marcel calls "mysteries"? (b) Most examples of the difference between "problems" vs. "mysteries" are obvious, but are there examples that are controversial so that they are problems for some philosophers but mysteries for others? If so, how does this classification make clearer why such philosophers also disagree on other matters? Take, for example, Pascal vs. Descartes, Hegel vs. Kierkegaard, Lao Tzu vs. Confucius, or James vs. Dewey (chs. 79 and 80).
15. If "recollection" (p. 64) is self-knowledge, how can the same self be both the subject and the object? Must not the subject always transcend the object, as not merely one more object but the knower of objects? Must not the object always transcend the subject, as not merely some aspect of the subject but the objective world the subject knows?
16. Why does Marcel classify "hope" not as a desire or a wish but as a trust ("credit," p. 64) and a prophecy (p. 65)?

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17. (a) Why does "creative fidelity" seem to be an oxymoron? (b) Why isn't it? (c) How does "creative fidelity" (p. 66) answer the defects of both the "conformism" that Sartre denounces and the "betrayal" that he offers instead? (d) Compare this with Kierkegaard's "ethical stage" in *Either/Or*.
18. Thinking of someone absent is not "presence" (pp. 66–67), so presence is not merely mental. Nor is touching someone without knowing who he is "presence"; so "presence" is not merely physical. Nor is "presence" touching someone without knowing who he is but while simultaneously thinking about him. So if "presence" is neither mental nor physical nor both, what is it?
19. Why does Marcel use the term "availability" for charity or sanctity? Why can the term be misleading? What does the term reveal?
20. Marcel claims (p. 67) that the study of the sanctity of the saints is the best introduction to ontology (metaphysics). Why does this claim seem ridiculous? Why, in Marcel's terms, is it not?

ON BUBER

1. What do you think is the reason for Buber's great popularity despite his lack of rigor and clarity? Do you think that reason lies mainly in Buber himself, his writings, or the lacks and needs of contemporary culture and philosophy? Compare Chesterton in this regard (ch. 100).
2. (a) Why is it difficult to be both "simple" and "profound" (p. 69)? (b) Give examples of some philosophers you judge to lack simplicity, to lack profundity, to lack both, and to lack neither.
3. (a) What does Buber mean by "primary words"? (b) Why are they double rather than single?
4. Why can "*I-Thou*" be spoken with one's whole being? Why can't "*I-It*" (p. 70)?
5. Why does "There is no *I* taken in itself" not equate to Hume's or Buddha's denial of a substantial self or ego?
6. How does the long paragraph on p. 70 answer Sartre's philosophy of interpersonal relationships on p. 58? How does it exemplify what Marcel means by "participation"?
7. Why isn't "*Thou* has no bounds" (p. 70) pantheism? Why isn't it solipsism or at least egotism or narcissism?
8. Compare Buber's three "spheres in which the world of relation arises" (p. 70) with Kant's three "Ideas of Pure Reason."
9. Compare Buber's notion of God with that of Spinoza (cf. p. 70).
10. What does Buber mean by saying that "Spirit is not in the *I*, but between *I* and *Thou*"? Does he deny that each of us has his own individual spirit, soul, mind, or will? Why does this saying not mean what it seems to mean, viz. that "Spirit" exists in the realm of impersonal objects such as thunder, grass, or gifts that are not in persons but outside of persons? How does it explain how a self can give itself away to another self without losing itself?

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11. Compare this with the Christian theological notion that the Holy Spirit is the love between the Father and the Son.
12. Compare Buber and Kant on the relation between love and feelings (p. 71).
13. (a) Why must every "*Thou*" become an "*It*" for us (pp. 71–72) (b) Does Buber then accept Sartre's analysis of interpersonal relationships but add an escape from it?
14. (a) Why does Buber say that God "the eternal *Thou*" is "the *Thou* that by its [essential] nature cannot become *It.*" (b) How would Buber relate this to Exodus 3:14 and to the Jewish refusal ever to attempt to pronounce the name of God (YHWH)? (c) How would Buber explain Job 42:1–7 by p. 73?
15. What history of the development of language is implied in the penultimate paragraph of p. 71?
16. What history of the development of self-consciousness is implied in the next paragraph?
17. (a) Hegel substituted his theory of "internal relations" for Aristotle's theory that relations were relative to substances and thus "accidents" or additions to substances or essences. Does Buber agree with this? (b) If so, does it reduce substances to accidents of relations just as Aristotle reduced relations to accidents of substances? If not, why not? (c) How can these two philosophies be combined, so that neither substances nor relations are mere accidents?
18. If both "*I*" and "*Thou*" correspond to Heidegger's "*Dasein*" and to Sartre's "being-for-itself," and if Buber's "It" corresponds to Heidegger's "*Seiendes*" and Sartre's "being-in-itself," does Buber have a third category corresponding to Heidegger's "Being" or not? If so, what is it? If not, why isn't Buber as dualistic as Sartre? Or are these correspondences among these three philosophers illusory oversimplifications and misunderstandings? If so, how?
19. How is the dualism Buber bemoans (pp. 72–73) between the inner, or subjective, and the outer, or objective, related to the three dualisms in the three philosophers in question 18?
20. Can you apply Buber's vision in p. 73 to the history of modern philosophy? Compare Pascal on "alienation" and Kierkegaard in *Either/Or*.
21. Can you "relate to" the rather mystical or mysterious claim about "the meaning of life" in the last paragraph? If so, try to put that point in your own words.

ON JAMES

1. Do you see any connection between James' philosophy and the fact that James taught and practiced medicine?
2. Why do you think philosophers of all schools, at least in modern times, are more subject to depression than other people?
3. James "distrusted any philosophical ideas or ideals that were not derived from or proved in practice, in experience" (p. 78). (a) Do you agree with this or not? (b) Why? (c) What

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concept of philosophy underlies your answer? (d) What alternative concept of philosophy underlies the other answer? (e) How would one who gave the other answer argue for it and how would you answer his argument?

4. Why is it difficult to join "tough-minded" facts and "tender-minded" values and principles?
5. How can a "tough-minded" person and a "tender-minded" person argue if they have different absolute values or first premises (e.g., facts vs. principles)?
6. (a) Would James classify the search for truth as tough-minded (facts) or tender-minded (principles)? (b) Would he classify the search for happiness as tough-minded (experiential) or tender-minded (moral, personal)? (c) Would he classify the different goals of truth and happiness as an example of the difference between tough- and tender-mindedness? (d) Would he justify lying (violating tough-mindedness) to make others happy (fulfilling tender-mindedness)? Or is that a misleading and misunderstanding example? If so, why?
7. (a) Do you think that either the "tough-minded" demand for truth and facts or the "tender-minded" demand for ideals and principles must be prior to the other in some way? (b) Why or why not? (c) Which would you rank prior and why? (d) If they are like men and women in that both are prior in different ways, what should be done when they contradict each other?
8. (a) Is Christianity more "tough-minded" or "tender-minded"? (b) Why? (c) If you want to say both, how does it relate or connect or unify the two minds?
9. In James' list of the attributes of the tender-minded and the tough-minded (p. 80), is any one of the contrasts inaccurate or out of place? If so, which one and why?
10. What is the relationship between pragmatism as a method and pragmatism as a world-view (p. 78)? Which is based on which?
11. (a) Do you agree with James' method of testing all abstract ideas by concrete experience? (b) Do you agree that all abstract ideas *can* be tested by concrete experience? (c) James would surely not exclude deduction as a way of testing (proving or disproving) ideas, since science uses deduction too, so how would that fit in with his principle of testing ideas by their consequences in experience?
12. If you asked the question "What difference would it make in experience and life if this idea were true vs. if it were false?" first of any idea before trying to find out whether it was true or false, what difference would *that* make in your life and experience?
13. Do you see any exceptions to the rule that "the meaning of an idea is the concrete difference it makes to our experience" (p. 82)?
14. Apply to various philosophies or philosophical ideas the principle above.
15. (a) How does James' essay on Chautauqua help to solve the "problem of evil"? (b) Why isn't it the *whole* solution? If not, what is missing? (c) How is Yogi Berra's one-sentence

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summary of James' point about Chautauqua ("If this world was perfect, it wouldn't be") not a self-contradiction, as it seems to be?

16. Why can't determinists write great novels (pp. 89–90)?
17. How is heaven different from Chautauqua? This is a serious question! If there are no evils in it, why isn't it boring? Is goodness really boring and evil interesting?
18. Why is the funny little story about the man and the squirrel (p. 81) significant beyond just illustrating the need to agree on defining terms?
19. How is pragmatism different from utilitarianism (chs. 82 and 83) if both teach us to judge by consequences (p. 82)?
20. (a) Does pragmatism necessitate Dewey's "progressive education" (see next chapter) as opposed to the classical meaning of "liberal education," viz. valuing and seeking truth for its own sake as an end and not just as a means, for its "payoffs"? (b) Why or why not? (c) Do you think that the only honest reason for you to accept any idea is that you believe it is true? (d) If so, how is that different from Clifford's Rule? If not, does that entail Dewey's "progressive education" in principle rather than the principle of "liberal education"?
21. Is pragmatism merely a method (p. 83) or more? Why?
22. (a) Is James' definition of truth as not timeless (p. 83) timelessly true? (b) Is it universally true of ideas like "2+2=4" as well as of ideas like "Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 55 BC" (cf. p. 84)?
23. The old definition of truth is "conformity to reality." Is the pragmatic definition of truth true according to the old definition? Is the old definition true according to the pragmatic definition (p. 84)?
24. (a) Can truth be one kind of good as well as good being one kind of truth at the same time (p. 83)? (b) If so, how can one thing (A) be simultaneously contained by another thing (B) and containing it? (c) A parallel case may (or may not) clarify this puzzle: Can falsity be one kind of evil and also evil one kind of falsity? Use examples to investigate this puzzle. (d) If the answer is yes, why does that mean that pragmatism is compatible with traditional notions of truth and goodness, and if not, why not?
25. (a) There are similarities and differences between James and Dewey (p. 83). Which are greater? (b) Why?
26. (a) Incidentally, why do these questions habitually separate and distinguish the first question and the second one, which is usually a "why"? (b) Why is the second question harder than the first?
27. (a) Is Christianity pragmatic according to James' definition, or not (p. 83)? (b) What is the main reason for yes? (c) What is the main reason for no? (d) Which reason is more correct? (e) Why?

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28. How does p. 84 explain whether the Dutch who hid the Jews from the Nazis lied to the Nazis or not?
29. (a) Evaluate James' evaluation of Pascal's Wager and Clifford's Rule (p. 84). (b) Evaluate his analogy at p. 85. (c) How does one evaluate an analogy? (d) Is an analogy a kind of argument or not? (e) If not, why not? And why does it seem to give a reason for its conclusion? If so, what kind of argument: inductive or deductive or pragmatic? (e) Does the analogy of *The Lord of the Rings* at p. 86 help you to answer that question? (f) How does this apply to Pascal's analogy in the first part of the "wager" that argues against agnosticism by the word "embarked" (cf. p. 86)?
30. What are some examples of the principle on p. 86?
31. How could James be both a believer and an agnostic (p. 86)? Why do these two things seem mutually exclusive? Are they? If not, why not? If so, how can James be both?
32. Is p. 87 a good definition of the common essence of all religions? Why or why not?
33. Is this momentous choice, to believe or disbelieve Hamlet's "There are more things in Heaven and Earth . . . than are dreamed of in your philosophy" made by faith, by reason, or neither?
34. How would a materialist answer James' argument against materialism on p. 87?
35. Evaluate James' pragmatic argument for morality as well as religion at p. 87.
36. Summarize and evaluate James' argument for free will.
37. (a) Is James' "argument" that he makes free will true by freely choosing to believe in free will (p. 88) the same or not the same as Samuel Johnson's argument against Berkeley's denial of the reality of matter by kicking a stone? (b) Why or why not?
38. (a) Can one logically disbelieve both in determinism and in free will? (b) Why or why not?
39. Would logical consistency demand that believers in determinism cease to have legal arguments in court about responsibility for good or evil choices, since we do not blame machines? No determinist draws that conclusion; why not?
40. (a) If determinism gives us too little responsibility and freedom, can the alternative give us too much? (Cf. Sartre.) (b) How do we tell how much is too little or too much? Is it quantifiable? (c) Or is it a simple either/or and not a matter of degree? (Cf. p. 89.) (d) If not, why not? Why is James' "meliorism" commonsensical?
41. How do you answer the question at p. 89? Compare Ivan's question to Alyosha at the end of the "Rebellion" chapter in Dostoyevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov.*
42. How does the example of Frodo's choice (p. 90) or Mary's, at the Annunciation, show the need for ignorance as well as danger?
43. Evaluate the critique of James at the end of the chapter.

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ON DEWEY

44. Why do you think Dewey is "the most important philosopher of education since Plato" (pp. 92–93)?
45. How can a scientific theory, which by its content is confined to the mechanism of biological evolution of animal species millions of years ago, logically entail a revolution in human thinking about literally everything, as Dewey, Spencer, Comte, Teilhard de Chardin, and many others aver?
46. If the answer is that it entails naturalism and refutes supernaturalism (p. 93), what is the logic of this entailment? Why is theism logically incompatible with evolution?
47. Why do you think most evangelical Protestants think it is and why do most Catholics think it is not?
48. Would Dewey deny that the truth of 2+2=4 is timeless?
49. Does p. 93 ("forswears inquiry") constitute censorship by fiat of will rather than reason? If not, what is the logical argument that disproves the existence of formal and final causes?
50. Is Dewey's Baconian "knowledge for power" a fiat of will rather than of reason? If there are reasons for it, what are they? Or is Dewey against the presupposition of that very question, that we must justify and explain things by their causes and reasons? If so, isn't the alternative to reason simply either desire, feeling, or force? And aren't all three different kinds of tyranny? How would Dewey answer that charge?
51. Isn't it simply (I) scientifically false and (II) the debunking of science itself to say that "the brain is . . . an organ of a certain kind of behavior, not of knowing the world" (p. 93)? How would Dewey answer that charge of logical inconsistency and self-refutation?
52. Isn't "the essential point in all response is the desire to control the environment" (p. 93) not only a reductionism that is refuted in psychology but also a reductionism to power, which is tyranny? How would Dewey defend his love of democracy and humanism in response to that charge?
53. Why does Dewey speak of "the errors of our ancestors, musty with antiquity" (p. 94) when it is they who invented science and technology as well as ethics and the arts, the control of fire, agriculture, mathematics, astronomy, navigation, and the industrial revolution? Why does he call classical logic "pseudo-science" when all the scientists in history have used it? Why does Dewey decry as an error the fact that "Aristotle thought of reason as solitary communion with rational truth" and reduce thinking to social thinking? How can society think if its individuals can't? Can a "society," as distinct from individuals, think at all? This is not a rhetorical question but an attempt to discover what is going on in Dewey's mind.
54. If "the good is not the end but the process" (p. 94) how can the process be desirable if the end is not? How can it be "better to travel hopefully than to arrive" if there is nothing desirable to hope for in arriving? Again, this is an attempt to discover the psychological

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origin of a set of thoughts that seem logically self-refuting in an apparently intelligent philosopher.

55. How can naturalism revolutionize logic (p. 94)? Why does God's nonexistence render all syllogisms invalid, including those of the atheist?
56. Why is Dewey's non-atheism and non-agnosticism more threatening to theism than atheism is (p. 94)? Why is "abandoning" the question more irreligious, even (if religion is true) more Satanic, than Nietszche's passionate atheism or Sartre's consistent atheism?
57. How can questions be "solved" by "disappearing" (p. 95)? (Cf. Orwell's "Newspeak" in *1984*.)
58. Since Dewey rejects the subordination of technology to morality (p. 95), how and why would he criticize the Holocaust or nuclear war (p. 95)?
59. Why does Dewey judge classical philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, all of whom were logicians and even rationalists) to be "dictated by man's imagination working under the influence of love and hate and in the interest of emotional excitement and satisfaction" (p. 96) and his own philosophy to be exempt from this animalistic, reductionist error when the difference is in fact the exact opposite? (Cf. p. 97; but isn't the use of logic here ["it follows that"] what Dewey is rejecting?) Why is the antirationalist criticizing the rationalist for being antirational? Why is the reductionist criticizing the antireductionist for being reductionist? What is his reasoning or strategy here? Compare Nietzsche in *The Genealogy of Morals*. Is this simply the genetic fallacy (p. 96)? Is it what psychologists call projection, the patient blaming the psychiatrist for being insane?
60. Compare Dewey's ethics with Mill's utilitarianism (pp. 97, 99), both likenesses and differences.
61. What contradiction does Dewey see between science and traditional morality (p. 98)? Isn't that comparing two incomparable enterprises and claims? Does morality claim to do science? Does science claim to know, prove, or disprove morality? What claims of morality does science disprove? What claims of science does morality disprove?
62. Evaluate logically Dewey's claim to escape moral subjectivism at p. 98. How can the addition of intelligence simply as an obedient servant to subjective desires or feelings or willings, whether individual or social, and thus merely calculating subjective pleasures, change Dewey's morality from subjectivism to an objective one? Intelligent calculation of subjective dreams does not introduce us into the objective world. Or is that analogy mistaken? If so, how?
63. (a) How can Dewey call traditional philosophy "arrogant" (p. 95) and "intolerance and fanaticism" (p. 99) while dismissing all previous philosophers and ordinary people for believing "that beliefs and judgments are capable of inherent truth and authority"? Is this belief not self-contradictory, like simple skepticism, a judgment against judgment? How

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would Dewey respond to this purely formal, logical critique? (b) Does Dewey's new morality entail something as radical as Nietzsche's "transvaluation of all values" (p. 99), making saints the greatest sinners? If so, did Dewey simply not see this, not care, or deny that this radical consequence necessarily followed? If the latter, why?

64. (a) If classical education is intrinsically bad, how has it produced all the great philosophers? If progressive education is so good, why has it produced no new great philosophers? (b) Why has experience disproved the efficacy of Dewey's "progressive education" in all things except ideological orthodoxy? (c) Or is the text criticizing only worst and least intelligent and successful "progressive" schools? (d) And is Dewey criticizing only the worst and least intelligent and successful classical schools? (e) If the answer to both of the previous two questions is yes, are the two opposite theories of education compatible and combinable, as the conclusion of the chapter (p. 102) seems to suggest?
65. What great novels and what great philosophers would survive in Deweyite schools?
66. Why would anyone actually prefer *Dick and Jane Go to the Supermarket* to *Dante goes to Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven*, or *Walden Two* to *The Lord of the Rings* since both are fictional?
67. How can the scientific method itself prove that "scientific method is the only authentic means at our command for getting at the significance of our everyday experiences of the world in which we live"? Isn't scientism (reductionism to science) thus self-contradictory?
68. If the above quotation is true, does it not logically entail that all education, literature, philosophy, psychology, morality, and religion before Francis Bacon failed to "get at the significance of our everyday experiences" even though it claimed to do so? If so, is not this sneering dismissal of Solomon, Buddha, Lao Tzu, Confucius, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Dickens, Hugo, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Camus, Freud, Jung, and Tolkien simply barbarism, ignorance, and intolerant, fanatical narrow-mindedness? Nietzsche at least took seriously the enemies he claimed to destroy with his "hammer." (Yes, that is a rhetorical question.)
69. Here is a very personal question, but one you may have been asking already in your own mind. Psychoanalyze the author: Why do I rank James as one of the ten most admirable philosophers and Dewey as one of the ten least admirable ones if they are both "pragmatists"?

ON COMTE

1. (a) Is it accurate and fair to say that scientific positivism "takes sciences as the medieval took divine revelation (revealed theology)"? (b) If not, why not? If so, why is the medieval exaltation of theology as "the queen of the sciences" and the supreme authority any less valid than the positivist exaltation of science as the supreme authority? (c) Some Hindus

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and Buddhists believe that the material world is not an objective reality but only a subjective dream, of either *Brahman* or of unenlightened Man. They would regard not just positivism (i.e., scientism; i.e., the reduction of all valid knowledge to scientific knowledge) but science itself as an illusion. But they might nevertheless respect and study this dream. Why do positivists and materialists not take that same attitude toward theology and mysticism that immaterialists take toward science and technology? (Or did Comte do that in his later years when he turned his philosophy into a religion?)

2. (a) Is scientism a religion since its basis is a faith, an unprovable presupposition rather than a proof, as is implied in question 24 of the previous chapter (p. 101)? (b) If so, why do most positivists say that it is not? If not, how can it be proved? (c) Can science prove itself? Does positivism try to do that? If so, does it succeed? (d) Can religion prove itself? Does apologetics try to do that? If so, does it succeed? (e) Can reason prove itself? Did Descartes try to do that? If so, did he succeed? (f) How are these three examples different?
3. Can science endure the rejection of all four kinds of causality (p. 106)? If so, how?
4. Why do most philosophers have difficulty keeping four things (p. 106)?
5. Why have most modern philosophers been unhappy? Why were most premodern philosophers happy (p. 106)?
6. Why does Comte use a positive word for a negative enterprise (p. 106–107)?
7. What is the difference between ideology and philosophy (p. 107)?
8. (a) Animals can describe phenomena, sensorially, but only man can explain them, rationally. How then can Comte claim that the enterprise that only describes phenomena but does not explain them is "science" (p. 106)? (b) How can scientism, the absolutization of science, thus destroy science?
9. Why, according to positivists, does the fact that positivism excludes the validity of nearly every interesting human enterprise (pp. 106–107) not refute its validity?
10. (a) Why would a positivist say that the fact that positivism simply "posits" and does not argue for its truth or validity does not make it an arbitrary and unprovable act of will and power, a kind of intellectual bullying, or intellectual warfare, as in Hobbes, rather than an act of reason or reasonableness (p. 107)? (b) What radical change in the essential meaning of "reason" is implied in positivism? (c) Does this change of meaning exist in Nietzsche and in his exaltation of the Dionysian and of the "will to power" or not? (d) Why or why not? (Careful; this is a tricky question.)
11. (a) How does the above transformation of the meaning of "reason" explain why Comte does not give reasons for his atheism? (b) Why does the text call this more atheistic than atheism? (p. 107)
12. (a) How is what Comte does with reason (p. 107) explained and justified in deconstructionism (ch. 95)? (b) How was it foreshadowed in Hobbes?

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13. (a) What truth and what falsity do you find in Comte's theory of the three stages of history? (b) What alternative philosophy of intellectual history do you find in Chesterton's *The Everlasting Man* and in the works of Owen Barfield?
14. (a) Do you see the stages of development of an individual mind as corresponding to those of the race (p. 108)? (b) If so, in the same way Comte does or differently? (c) What are some of the consequences or corollaries or applications of this principle if it is true?
15. How would Comte answer the following question: If "instead of trying to understand and explain things, positive science enables us to predict and control them," as Bacon called for, how can we predict and control what we cannot understand and explain?
16. (a) Why, for Comte, is sociology the supreme science? (b) Who believes this today? (c) Why did Comte think of it as a new *religion*? (d) Why is that idea unpopular among those who agree with the rest of Comte?
17. How is Comte's ethics more radical than any previous one, even Nietzsche's (p. 110)?
18. What, in Comte's theory of the sciences, does Dewey disagree with and why (hint on p. 110)?
19. Is Comte's elitism or Dewey's democratic collectivism more consistent with their common principles of scientism, positivism, and naturalism?
20. (a) Why must Comte erase the notion of "rights," both moral and political? Why is it the logical consequence of his principles? (b) Why do nearly all others who accept his principles not accept this corollary?
21. Would Comte love Huxley's *Brave New World*? Skinner's *Walden Two*? Why or why not?
22. (a) Is Comte's turning positivism into a religion and worshipping man as God a natural consequence of his principles or an aberration? (b) Why?
23. Of the eight critiques of Comte at the end of the chapter, which do you think is the strongest? (b) Why? (c) Which do you think is the weakest? (d) Why?

ON BENTHAM

1. Why do you think utilitarianism is so popular?
2. (a) Do you think it is good to have "a single moral principle" to which everything else is relative, as Bentham does, or not? (b) Why?
3. (a) Do you think "the maximization of individual liberty" is the greatest social and political good or not? (b) Why? (c) Do you agree with the *laissez-faire* principle that "that government governs best which governs least" or not? (d) Why?
4. (a) Do you see the disagreements between positivists and utilitarians (p. 115–116) or their agreements (p. 116) as more fundamental? (b) Why?
5. (a) Why do some positivists (Hobbes, Comte, Marx) reject liberalism and democracy and others (Dewey, Bentham, Mill) accept it? (b) Which political option is more consistent with, or more naturally follows from, positivist principles? (c) Why?

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6. (a) Evaluate Bentham's "egotistic 'hook'" as his solution to incorporating altruism into utilitarianism (p. 117). (b) Does Plato use the "hook" in arguing, in the *Republic*, that justice (virtue) is more profitable (happifying) than injustice? (c) If so, does that make him a relativist compared to Kant's absolutism? (d) How did Plato distinguish happiness from pleasure, if he was not a hedonist? (e) How did Aristotle? (f) Why don't utilitarians?
7. (a) Evaluate the six ethical absolutes or touchstones listed in pp. 117–118. (b) Compare each one with that of Bentham's. (c) Does God function in theistic religion as the principle of utility functions in utilitarianism? (d) If so how? If not, why not?
8. Is "the pleasure principle" a fact or a value (p. 118)? If both, which is derived from which?
9. Isn't it obvious from observation that most people often sacrifice pleasure for other things? If so, how can hedonism be believed? Are hedonists simply morally blind?
10. Does the existence of conscience refute hedonism? No one ever feels an obligation in conscience to experience pleasure, do they?
11. (a) Does the fact that most people immediately experience the falsity of the idea that "pleasure and pain are our only motivators" (pp. 119–120) refute that idea or not? (b) Why?
12. Evaluate "the hedonic calculus."
13. (a) Does the quantification of pleasure logically follow from materialistic, positivistic, Ockhamist reductionist, or utilitarian principles? (b) Can pleasure and pain be quantified? (Cf. the doctors' question: Rank your pain from 1 to 10.) (c) Can intelligence be quantified (e.g., IQ tests)?
14. Can one kind of pleasure be compared with another (e.g., sexual excitement with comforting warmth), or the pleasure of a museum with the pleasure of an amusement park?
15. How well does "enlightened self-interest" work in practice as a moral motivator?
16. Compare the intellectual, volitional, and emotional appeals in ethics (p. 120).
17. (a) Can utilitarianism incorporate justice and law (pp. 120–121)? (b) If so, how? (c) How would they mediate the problem of the German cannibal? (d) What other consequences would follow from adopting utilitarian principles consistently?
18. Which of the fourteen critiques at the end do you find weakest? Which is the strongest? Why?
19. If they are valid criticisms, how much does each one tell you about true morality, by contrast? If they are not valid, why not?

ON MILL

1. (a) How did Mill's father influence his philosophy? (b) Why is this so common? (c) Give some other examples (e.g., Sartre, Freud).
2. (a) What aspects of philosophy are missing from Mill because he was "robbed of his childhood"? (b) Why are some aspects of the "love of wisdom" associated with and learned in

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childhood? (c) Was this a direct cause of his nervous breakdown and depression, do you think? If so, why? (d) Do you think it likely that those who believe and live his philosophy will also be more prone to nervous breakdown and depression?

3. (a) Can there be a more serious depression than Mill's: "It occurred to me to put the question directly to myself: 'Suppose that all your objects in life were realized. . . . Would this be a great joy and happiness to you? . . . No!" (b) Relate this to Augustine's most famous saying (statement 1 in vol. 2, p. 21) and to William James and Yogi Berra (p. 79, footnote)
4. (a) What is your spontaneous reaction to Mill's claim, before looking at it logically, "that all previous moralists were superseded, and that here [in Bentham] indeed was the commencement of a new era of thought"? (b) Why? (c) What other important philosophers have made such a claim? Which have not?
5. What is common to all four of the things that defeated Mill's depression (p. 125)?
6. (a) In what way is Mill's non-materialism more skeptical than materialism (p. 126)? (b) Why? (c) Is this equally true or Kant for the same reason, or not? If not, why?
7. (a) Does Mill's argument against natural law ethics depend on his redefinition of "nature" (pp. 140–141)? (b) Why or why not? (c) Compare the premodern concept of "nature" (p. 126) with Mill's. (d) Does the premodern one presuppose metaphysical realism? Does the modern one presuppose nominalism?
8. (a) What is the connection between (I) the new, typically modern notion of happiness as a subjective feeling, (II) the new, typically modern notion of moral conscience as a subjective feeling, and (III) the new, typically modern notion of nature as a collection of material things? (b) Is there a common epistemological principle at the root of all three changes? If so, what is it and how does it entail these three changes? (c) Is there a common metaphysical principle behind them? If so, how does it entail all three changes? (d) If there is both an epistemological and a metaphysical principle behind them, what is the relation between the epistemological principle and the metaphysical principle? Which comes first and why?
9. Why do you think these changes have come about in modern thought and life? Keep tracing your premises or causes back to prior and more fundamental ones.
10. Evaluate Mill's description of the natural moral law as "follow nature." Is this what Aristotle and Aquinas meant by it?
11. Mill is a phenomenalist but not a phenomenologist. What is the difference?
12. (a) Is Mill's epistemological premise that "all we know of objects is the sensations which they give us" the same as Locke's first premise (vol. 3, p. 63)? (b) Is it more or less skeptical than Locke's? (c) Than Kant's "Copernican revolution"? (d) Is there a logical problem with this as distinct from the practical problem of unwelcome consequences? (e) Would Berkeley agree with Mill's cosmology outlined on p. 127?

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13. (a) Can you prove that there really is an external world (p. 127–128) (b) If so, how? If not, why not? (c) Use James' criterion of meaning: What difference would Mill's philosophy of phenomenalism (that we can only know phenomena, not the real world) make to our lives and our behavior?
14. Do the same with Mill's (and Hume's) denial that we can know the meaning of the word "I" or "self" (p. 128).
15. How can we escape the apparently incorrigible and inescapable subjective predicament in p. 128? Is there an objective, impersonal logical argument that can settle whether the believer in a self is hallucinating or whether the unbeliever is color blind?
16. Compare Mill's psychology with Skinner's "Behaviorism" (p. 128).
17. Can you find an error in Mill's argument that all syllogisms are fakes (p. 129)?
18. Do you claim that you are certain that all men are mortal, or not (p. 129)? Why?
19. (a) How does this, and much else in Mill, depend on whether or not there exists an argument for the existence of "intellectual intuition" or what premoderns called "the first act of the mind" (p. 129)? (b) Is there an argument for its existence? (c) How would Mill respond to that argument? (d) How would Plato, who first assumed this (p. 130), justify his assumption? (e) How would he (or Aristotle) answer Mill's response in (c)?
20. (a) Mill thought that to justify induction, he had to justify the principle of the uniformity of nature: Why? (b) Why can't he justify the principle of the uniformity of nature? (c) How does metaphysical realism do it (p. 130)?
21. How would Mill respond to the following logic joke? John was a very logical boy but he believed he was dead. A psychiatrist claimed he could be cured of his illusion by going to medical school, which he did. The psychiatrist then asked him, "John, how old are you?" "Twenty-five." "Have you been dead all your life?" "Yes." "Did you learn in medical school whether dead men bleed?" "Yes. They can bleed, but only for a few hours after death." "Look here, John. I'm going to prick you with this pin. Please tell me what you see." "Doctor, I'm bleeding!" "Yes. And now what do you logically conclude from all this?" "Doctor, you are a genius. You have cured me from my illusion. Dead men do bleed after all."
22. Do you see any problem in Mill's five ways of determining causes (pp. 130–131)?
23. Mill is a determinist, though not a materialist. He claims that "given the motives . . . character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act might be unerringly inferred [deduced, predicted]" (p. 131). (a) Is unpredictability a necessary consequence of free will? Could a free choice be certainly foreknown? (b) Is the fact that we have not been able to "unerringly infer" choices a good reason to believe they are free and not totally determined?
24. What are the consequences of determinism in life?
25. Does Mill's "modified fatalism" make determinism and freedom logically compatible? Why or why not?

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26. (a) What justifies Mill in defining freedom differently than common usage does (p. 131)? (b) How is the logic of his argument for compatibility dependent on his redefining this common term? (c) What is the parallel here to his redefining "nature" in rejecting "natural law"?
27. How would James and Mill debate the issue of determinism? How would James respond to Mill's description of the will?
28. (a) Why must Mill believe that "we never know that we are able to do a thing except from having done it"? (b) To believe the opposite, what else must we believe that Mill does not?
29. (a) Why, having rejected personal freedom, is Mill so strong on political freedom? What accounts for this pattern that we also see in both Hobbes and Rousseau, who seem polar opposites? (b) How do these common political consequences follow from common anthropological premises (p. 132)? (c) Evaluate the footnote on p. 132.
30. (a) What accounts for Mill's very strange psychology of identifying personal responsibility with fear of punishment? (b) What refutes it?
31. Why do nearly all influential modern philosophers deny some important almost universally believed assumptions of common sense?
32. (a) Does determinism follow from the principle of causality, that nothing happens without an adequate cause? (b) If so, why do most people not see this? For nearly everyone accepts the principle of causality but few accept determinism. If not, why not? How could a human act be both caused and free?
33. Is it self-contradictory that utilitarianism's only absolute is relativism (p. 133)?
34. (a) Why does it seem absurd to say that there are no human acts that are morally good or evil by their intrinsic nature (p. 133)? What are some radical consequences of this belief? (b) Why must Mill believe it?
35. What is the appeal of utilitarianism?
36. What is Mill's answer to how we argue from fact to value (pp. 133–134)? (Perhaps this is a trick question!)
37. (a) Would Mill say that the critique of his argument from analogy as fallacious (p. 134) is based on a misunderstanding? (b) If so, how? (Hint: Does Mill have a different answer to the question of the relation between "can" and "should" or between "is" and "ought" than nearly everyone else does?) If not, what better answer would he give or could he give to the question of how we come to know the happiness principle?
38. Is p. 134 a simple refutation of empiricism? Is point 3 on p. 135? Why or why not?
39. (a) J. Budziszewski says that there are some things we "can't not know." Is it possible not to know or see the primary thing conscience sees (p. 134)? (b) If so, how is that possible? If the answer is by reducing conscience to a feeling or emotion, how is it possible to do that? How is it possible not to see the difference between the fact of how you feel (e.g., Hitler felt good about the Holocaust) and the moral rightness, virtue, duty, or obligation to act or not

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act on that feeling? (c) If not (i.e., if it is not possible not to see this whole moral dimension), why does Mill seem not to see it? (d) Why are "men without chests" found much more among educated "intellectuals" than among uneducated peasants? (e) Aquinas taught that the natural moral law cannot be abolished from the human heart (*Summa theologiae* 2.2.94.6). C.S. Lewis warned, in *The Abolition of Man,* that modern education is doing just that, producing "men without chests" (hearts, consciences). Who's right? (f) What different plans of action and argument logically follow from each of the two answers to (e)?

40. Evaluate the analogy between morality and art (p. 135). What difference does using it make?
41. (a) Evaluate the text's arguments against hedonism (p. 135) and (b) Frankl's empirical argument from Auschwitz (p. 136). (c) What difference does the changed definition of "happiness" make to the arguments?
42. (a) Is Mill really less logical than Bentham by being more human (p. 136)? (b) Why or why not?
43. (a) Why does nearly everyone admit that egotism is bad and altruism is good (p. 137)? (b) How would you argue with someone who denies that?
44. (a) What is the weakness of Bentham's "egotistic 'hook'" of enlightened self-interest as a way of justifying altruism? (b) How does Mill try to overcome that weakness? (c) Does he (p. 137)?
45. How would you refute the common misconception that moral conscience is only a feeling?
46. How would Mill answer the argument about the ten cannibals (p. 140)?
47. How would he answer the argument from the science fiction story of Ursula Le Guin?
48. How would you answer the question of the footnote on p. 141?
49. Argue for and against Mill's "libertarian" political philosophy.
50. How can the principle of subsidiarity (p. 143) and the priority of the common good over the private good be reconciled?
51. (a) Evaluate Mill's defense of free speech (p. 143). (b) How is the analogy between speech and lifestyles a good one and how is it not?
52. (a) Are women equal in all things to men (p. 143)? (b) If not, if neither has a "disability" (Are men able to get pregnant? Are women able to knock out Mike Tyson?), then why and where is it right to act as if they are equal? If so, in what are they equal and how should this play out in politics? (c) Is "equal" equivocal here?
53. (a) Why does Mill require language about God to be unvocal, not analogical (p. 143)? (b) What are the consequences of this? (c) What is the defense of analogy here? Is the quotation on p. 144 unreasonable? If so, why?
54. Why is Mill an agnostic rather than an atheist? Why does he not consider the problem of evil a conclusive refutation of theism?
55. (a) Can the true and the good be opposed to each other (p. 144)? (b) Why or why not? (c) Why did Mill regard this as a very serious problem?

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56. (a) Why did Mill think a non-supernaturalistic religion could provide consolation as well as a supernaturalistic one (p. 144)? (b) Why do most people disagree?
57. (a) Is the top of p. 145 a misunderstanding? (b) If not, why would Mill not want heaven to exist or himself to enter it?
58. Why does the text imply that the facts of "the century of genocide" would refute or weaken Mill's philosophical positions (p. 145)?

ON SPENCER

1. If evolution is almost universally accepted, why do you think the three evolutionist philosophers are notable for their precipitous unpopularity?
2. Is there evidence for universal evolution and progress? Is there evidence against it?
3. Can you answer Spencer's argument against any absolutely absolute absolute (p. 151)?
4. How would Lao Tzu answer it? (p. 151; cf. vol. 1, ch. 6; read the Tao Te Ching)
5. (a) Is Spencer's goal and program (p. 151) possible in principle or not? (b) Why or why not?
6. (a) If evolution is universal, it must include society too, and thus "Social Darwinism" too, so why is "Social Darwinism" relatively unpopular? (b) How is it related to libertarianism?
7. Answer the questions in the footnote on p. 152.
8. Why can't "rights" and "justice" be explained as "sentiments" (p. 153)?
9. Evaluate Spencer's hope for the disappearance of conscience (p. 153), with reasons.
10. Can scientific, technological, and industrial causes produce moral effects (p. 153)? Why or why not?
11. Why have there been no influential comprehensive systems since Hegel (p. 154)?

ON BERGSON

1. In terms of p. 155, (a) is Bergson's "musical" or "participatory" or "synthetic," "big picture" thinking meant to replace, to join with, or to relativize "analytical," definitionary, quasi-mathematical thinking? (b) Since our brain has two hemispheres, each of which specializes in one of these, and since we need both profundity and clarity, why is it so difficult and so unusual to join them? (c) What philosophers did justice to both? (d) How?
2. (a) Why is the age and culture that Bergson tries to correct so typically materialistic, skeptical, reductionistic, scientistic, positivistic, deterministic, mechanistic, atheistic, nominalistic, and nihilistic? (b) Is the fact that so many of Bergson's students called his philosophy "liberating" significant? If so, what does it signify? Is this "evidence" of some sort? How to evaluate it?
3. If you were in Bergson's position in the 1930s, would you have done what he did or not (p. 156)? (b) Why?
4. "Most philosophers have one Big Idea" (p. 156). Who doesn't?

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5. Why is time such a "big idea" that it influences nearly everything else?
6. Light is both continuous wave and discontinuous particles. Why isn't time like that? Is it like light in other ways?
7. How is time unlike space? How is it like space?
8. What are the probable consequences of Bergson's notion of time for life after death: its existence, its time experience, and its relation to matter and space?
9. Is it an overstatement to say that according to Bergson, "physical time, the time physical science measures, is not real" (p. 157)? Is this like Berkeley's denial of matter? Is it like Aristotle's denial of Plato's "Ideas"? Does it follow that space is also not real? If so, does it follow that it is not true that an elephant is really bigger than a mouse? (I did not divide this question into parts because each part is dependent on, or at least very closely connected with, each other part.)
10. What are some other examples of "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (p. 157)?
11. (a) In Bergson's philosophy, what is the difference between the way the past is present in the "memory foam" of a pillow and in the conscious memory of a person? (b) Might we extrapolate, by analogy, that the way the past is present after death and the way it is present now through memory are related, in the same way as present memory is related to a pillow's "memory foam"? If so, how might that work? If not, why not? (c) Might the way the past is present to God be related to the way it is present to us after death, in the same way its presence to us after death is related to the way it is present to us now? If so, try to explain; if not, why not?
12. (a) At the point of death, many people say that every single event in their past life seems to be seen and even experienced as if it was alive and present, at once (simultaneously) but in perfect order. How would Bergson interpret this phenomenon? (b) Might this phenomenon cast some light on the nature of purgatory in Catholic theology?
13. Does Bergson have a logical proof of life after death? If so, what are its premises? How questionable are they?
14. What does "nothing is lost" (p. 158) mean? What more does it mean than that our memory banks contain them, like pictures in a photo album? (Compare what Marcel says about "presence.")
15. How does Bergson's method of "*découpage*" answer the rationalist-empiricist dispute? What other philosophical disputes might it answer similarly? For example, is there a common error of both monism and pluralism? Of capitalism and communism? Of Aristotle's ethics and Kant's? Of feminism and chauvinism? Of relativism and absolutism? Of materialism, immaterialism, and dualism? Of James' "tough-mindedness" and "tender-mindedness"?
16. What are the likenesses and differences between Bergson's "*élan vital*" and Christianity's "Holy Spirit"?

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17. How does evolution, for Bergson, lead toward theism rather than atheism? Evaluate this argument.
18. (a) How, for Bergson, are all modern reductionisms exactly the opposite of what they appear to be (p. 159)? (b) Evaluate his argument.
19. Explain and evaluate Bergson's argument against determinism (pp. 159–160)
20. How is Lewis' point at pp. 160–161 similar to Bergson's and how is it different?
21. Formulate and evaluate the syllogism that Bergson claims refutes materialism (p. 161).
22. What are the consequences for "artificial intelligence" of Bergson's refutation of materialism? Of his notion of time?
23. How does Bergson's fourth argument against materialism (p. 161) support mystical experience?
24. How is it possible for great philosophers, including Augustine, to miss the "in your face" obvious point at p. 162 that refutes materialism even on the level of sensation?
25. (a) Why is the kind of knowing whose time is "*durée*" trans-lingual? (b) What are the consequences of this for ordinary rather than mystical experiences? (c) For ordinary human communication and misunderstandings? (d) Can it answer question 24?
26. Is Bergson denying that we can be timelessly certain that 2+2=4?
27. (a) Would Bergson's notion of time interpret God's omnipresence as infinite movement and speed? (b) Might this notion and the notion that God is simply timeless both be errors, subject to refutation by the principle of "*découpage* "?
28. Did the Greek and medieval priority of eternity over time concern both kinds of time or only *kronos*?
29. How far does the analogy go between Bergson's "*élan vital*" and Aquinas' notion of "*esse*" as active but not temporal?
30. Could "eternity" contain rather than exclude all time and change? Compare question 12 here.
31. Does the simple argument at p. 163 refute evolution by natural selection? If not, why not? If so, why is it almost universally rejected as the "intelligent design" argument, and why is that argument almost universally regarded as religious rather than scientific? Even a physical organ cannot evolve this way; why is not the evolution of the person who has them even more absurd?
32. What is the point of Bergson's parable of the intelligent bees? What does it prove?
33. Compare Wittgenstein and Bergson on the argument made on p. 164.
34. (a) Why is humor more central and revealing than it seems, according to Bergson? (b) How would a materialist like Marx or Freud explain humor? (c) Which explanation conforms best to the actual experience of humor?
35. (a) Can we be emotionally detached from our own pratfalls to laugh at ourselves (p. 164)? (b) If so, how? And what does that prove? (c) Can we also laugh at our own tragedies?

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Could Jesus laugh on the cross? (d) At others' tragedies? Did he laugh at Judas when he said, "It would have been better for that man if he had never been born"? (e) Can laughter have the last word? If so, how and when? (f) Can something be both serious and funny? (g) Why or why not? (h) Both tragic and funny? (i) Why or why not? (j) Why is humor so difficult to seriously pin down?

36. Bergson finds some attributes common to most humor. Is there one that is common to all humor?
37. (a) Why does Bergson find teleology to be a form of determinism (p. 165)? (b) Evaluate this.
38. (a) How can universal evolutionism (progress) and universal entropy (regress) both be true? (b) Does Bergson's answer presuppose Cartesian dualism (p. 165)?
39. (a) Was the Vatican right to reject Bergson's rejection of all timeless and unchangeable dogmas (p. 166)? (b) Why or why not? (c) Is there any way to combine the commonsensical belief in some changeless truths, whether religious ("divine revelation") or other (mathematical equations) with Bergson's philosophy of time?

ON TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

1. (a) What is it about Teilhard's philosophy that makes it "either wonderfully right or disastrously wrong"? (b) Could it possibly be both? (c) If so, how? If not, why not?
2. Explain and evaluate this comparison (p. 168): "Bergson spiritualized evolution; Teilhard evolutionized spirituality."
3. Teilhard "attempts to unite religion, science, and philosophy" (p. 168). Can this be done? Should it?
4. (a) Teilhard claims that his central idea is "the cosmic Christ." Typically Eastern Orthodox theology also emphasizes "the cosmic Christ" but does not emphasize the modern idea of evolution, or modern science, but tradition and eternity. Is there a natural or even necessary connection between "the cosmic Christ" and universal evolution for Teilhard? (b) If so, what is it? Evaluate it. (c) If the connection is external and arising only from outside Christianity, from modern science, what justifies it? (d) Does it require the abandonment of the traditional idea of eternity as timeless? Why or why not?
5. "We are drawn . . . by the beauty . . . of the whole . . . not by a chain of proofs." What kind of evidence or reason is this for any comprehensive picture?
6. Why is the spatial, geometrical analogy of "within" for self-consciousness and "without" for consciousness of another apt? What is its limitation (p. 169)?
7. (a) Is the "radium" example on p. 169 apt? (b) Is it universal? (c) Does it entail that there is a "Hitler in ourselves" (Max Picard)? A "Buddha" in ourselves"? A "Jesus in ourselves"? (d) Does it justify the universality of God? Of life? Of consciousness? (e) Why is it not pantheism? (f) Is there any other way to justify it without falling into monism and the denial of

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differences in kind rather than degree other than to see being (reality) as really analogical rather than univocal, as in Aquinas? (g) If analogy is necessary, why is it usually denied by both most empiricists and most rationalists as too "mushy" and "subjective"? (h) Can electromagnetic attraction be rightly seen as a kind of consciousness? Does an electron "know" the difference between a proton and another electron? Is there "love among the particles"? Is gravity a form of love? See the last line of the greatest poem ever written, the *Divine Comedy*.

8. (a) How can Teilhard say there is "spontaneity" (i.e., freedom and unpredictability) everywhere (p. 169), even in mechanical motion (e.g., between magnets)? (b) Are freedom and unpredictability always identical in practice? Can a human act be free if it is predictable? Are non-saints, then, more free than saints, who are more predictably good? Is God maximally *un*-free?
9. Are complexity and consciousness always coordinate (p. 170)? Is a more complex geometrical structure more *conscious* than a simpler one? If so, how? If not, does not this show that consciousness is not universal?
10. (a) Why does Teilhard say that "there must be a single energy operating in the world" (p. 170)? (b) How are spiritual (conscious) energy and unconscious energy one?
11. In saying that "in the world, nothing could ever burst forth as final across the different thresholds successively traversed by evolution (however critical they be) which has not already existed, in an obscure and primordial way" (p. 170), why does Teilhard unify "up" from evolution rather than "down" by creation and Providence?
12. (a) Why does Teilhard make the difference between men and animals' self-consciousness rather than consciousness, reason, understanding, abstraction, moral sense, and knowledge of God (p. 170)? (b) He lists "abstraction, logic, reasoned choice and invention, mathematics, art, calculation of space and time, [and] anxieties and dreams of love" as consequences of self-consciousness and properties of man, but the last two seem also present in higher animals while the others are not. How would he explain this?
13. (a) Do Teilhard's principles entail that man is still evolving (p. 171) into some "super-man" or "over-man"? (b) If not, why not? If so, what would that be? (c) Animals evolve, angels do not, and man is either both animal (body) and angel (spirit) or neither animal (spiritless) nor angel (bodiless). So does man evolve or not? (d) Does the existence of angels refute universal evolutionism?
14. (a) Why does Teilhard's cosmology (p. 171) sound more like that of atheists (Comte, Nietzsche, Spencer) than that of theists? (b) Why did his principle about radium points (question 7) seem like the opposite of reductionism (seeing more potentialities in the lowest forms of life) while these passages sound like atheists' reductionism (that the highest forms of life are only the culmination of the lower forms)?

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15. If, as Teilhard says (pp. 171–174), we are at a crisis in which man can take control of the fundamental forces of evolution, as Bacon and Nietzsche says, is this cause for optimism or worry? Even nuclear power is a worry; why shouldn't even greater powers be greater worries?
16. Isn't it personalizing evolution and depersonalizing individual persons to see man as evolution looking at itself (p. 171)? Is evolution more intrinsically valuable than persons? Will evolution go to heaven?
17. Why does Teilhard say there is no middle way between absolute optimism and absolute pessimism (p. 172)? This seems to leave room only for irresponsible, blind optimism or total pessimism. Doesn't Christianity refute this, since in it there is both sin and salvation, both good and evil in all of us? Is this an application of our real absolute either/or, viz. salvation vs. damnation, to the Baconian, Promethean, Faustian demand to play God (p. 172)?
18. How would Teilhard regard Solzhenitsyn's most famous saying, that the line dividing good and evil runs not between nations, cultures, or ideologies but between the two halves of every human heart?
19. (a) Evaluate "there is less difference than people think between research and adoration" (I) in itself and (II) in light of the "research" of Dr. Mengele, the Nazi eugenics program (which was explicitly based on American models—cf. p. 173), and the research of Silicon Valley's present "transhumanists" in their attempt to create artificial immortality by genetic and/or cybernetic engineering. (b) Would the fulfillment of "man's conquest of nature" be the conquest of death? Would the "immortality pill" produce heaven on earth or hell on earth? Defend your answer.
20. If your response is critical of Teilhard, how do you suppose a pious Jesuit who can believe and write such almost mystically beautiful things in *The Divine Milieu* (p. 176) could be led to make common cause with the most Satanic forces in the world?
21. (a) Is there such a thing as "collective consciousness" (p. 173)? (b) Is this not beyond even the totalitarian dreams of communists and Nazis? Is it not Satan's desire to melt down our individuality and our freedom as one would melt toy soldiers in a fire?
22. Does Teilhard's labeling God as "the Omega Point" (p. 174) make him a Hegelian, who sees God himself as the evolving final end rather than the trans-temporal Creator?
23. Does his distinction between ego and egotism, individuality and personality (p. 174), answer this concern?
24. Compare his vision of cosmic love (pp. 174–175) with Dante's (question 7).
25. In light of his belief in Scripture and its pessimistic this-worldly eschatology (p. 176), why do you think Teilhard is so naively optimistic about our future in this world even after Auschwitz and Hiroshima? (When he heard of the first nuclear bomb's successful detonation in New Mexico in 1945, his reaction was rejoicing, not because it would end the war but because mankind had conquered nature's most powerful force.)

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26. List all the insights you find genuine, true, and personally helpful in *The Divine Milieu* (pp. 176–180). That should compensate for my list of seven very serious criticisms on pp. 181–182, and it presents the puzzle in the next question.
27. Do you find what you regard as Teilhard's positive (true, good, beautiful) points and what you regard as his negative (false, evil, terrifying) points as (I) accidental to each other, almost as if he were a schizophrenic, or as (II) related to each other naturally, logically, and perhaps necessarily, or (III) something in between, the bad points being dangerous and natural but avoidable consequences of the good ones? Of is it some of each of these three things? If the latter, which of these three relationships first the most of his points?
28. What moves you to embrace or to renounce Teilhard?

ON ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL

1. (a) State and evaluate the single central reason why the text labels early analytic philosophy "a disease and a disaster." (b) Now evaluate that argument (not just its conclusion).
2. What do you think caused the significant modification of the claims of the early analytic philosophers (p. 187)?
3. (a) How was the basic problem and program of the early analytic philosophers the same as that of Descartes? (b) Which one succeeded better? (c) Why? (Or is that a trick question?)
4. What do you think is the reason why philosophers, unlike scientists, never agree, no matter what method they use?
5. Why are nearly all great English speaking philosophers nominalists and empiricists (p. 188)?

ON MOORE

1. In what ways does Moore resemble Socrates? In what ways does he not?
2. How can a philosopher be "so boring that he is fascinating" (p. 190)?
3. Do you find Moore useful? If so, how?
4. Do you see a connection between Moore's non-ideological common sense (p. 191) and his ordinary, happy life, which was so very unusual among philosophers (p. 191)? If so, what is it?
5. Why is the discussion of Moore's philosophy more difficult than that of most other philosophers? (Hint: There is a hidden assumption in this question, and it is not the one that seems obvious.)
6. Would you like to have Moore as your roommate? Why or why not?
7. Why, unlike Ayer, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein, did Moore not invent or advocate for any new logic or method?
8. (a) Is Moore's method of analysis, breaking down a view into its parts, in need of an opposite method too? (b) If not, why not? If so, why? (c) How are the two to be related?

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9. (a) Is it good to worry or wonder about whether you are not really a brain in a vat only dreaming that the external world exists? (b) Why or why not?
10. If "most of Moore's points are 'Duhs,'" what is their worth?
11. From the principle that "the knowledge of a thing is not one of that thing's parts or properties" (p. 195), what follows logically? How?
12. Why is "goodness" "the fundamental term of ethics" (p. 195)? Are there other candidates? If so, why are they not as primary?
13. Why, for Moore, is goodness indefinable?
14. Does this same argument hold for being?
15. If, as Moore says, the question "What kinds of things ought to exist for their own sakes?" "can only be directly 'intuited,' like a simple color" (p. 196), how can we argue about it?

ON AYER

1. What makes it possible for the book defending "one of the only philosophies in history that has been almost universally agreed to have been conclusively refuted" to have been "one of the most influential and best-selling philosophy books of modern times" (p. 197)? Certainly not its writing style, unlike its parallel case *The Communist Manifesto.*
2. What is the answer to the question on p. 197 about the connection between leftist politics and sexual conquests?
3. Is there any significance to the fact that this philosophy was concocted not by an individual but by a large group of philosophers (the "Vienna Circle")? Why is it harder to imagine a collective origin to most other philosophies?
4. The two "most interesting things" Ayer ever wrote, about Mike Tyson and about what the red light told him about space (p. 198), almost certainly could not have happened to most other philosophers. Why?
5. (a) Do these two personal incidents impact Ayer's philosophy somehow? If so, how? (b) Nietzsche reduced all philosophies to "personal confessions." Defenders of Heidegger insist his philosophy is only accidentally connected to his personal love of Hitler and Nazism. Can you refute both answers to the question of the relationship between a philosopher's thought and his personality and life? (c) Can you formulate and defend the moderate position between these two extreme answers to that question?
6. (a) Apply your answer to the above question to the connection between Hume's and Ayer's denial of a personal center (p. 198). (b) Why can such a denial be attractive to any philosopher, even a Hume or an Ayer? (c) Why was it attractive to Buddha? (d) Why could that not be the same reason it attracted Hume and Ayer?
7. What is the relation between meaning and truth? It would seem that a proposition (or truth claim) must have meaning before it can be either true or false; but if that (immediately

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preceding) proposition is true, it too must first be meaningful; so does this not set up an unstoppable infinite regress? Is "What is the meaning of meaning?" a meaningless question, since it is unanswerable?

8. For Ayer, "the purpose of philosophy is . . . not profundity but clarity" (p. 199). Why are these two goals so hard to attain together? Which philosophers did that best?
9. Would Ockham approve Ayer's use of "Ockham's Razor" to create the "verification principle"?
10. Why does Ayer's and Hume's division of all propositions into only two classes seem logically necessary? (Hint: Ask yourself whether it is true that a proposition must be either one whose contradictory is self-contradictory or one whose contradictory is not.) Why is it not?
11. Kant tried to answer Hume's division of all knowledge, and Ayer's division of all meaningful propositions, into a priori (tautologies) and a posteriori (empirically verifiable) by justifying synthetic a priori propositions. How would Ayer evaluate that? What would he say about "Every event must have a cause"?
12. (a) Isn't Ayer right to say that "a sentence is factually significant to any given person if and only if he knows how to verify the proposition" (p. 201)? (b) If not, why not? If so, doesn't the verification principle follow from that?
13. Ayer's first, and therefore unquestionable and unprovable, assumption seems to be not the verification principle but the impossibility of metaphysics (p. 200–201). How would Ayer answer the charge that this makes his verification principle merely a practical weapon of spiritual warfare rather than a meaningful proposition or a logical argument (pp. 202–203), as in Bacon, Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, Mao Zedong, and Mussolini (p. 206)?
14. Is the argument on p. 203 a legitimate *reductio ad absurdum*?
15. (a) Does the fact that the verification principle is self-refuting make the analogy in point m on p. 204 a valid one? (b) If analogies do not *prove* anything, what is their power and proper use?
16. (a) How is Ayer's "boo-hooray" theory of values self-refuting, just as his verification principle theory of meaning is? Explain the logic. (b) Does this then refute the popular notion (Rousseau, Hume) that moral values are feelings? (c) If so, why does it continue to be enormously popular?

ON RUSSELL

1. Why do you think philosophers who are political activists like Russell are always leftists, except for Heidegger?
2. (a) What is the serious, literal point of the first five paragraphs of the long excerpt from "A Free Man's Worship"? Interpret the satire, especially in view of the identities of Doctor Faustus and Mephistopheles. Does the last paragraph answer that question or not? If so, how? If not, why not?
3. Interpret Russell's joke about socialists and Christians on p. 209.

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4. How serious is his joke farther down on p. 209?
5. Is the aim of *Principia Mathematica*, viz., a new logic, possible? Isn't that like a new arithmetic?
6. (a) What are the differences between the old logic and the new (pp. 213–214)? (b) What are some of the consequences these differences make to the content of philosophy?
7. What is your reaction to Russell's description of JFK and America (p. 209)? Who or what does this remind you of? What does this reveal about Russell?
8. Why were Sartre and Russell by far the two most famous and popular philosophers of the century? What does this reveal about the century?
9. Is a philosopher's "continuous experiments with his philosophy, his politics, and his loves" (p. 209) admirable or not? Why?
10. What significant character trait does Russell share with Rousseau (p. 210)? How is this relevant to his philosophy?
11. What does the fact that Russell could not learn to boil water for tea (p. 210) reveal about him? How is this relevant to his philosophy?
12. (a) What does Russell's "I like mathematics because it is *not* human" (p. 210) reveal about him? (b) How is this relevant to his philosophy (cf. p. 211)?. (c) Compare it with Sartre's "black boulevard" (p. 54).
13. What does Russell's description of common sense as "the metaphysics of savages" (p. 210) reveal about him? About savages?
14. To understand Russell's new logic, why is it important that we know its motivation and attraction as well as its cognitive content (p. 211–212)?
15. Can its limitations also be part of its attraction (p. 213)? If so, how is this psychologically possible?
16. What are some other ways it resembles a computer (p. 211)?
17. (a) If philosophy as conceived and invented by the ancients began in wonder and aimed at wisdom (p. 213), what does philosophy as conceived by Russell and the analytic philosophers begin with and what does it aim at? (b) What other schools of modern philosophy share this new concept of philosophy and which do not? (c) What is wonder? (d) What is wisdom?
18. (a) What's wrong with deducing the structure of the world from the structure of your newly invented logic (p. 213)? (b) Did Aristotle do this? (c) Did Kant? (Careful here! Tricky question.)
19. Why is it a philosophical, and even a metaphysical, assumption or aim rather than simply a logical and methodological one to begin with propositions rather than terms, as the new logic does (p. 213)?
20. Why did Russell attack Aristotle's and common sense's grammar of subject-predicate propositions (p. 214)? This is not merely an exaggeration or an emotional outburst—Hobbes shared this passionate hatred of Aristotelian logic. What psychological forces and motives are behind it?

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21. Why did Russell think he had not only to add extensions onto the old logic to solve peripheral problems like relational propositions, the liar paradox, and the theory of descriptions but to denounce the old logic as a whole, even though the old logic also had ways to deal with these?
22. (a) Why would someone who embraces and practices the new logic and not the old believe that computers think, that "artificial intelligence" is not an oxymoron (puzzle 3 on p. 215—a crucial paragraph)? (b) If this is an error, how serious is it both in theory and in practice? If it is not, why not?
23. (a) Is Russell's elimination of the word "I" as a "logical fiction" (p. 218) self-contradictory, as suggested on p. 217, or not? (b) Is it merely a logical problem? (c) How would Kierkegaard diagnose this ailment? (cf. *Either/Or* and *The Sickness Unto Death*.) (d) How would Sartre? (e) How would Marcel?
24. How tight is the bond between utilitarianism in ethics and (a) empiricism, (b) nominalism, (c) materialism or physicalism, (d) positivism, (e) hedonism, (f) the new logic, and (g) artificial intelligence? How many of these are presupposed in *Brave New World*?

ON WITTGENSTEIN

1. Why is it so difficult to combine "the scientific, technological, and practical on the one hand and the poetic, aesthetic, and mystical on the other hand" (p. 222)? What other philosophers have done this?
2. Why do you think most modern philosophers are "troubled and conflicted soul(s)" (p. 223)?
3. (a) What is meant by saying that "Wittgenstein is to Russell what Job is to Ecclesiastes" (p. 223)? (b) How could someone who lived "in perpetual torment" judge his life to be "wonderful"?
4. What relationship do you see between the two facts that "no philosopher in history was ever so totally ignorant of the history of philosophy" (p. 223) and "no philosopher in history ever more completely disowned his own major work" (p. 223)?
5. In light of the rest of the chapter, did Wittgenstein disown or properly interpret his major work? Could he have done both?
6. What was it that scandalized Russell in Wittgenstein? Why?
7. (a) In what way, exactly, is Russell misunderstanding Wittgenstein when he says, "I think . . . that what he likes best in mysticism is its power to make him stop thinking"? (b) How is this the same misunderstanding many people have of Heidegger? (Hint for answering both questions: What is the relationship between thinking and calculating?)
8. When Wittgenstein quotes Tolstoy ("The more we live by our intellect, the less we understand the meaning of life") (p. 224), which word in that quotation changed its meaning radically between Aquinas and Wittgenstein? Would Aquinas disagree or disagree with

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that quotation if he used that word in the typically premodern sense? Would he disagree or agree with it if he used that word in the typically modern sense?

9. What did Wittgenstein show, by his life, he believed about the relationship between philosophy and life?
10. Henry Veatch, a Thomist, wrote an explanation and defense of Aristotelian logic entitled *Logic as a Human Instrument*, which elicited passionate anger from most analytic philosophers but would not have elicited that reaction from Wittgenstein if he had read it. Why? (Cf. point 5 on p. 236.)
11. Explain this sentence: "The whole book [the *Tractacus*] is a very long shaggy dog story" (p. 225).
12. What do you think Wittgenstein would have thought of Kierkegaard if he had read him?
13. The longest section in this chapter, and probably in the whole four volumes of this book, that is not directly about the philosopher in question is the section on the two logics (pp. 225–229). What is the justification for this?
14. Of the eleven differences between the two logics, which do you see as the most important and why?
15. Explain as many connections between these eleven differences as you can.
16. (a) Why would nearly the entire philosophical establishment eagerly embrace a new logic that not only repudiated the logic used by all the greatest minds in the history of philosophy but also was so radically in conflict with common sense and what the rest of the world meant by logic, as summarized in point 5 (pp. 227–228)? (b) What do you see as the causal or motivational relationship between logic and life in light of the end of point 5 (p. 228)?
17. Research the "predicable" called "property" or "proper accident" in a textbook of Aristotelian logic. (a) Why is it impossible for the new logic to admit that this predicable exists? (b) What are the philosophical consequences of this logical omission?
18. Why is the new logic the logic of computers (p. 228)? What are the consequences for "artificial intelligence" of all the omissions that the new logic must make?
19. What do you suppose can be the *motivation* for preferring a logic that has nothing to do with the real world or real causal relationships or even logical inferences from premises to conclusions (points 5 and 6 on pp. 227–228)?
20. Why is the most important word in the last sentence of the Tractatus the last word, "*schweigen*," literally "shut up" (p. 230)?
21. If "all that is worth saying is unsayable" (p. 230), is *that*, then, also not worth saying, since it is said and therefore sayable? But Wittgenstein showed (but did not say!) that he believes that is is indeed worth saying, by the act of saying it. Is this just another case of skepticism in all its forms being self-contradictory, or is it different?

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22. (a) Compare and contrast Wittgenstein's "mysticism" with that of Lao Tzu, Pascal, and Aquinas (p. 230). How are they similar and how are they different? (Hint: What concept of language and logic did they begin with and then transcend? What concept of language and logic did Wittgenstein begin with and then transcend? Cf. p. 231) (b) Aquinas called his masterpiece, the *Summa,* "straw" compared with what he had seen in mystical experience. Compare and contrast this with Wittgenstein's "repudiation" of his *Tractatus.* (c) Straw was used in the Middle Ages to cover dung from cows and bulls. Look up the meaning of the word "*skubala*" in Phil. 3:8 and relate this use of the word by St. Paul to Aquinas' "straw." (d) How does this explain the relationship between Wittgenstein and the other analytic philosophers (cf. also p. 235)?
23. How many philosophers' "ethics" miss the whole ethical *dimension* (p. 230) that Wittgenstein is trying to show by omission and contrast? Make a list. Hobbes, Rousseau, and Mill would certainly be on it, and Socrates, Aristotle, and Kant would not. Who else? Would G.E. Moore be on it or not? Why?
24. How can ethics and logic be combined by premodern philosophers but not by most modern philosophers?
25. Would Wittgenstein say that the personal act of thinking, even calculating thinking, is "mystical"? Why or why not?
26. Did Wittgenstein succeed in avoiding the self-contradiction he accused Kant of in p. 233? P. 234 says no. Can you make out a Wittgensteinian case for yes?
27. Explain how "the history of modern British philosophy suddenly tottered" when an Italian made a crude gesture to Wittgenstein (p. 236).
28. Compare and contrast Wittgenstein's "*Übersicht*" with what the Greeks and medieval meant by logos.
29. Why is analogy the key to theological language and cosmological hierarchy (p. 237)?
30. (a) Would Wittgenstein call poetry and music a mode of "thinking" (p. 237)? (b) Why is this point so shocking to most people today? (c) Why would Heidegger not be shocked by it?
31. Compare Wittgenstein's "imponderable evidence" with "intuition," with "*kennen*" (German) and with "*connaitre*" (French).
32. How did Wittgenstein come to know that "there really have been people like that" like the fictional Father Zossima in *The Brothers Karamazov?*
33. Give more examples of the principle that "the meaning is the use."
34. How does this principle radically limit "artificial intelligence" (p. 240)?
35. How does Wittgenstein explain both what Descartes is up to in his *Discourse on Method* and what Augustine is up to in his *Confessions* (p. 240)?
36. Compare what Wittgenstein means by "family resemblances" and what Aquinas means by analogy.

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37. Will artificial intelligence liberate the fly from the bottle or imprison it (p. 241)?
38. Do you agree with Wittgenstein and most psychologists about "no private language"? Why or why not?
39. Locke sees himself as the opposite of Descartes. How does Wittgenstein disagree with both of these two opposing philosophers *for the same reason*?
40. Why is every person "mystical" for Wittgenstein (p. 243)?
41. Evaluate the startling footnote on p. 243.
42. How does one experience transcending time and fear by living in the present (point 7 on p. 244)?
43. How would Wittgenstein deal with Heidegger's "fundamental question of metaphysics"? (p. 244 point 8) Imagine a conversation between those two.
44. (a) What is "the spirit of the main current of European and American civilization" that Wittgenstein has no sympathy for (p. 245)? (b) Why? (c) What other philosophers share this reaction? (d) Why are they so few?
45. Can you imagine a conversation between Wittgenstein and Marx?

ON HUSSERL

1. (a) Is the Husserlian/Cartesian demand for certainty a valid one or not? (b) Why or why not? (c) Theoretically, certainty would seem to be necessary because probabilities (the alternative to certainties) can be judged as more or less probable only by the use, and therefore also the knowledge, of a certain standard. Evaluate this argument. (d) On the other hand, in practice, all our knowledge seems probable and that seems in practice quite adequate. Evaluate that argument. (e) Yet, as Husserl notes, all successful and lasting cultures have rested on (at least apparent and believed) certainties, while skepticism and relativism is dooming Western civilization (p. 250). How do you negotiate this dilemma?
2. Can Husserl's "failure" to find certainty by the phenomenological method be nevertheless "useful"? How can any invention that fails be used usefully (p. 250)?
3. Is it possible to begin without presuppositions (p. 251)? (Cf. Kierkegaard on Hegel, p. 11).
4. (a) Is Husserl's "eidetic reduction" significantly different from Aristotle's distinction between substance and accident? (b) If so, how? (c) Is it significantly different from Aristotle's theory of abstraction of universal form from individuating matter? (d) If so, how? (e) Is Husserl's "*eidos*" (form or essence) significantly different from Aristotle's use of the same word? (f) If so, how? (g) Would Aristotle agree with Husserl's "eidetic reduction"? (h) If not, why not?
5. Existentialism, analytic philosophy, and phenomenology are all methods rather than doctrines. They also are the three philosophies declared by their greatest representatives to

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have been failures (Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Husserl). Do you see any connection other than coincidence between these two remarkable and historically unprecedented facts?

6. (a) Can one combine and unify the analytic and phenomenological methods? Did Husserl do that? (b) Can one combine the existential and phenomenological methods? Did Heidegger do that? (c) Can one combine the existential and analytic methods? Did Wittgenstein do that? (d) Can one combine all three methods?
7. Why did Husserl "open the brackets" to epistemological idealism and Von Hildebrand to epistemological realism?
8. (a) What is your solution to the "bridge" problem that Descartes gave us? (254a) (b) Is there a questionable hidden assumption in the question? (c) How do you think we know the reality of other minds? If it is some kind of "empathy," how is it different from Husserl's? (d) Why is time so central to Husserl's answer to that question?
9. Was Aristotle a phenomenologist (a) in his ethics? (b) In his metaphysics and cosmology?

ON HILDEBRAND

1. In general, why is Hildebrand more interesting and more worthy of being argued over than Husserl?
2. Assuming that you (I) want to understand new truths from a philosopher so that you can say he has made a difference to your thinking on many points and that you (II) want not just novelty or shock value but to trust the philosopher because he confirms your deepest common sense and lived experience, (a) why are these two things so rarely combined? (b) Is there any other philosopher who does both of these things better than Hildebrand?
3. On the three kinds of good: (a) Is Von Hildebrand doing what Wittgenstein and Moore both say is impossible, viz. defining "good"? (b) Is "good" analogical for Von Hildebrand? (Review what is meant by "analogical" in the Aquinas chapter in vol. 2.) (c) If so, is it close enough to being univocal that there is something, whether definable or not, common to the three kinds of good that justify using the same word for them?
4. Are there other classifications of the basic kinds of goods? If so, what are they and how are they related to Hildebrand's classification?
5. How would Hildebrand classify Mill's hedonism in terms of his three basic kinds of good and evil?
6. Why must there be three, not two, basic kinds of good?
7. Might there be four? Can you think of any kind of good that does not fit into Hildebrand's three categories?
8. Would Mill agree that "for the merely subjectively satisfying, nothing in this category is good in itself" (p. 257)?
9. Why does Hildebrand use the word "value" instead of the word "good"?

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10. What does it mean for value to "call for " a response? Is this a figure of speech, or an analogy, since only persons can "call" literally? How would each of the following philosophers answer that question? Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Mill, Sartre?
11. Compare the traditional distinction between ontological values and moral values with Hildebrand's three categories. How would he classify them?
12. Compare the traditional list of three moral determinants (i.e., three things that make any freely chosen human act morally good or evil), namely the nature of the act itself, the personal motive for doing it, and the circumstances or situation. Would this fit into Hildebrand's scheme or not?
13. Compare Hildebrand's assertion that values call for "adequate" responses with Aquinas' concept of truth as "adequation" of thought to being.
14. Why are there more examples from everyday life in the chapter on Hildebrand than on any other ethical philosopher?
15. Why would Hildebrand argue against Plato's position that all evil is ignorance, not of fact but of value, or of the fact that only moral virtue can give me what everyone wants, namely happiness? Doesn't Plato's ethics center on his concept of "justice," the all-inclusive virtue, as due response to value?
16. How, for Hildebrand, can an ethical response come from the heart (feelings, affectivity) as well as from the will if feelings are not freely chosen?
17. If most ethical philosophers would limit moral good and evil to acts of the will, since they alone are freely chosen. Yet common sense judges someone who lacks moral feelings (compassion, generosity, gratitude, guilt) as morally defective. Is Hildebrand exposing a basic error in almost all traditional moral philosophers here? Or is there another explanation of the apparent contradiction between his philosophy of the heart and the consensus of not only the Stoics and Kant but also Aristotle and Aquinas about the first sentence of this question?
18. What are the various meanings of the word "motive" that Hildebrand would distinguish (p. 260)?
19. (a) Can some of the things Hildebrand calls "substitutes" for real moral norms, values, virtues, and motives be legitimate motives even if none of them are adequate? (b) Only the first four on pp. 262–263 or the other six also? (c) Are the last six fundamentally different from the first four? Is it simply a case of all ten of these motives being good but inadequate? (d) Explore different cases in real life to see the difference between fake or substitute motives and legitimate but partial or inadequate eons. Do some moral phenomenology yourself!
20. List all the spiritual, "intentional," distinctively human feelings or affectivities.

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21. (a) Deconstructionism (ch. 95) denies that words or even concepts have intentionality. If this were true, what consequences would follow regarding Hildebrand's ethics? (b) How can such an abstract, theoretical difference in epistemology or linguistics make such a radical and revolutionary practical difference in ethics?
22. (a) Is Hildebrand's point about inner freedom, especially the freedom to take a deliberate moral stance toward thoughts and feelings that arise in me without my deliberate will (pp. 264–265), a new discovery or a traditional one? (b) What current conflicts would it clarify (p. 265)? (c) What does Hildebrand presuppose in this point? Why do some disagree with that presupposition or presuppositions? Why would he disagree with them?
23. What is the relationship between Hildebrand's most fundamental distinction, between persons and nonpersons (p. 265), and Descartes' most fundamental distinction, between mind and matter.
24. What is the assumption behind defining a person by inherent personal potentialities (p. 265)? Contrast Sartre on this. Is this the source of the primary conflict between "pro-choice" and "pro-life" ethics?
25. (a) What is meant by "self-transcendence" (p. 265)? Why is this not simply a self-contradiction? How can a self be both itself and more than itself? What are some examples of this?
26. (a) How would Hildebrand prove that every association between persons that lessens or threatens our individuality is not a personal relationship? (b) Hegel's dialectic seeks to show that individuality and community (the state) are both increased and perfected in the "higher synthesis" of a good state. What would Hildebrand say about this?
27. Which of the following relationships would Hildebrand's "personalism" prioritize and why? The human race, the state, the city, the neighborhood, the family, or friends?
28. How would Hildebrand interpret falling in love?
29. What would he say is the essence of love?
30. Evaluate each insight on the list of other major insights (pp. 267–268)
31. Why is it important to distinguish receptivity from passivity? Give concrete examples.
32. Dietrich von Hildebrand wrote a lot about being a man. His wife Alice von Hildebrand wrote a lot about being a woman. If you liked Dietrich, you would probably like Alice too.

ON RICOEUR

1. Ricoeur's most central idea is his "hermeneutics," which is usually defined as "the science of interpretation." (a) In what sense is it a "science" for Ricoeur? (b) Can a science begin in wonder rather than doubt (p. 270)? (c) Can it begin in both? (d) Is the "hermeneutic of suspicion" typical of many modern philosophers simply Descartes' "universal methodic doubt" or is it something different?

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2. "Interpretation" refers primarily to "texts." Ricoeur's placing the issue of interpretation (hermeneutics) at the center of philosophy assumes that the world, or reality, is a text. But the universe is not a book and chemical element are not words. What justifies Ricoeur's assumption of this analogy (p. 272)?
3. Why are ideas that are the most "useful" also usually the most dull and boring (p. 270)?
4. (a) Compare Ricoeur's problem of "the hermeneutical circle" with the problem of "the gnoseo-ontological circle" in Kant and Hegel. (b) Can Ricoeur's solution ("it is not a 'vicious circle' but a 'virtuous circle'") apply to both problems? (c) If so, how? If not, why not?
5. (a) Evaluate Ricoeur's solution to the "problem of evil" (p. 217). (b) Evaluate his three *dimensions* of evil (pp. 271–272). (c) The stages are historical, but are they sequential, like the stations on a railroad, or cumulative, like the snow on a snowball rolling downhill? (d) Might all three be present in some way from the beginning? (e) Compare Comte's, Hegel's, and Marx's theories of the history of human consciousness.
6. Give some examples, in ordinary life, in poetry, and in philosophy of metaphors that help us "to see something familiar in a new and unfamiliar way" (p. 273).
7. (a) Since he sees philosophy as "interpretation" and the world as a "text," Ricoeur seems to disagree with Wittgenstein about language being a limitation (p. 273). Does he? (b) Why or why not? (c) Ask a great author about the meaning of his story and you will probably get the answer: "the meaning of the story is the story itself." If life is a narrative, does it follow that the meaning of life is simply the story itself? (d) If so, is this not naturalism rather than supernaturalism? But Ricoeur is a Christian, a supernaturalist. If not, why is the Bible essentially a history, a story, and Christianity a "gospel" or "good *news*"?
8. Evaluate Ricoeur's definition of justice a remembering (p. 274).
9. Why is narrative "inherently ethical" (p. 274)? Evaluate.
10. Evaluate Riecour's political philosophy, especially his solution to the "political paradox" (pp. 274–275).
11. (a) How and (b) why do the political categories "liberal" and "conservative" change their meaning when you cross "the pond" (the Atlantic) (p. 275)? (c) If the change is partial rather than total, what remains unchanged?

ON LEVINAS

1. Explain in your own words and evaluate Levinas' central claim that philosophy begins not with metaphysics or epistemology but ethics (p. 277).
2. (a) Explain the reason behind Levinas' claim that the foundation of ethics is neither natural law nor utilitarian calculation of pleasure nor a Kantian a priori but "the Face-to-Face" (p. 278). (b) Evaluate the claim.

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3. Like Levinas, Sartre sees the other self as an "interruption." How and why do Levinas and Sartre interpret this "interruption" in opposite ways?
4. Why was Ricoeur, a left-wing socialist and pacifist, hated and feared and driven out of his job by the left, not the right? Why was Levinas, who was apolitical and one of the earliest enemies of Hitler, also hated by the left, not the right? Why was his praising of the "feminine" denounced by nearly all European feminists?

ON DERRIDA

1. Aristotle, speaking for common sense, saw the law of noncontradiction as something that was impossible to deny. Yet Derrida denies it. Did Derrida, then, do the impossible? If so, would that be an example of a real contradiction? If not, why not?
2. Is it equally impossible to deny "all boundaries, identities, and hierarchies" (p. 281)? Is there then no boundary between boundaries and no boundaries, an identity between that which has and that which does not have an identity, and no hierarchical superiority of deconstructionism over its denial? Why is this not philosophical suicide? How does Derrida make something out of this, how does he raise the dead corpse of the philosopher who has just assassinated his own mind?
3. (a) This is daring thing to do. Why is Derrida *derring* to do this? What is his motive, his end? (b) Might it have something to do with Russell's snobbish and elitist denouncing of common sense as "the metaphysics of savages"? (c) Or with Marx's quote from Mephistopheles: "Everything that exists deserves to perish"? (d) If it is a kind of *thanatophila* (love of death), what motivates that? For something must motivate it, since it came into existence. (e) Or do things just appear for no reason at all? If so, why do we never see an elephant appear in our living room?
4. Why is this most absolute anti-reason, anti-logic, anti-commonsense, anti-philosophy philosophy the most fashionable in the world among academics in the humanities?
5. Why not in the sciences?
6. Other philosophers (Heraclitus, Cusa) also perceived "the presence of the opposite in everything" without denying the law of noncontradiction or "all boundaries, identities, and hierarchies"; why? How is Derrida different? How is his motive different?
7. It is obvious that writing arose late in history, and storytelling very early. How can Derrida reverse that historical error? Isn't that like saying that apes evolved earlier than dinosaurs?
8. What follows from the principle that "truth-telling is lying and lying is truth-telling" (p. 282)?
9. (a) Compare Derrida's attack on "logocentrism" with Gorgias (vol. 1, ch. 22); (b) with Nietzsche's labeling himself "The Antichrist." (c) How are these two different?
10. (a) How is the deconstructionist principle that there is no objective truth and therefore words are not truths but weapons (i.e., "the sword is mightier than the pen") (p. 284) the

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secret of the success of great tyrants like Hitler and Mao Zedong? (b) Why did all their movements fail, throughout all of human history?

11. Why is it impossible to defeat deconstructionism (p. 285)? Does this make it a "winner"?
12. Why do deconstructionists reduce everything to war about race, class, or gender? Why pick out these three aspects of human life and only them?
13. Evaluate the text's claim that deconstructionism is an effective argument for religion (p. 285).

ON GILSON

1. Why do you suppose Thomism is "the only traditional philosophical school that has remained popular, alive, and growing, in various directions, like the branches of a tree" (p. 289)?
2. (a) How could "the primacy of *esse*," the act of existence (or, more accurately, "the act of exist*ing*") be so important? It sounds terribly abstract. (b) If it is central to Aquinas, how could it have been so uniformly forgotten by most Thomists until Gilson rediscovered its importance? (c) What is "essentialism" as its alternative? (d) Why is "essentialism" naturally "rationalistic"? (e) Why is Thomas' "existentialism" (the metaphysical primacy of the act of existence, not the "existentialism" of Sartre or even Kierkegaard and Nietzsche) the alternative to rationalism?
3. (a) Can "being" be defined? (b) If not, how can there be arguments between Platonists (being = the Forms, or essences), Aristotelians (being = substance), Augustinians (being = eternity), Thomists (being = *esse*), Avicenna (existence = accidental to being), Sartreans (being = only either being-in-itself or being-for-itself), Niezscheans (being = "a vapor and a fallacy"), and Heideggerians (being = the destiny of the West)?
4. (a) Explain and evaluate Gilson's (and Chesterton's) answer to "the critical problem" of the critique and justification of reason itself in Descartes and Kant (p. 290). (b) Imagine (or write) a dialog between Gilson and Lonergan (ch. 98), who disagrees with Gilson, Maritain (ch. 97), and Clarke (ch. 99) on this. (c) How can different Thomists disagree so fundamentally? (d) How would Ricoeur mediate this dispute? (e) Compare the problem of "the gnoseo-ontological circle" (p. 290).
5. Compare and evaluate Gilson (p. 291) and Maritain (p. 296) on the idea of a "Christian philosophy."

ON MARITAIN

1. (a) Maritain is often classified and dismissed as a "Thomist" as if that narrows him; yet he has a more varied set of books and interests than the vast majority of other philosophers. What does that say about Maritain, Thomism, and other philosophers?

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2. What is the relevance of the personality of the philosopher, or the relation between the philosopher and his philosophy? Compare Marcel, James, Hildebrand, and Maritain with Rousseau, Marx, Heidegger, and Sartre on this matter. On the one hand, can you say, with Nietzsche and Dewey, that philosophy is totally relative to the philosopher? On the other hand, can you say that there is no relation or relevance there, that the personality of the philosopher and how he lived his philosophy has no positive or negative bearing on the authenticity of his philosophy? If you seek a mediating position between these two extremes, try to formulate it in a way that is not composed of clichés.
3. Evaluate Maritain's practice of praying even though he was an agnostic (point 7 on p. 293).
4. Look up Charles Malik (p. 294) and his writings. A most remarkable and unusual man and life!
5. (a) Maritain, like Husserl, believed that "the disease afflicting the modern world is above all a disease of the intellect" (p. 293). Evaluate this claim, and (b) Maritain's five reasons for it (p. 295). (c) Would Heidegger agree with the claim?
6. Why is the word "indocile" the key word for Maritain's analysis (p.295)? How is "it retires within itself" a description not just of evil or folly but hell? (Sartre may help you to answer this question if you haven't read *The Last Battle* in C.S. Lewis' *Chronicles of Narnia*.)
7. (a) How is Aquinas' notion of intellect's relation to being an alternative to both irrationalism and rationalism without being merely a compromise or mediating position (p. 295)? (b) Can one both overestimate and underestimate reason at the same time (p. 295)?
8. (a) Why do you think Maritain, like Aquinas, sees the relation between Christianity and democracy as "neither a contrast [or conflict] nor an identity" (p. 296)? (b) Why did some Christians, especially in the past, think it was a contrast? Why do many Christians in the present think it is an identity? (c) Give some other examples of this third relationship between two enterprises that is "neither a contrast nor an identity."
9. (a) Why in our culture is there what Maritain calls "the contrast between artistic creativity and sanctity" (p. 296)? How are both of those terms misunderstood? (b) Why was there in no other culture in history, whether Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Taoist, or Confucian, such a contrast but rather a mutual reinforcement?
10. Compare Maritain's philosophy of education (p. 296) with Dewey's.
11. (a) What is the meaning and importance of Maritain's distinction between "the person" and "the individual" (p. 297)? (b) How would Bergson call this a "*découpage*"?
12. Compare Maritain and Tocqueville on democracy in America (p. 297) if you've read both books.
13. Premodern political philosophers did not speak of "rights" and most modern philosophers do not speak of a "natural (moral) law" based on "natural ends." Why are these two usually seen as alternatives? Why does Maritain think they should not be (p. 297)? What

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misunderstandings or mistaken versions of these two things might be responsible for the problem?

14. Compare Maritain's treatment of mystical experience with Wittgenstein's.
15. Why are most people surprised that Maritain's main example of mysticism, St. John of the Cross, was "a philosopher and a Thomist as well as a saint and mystic"? How does their surprise reveal a misunderstanding of both philosophy and mysticism?
16. Do you agree that wisdom rather than certainty should be philosophy's goal (p. 298)? Why or why not?
17. (a) Do you agree that it is impossible to demonstrate (i.e., to prove with certainty) that the external world exists (pp. 298–299)? (b) That other minds exist? (Cf. Alvin Plantinga's famous argument in *God and Other Minds*.) (c) That you exist as a real being, entity, substance, or person (which Hume and Buddha both deny, for different reasons)? (d) That God exists? (e) Why or why not? (f) What are the consequences of the "yes" answer and of the "no" answer? In other words, what difference does it make? (This question obviously goes far beyond only Maritain.)

ON LONERGAN

1. (a) Do you agree with Lonergan's focus on science and history as the two things most lacking in premodern philosophy in general and Aquinas in particular? (b) Do you see the synthesis or reconciliation between the old and the new here as (I) easy, (II) natural and proper but a formidable and massive task, (III) in necessary tension that is not quite contradiction, or (IV) contradicting each other? (c) Why?
2. Lonergan uses Kant's "transcendental method" without the epistemology he derives from it, his epistemological idealism or "Copernican revolution in philosophy." Do you see method and doctrine as related to each other necessarily or accidentally? Give examples from other philosophers.
3. Compare and contrast Maritain's *The Degrees of Knowledge* with Lonergan's *Insight*.
4. Put Gilson and Lonergan into dialogue concerning whether the "critical problem" (the critique of reason) is illegitimate and to be dissolved rather than solved or legitimate and to be answered by a "*critical* realism."
5. Try again question 4 on Gilson and Lonergan.
6. Evaluate Lonergan's starting point as "the pure, unrestricted desire to know." What criteria must a starting point meet in order to be a good one? What makes one better than another? Compare other divergent starting points in other philosophers.
7. How can the fact of *questioning* prove or imply the existence of God (p. 301)? Evaluate.
8. So do you have a direct intuition of being or not (p. 302)?

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9. Teilhard de Chardin, Lonergan, and Clarke are all not only Catholics but also Jesuits. If you know anything about Jesuits, what do you see that is distinctively Jesuit in all three?

ON CLARKE

1. Why is the inclusion of this relatively obscure, provincial, and specialized philosopher, who wrote mainly about metaphysics and who has only one main idea, not itself obscure or provincial or narrow and specialized but expansive and revolutionary?
2. (a) In Kołakowski's two contrasting lists of typically premodern or traditional theses and modern theses (pp. 306–307), how many do you see as contradictions, if any? How many do you see as creative and productive tensions? How many are differences that are not even tensions but call out for synthesis, like romantic love? (b) Which do you see as the most difficult to reconcile with its opposite? Which do you see as the easiest?
3. What *is* a "person," anyway? What is "being"? How are those two questions, as questions, similar?
4. How does Maritain's concept of "the generosity of existence" (*esse*) fit into Clarke's synthesis of person and being?
5. What concepts of being are not amenable to synthesis with personalism?
6. What concepts of a person are not amenable to synthesis with Thomistic metaphysics?
7. Evaluate the principle in Aquinas that justifies Clarke's main thesis (p. 309). Remember, "evaluate" does not mean merely "express your feelings" but "give reasons."
8. What are some of the consequences that you see if Clarke's main thesis is accepted?

ON CHESTERTON

1. (a) Why do you suppose no other history philosophy classifies Chesterton as a philosopher? (b) What justifies including him? (c) In what division of philosophy does he have nothing to say? (Warning: trick question!)
2. (a) The two characteristics that most readers detect in Chesterton's philosophy are its common sense ("Yes, of course. Why didn't I see that before?") and his reveling in paradoxes. But these two things seem opposite. How are they not only not opposite but two sides of the same point for Chesterton (p. 310)? (b) How are his paradoxes apparently similar to those of Derrida and how are they the opposite?
3. (a) Do what GK suggests in p. 311 with other examples. (b) How did Aristotle do that with "truth"? (c) Can you do it with "being"? (d) With "person"?
4. (a) How can "the fact that things truly are" be "unthinkable"? Compare Wittgenstein. (b) How can it be that "yet we cannot unthink it" (p. 312)? (c) How are these two opposite things about thinkability two sides of the same thing? (d) Why did you "get" Chesterton's

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point when you first read it but, now that you have to answer the most obvious questions about the point, you find it so difficult?

5. (a) If you paused after you read GK's question ("Granting that being comes first, what comes first in our reaction to it?") (p. 312) before going on to read GK's answer, you probably thought you knew what his answer was going to be, and then you discovered both that you were wrong and, perhaps, that GK was right. Why did that happen? (b) Why didn't any other philosopher give GK's answer? Or did they?
6. (a) What is GK's purpose in writing (p. 313)? (b) Why is this purpose so high and holy, so rare and remarkable? (c) What are its collective, social, global consequences (pp. 340–341)?
7. (a) Why does GK not only disagree but disagree so violently with Shankara, Spinoza, and Hegel (p. 313)? (b) Explain and evaluate GK's analogy of the giant. (c) GK sees nominalism as the opposite error (p. 313); how does he refute it? (d) How would Bergson see this as a "*découpage*"? (e) Compare Maritain's insight that collectivism and individualism are the same error.
8. Compare (a) Plato's "Ideas," (b) Aristotle's and GK's notion of "form," (c) Aquinas' "essence" as distinct from existence, (d) Scotus' "thisness" (*haecceitas),* and (e) Husserl's "*eidos.*" How are they different? How are they the same?
9. Why is this central idea absent from or even repudiated by many modern philosophers?
10. How does GK refute Marx (p. 314)? Evaluate.
11. How does GK prove God's existence from the fact of the oldest and most universal human art form (pp. 314–315)? Or does he? Evaluate the argument. Compare Ricoeur.
12. How can most of us almost always ignore the most obvious and ubiquitous feature of everything in the universe, its contingency (p. 315)?
13. (a) What would Hume say to GK's distinction between two kinds of event sequences on p. 315? Explain why he would agree or disagree. (b) What would Kant say? (c) Which philosophers, if any, deny this distinction? (d) Why is GK's way of expressing the point more understandable and memorable than theirs?
14. How does what GK says about miracles answer Hume by using some of Hume's own premises (cf. p. 316)?
15. Evaluate GK's argument at pp. 316–317. What is GK trying to refute? What is he trying to prove or disprove? Does he succeed?
16. (a) Apply GK's principle that "God is strong enough to exult in monotony" to grains of sand, (b) to mosquitoes, and (c) to people. (d) Is this Scotistic or Thomistic or both? (e) Explain.
17. What difference does it make if you realize your contingency (p. 317): One in 20 million sperm got to unite with its mate's ovum for each ancestor?

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18. (a) Explain GK's analogy of the hornbill on p. 317. (b) Why "brightly colored"? Why do children love bright colors? Why did Aquinas include this as one of the four properties of the beautiful? (c) Why does GK use the analogy of a "toy"? Explore the details of this analogy.
19. Even though explanations of a striking analogy, as of a joke, spoils its emotional surprise, explain GK's sentence on p. 317: "He who has seen the vision of his city upside-down has seen it the right way up."
20. (a) Evaluate GK's distinction between his Dickensian "higher optimism" and ordinary optimism (p. 317). (b) Is this possible to maintain when experiencing pain, poverty, or persecution?
21. Does GK's point about cosmic patriotism at p. 318 explain why the political left dislikes patriotism?
22. What does GK mean by calling man "not merely an evolution but rather a revolution" (p. 318)?
23. Does GK's point about seeds and trees (p. 318) solve the puzzle of "which came first, the chicken or the egg?"?
24. (a) GK's point that "barbarism and civilization were not successive stages [but] existed side by side" (p. 318) contradicts nearly all philosophies of history. It is obviously false about science and technology. About what other aspects of human enterprise is it right? (b) Is the belief in universal evolutionism (Teilhard, Spencer, Comte) dependent on choosing technology rather than any of these other enterprises as its standard for judgment? (c) Why do we not use the word "barbaric" to describe primitive science or technology? What do we use it for?
25. (a) How can things in the cosmos like planets, plants, and pandas be not just "things" but "signs" (p. 319)? (b) Compare Bonaventure on this. (c) Contrast Derrida. (d) With what mental power do we read physical signs (not just mental signs, concepts) in science? (e) In art? (f) Which is more basic and primordial? (g) Why? Give examples.
26. (a) If, as Hamlet says, there are more things in heaven and earth that are dreamed of in our philosophy, does it necessarily follow that there are also more *connections* (p. 319)? (b) Which philosophers would answer no to that question? (c) Evaluate GK's defense of "synchronicity" (p. 319) as one kind of connection.
27. Why is the same skeptical, cynical, critical, humble, or "negative" attitude the reason GK, like Aquinas, rejects both rationalism and irrationalism (p. 319)?
28. Formulate the argument (it's not a syllogism but more like Pascal's Wager) that is common to GK on p. 320 and James on pp. 78–79, 86.
29. Compare GK's defense of mysticism (p. 320) with Wittgenstein's.

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30. (a) Does GK's statement about faith and reason on p. 321 fit the epistemology of Gilson or Lonergan? (b) Why? (c) Could it fit both? (d) Why or why not? (e) How do pp. 322–323 answer that question?
31. Would James agree with GK's argument against the inadequacy of pragmatism (p. 321)?
32. (a) Evaluate GK's refutation of subjectivism (p. 321). (b) Do you think it is stronger or weaker than the self-contradiction argument? (c) Why?
33. Answer the same three questions about his refutation of skepticism (p. 322).
34. Answer the same three questions about his refutation of relativism (p. 322).
35. (a) Evaluate GK's critique of the modern "turn to the subject" at p. 323. (b) Is this not a natural turn that occurs in every teenager? If so, how can it by reconciled with GK's point? If it cannot, how can you choose between primitive, naïve childlikeness and sophisticated skepticism and despair? (c) If you judge this question by reason, do you get a different answer than when you judge it by personal experience? If so, which do you use to judge the other and why?
36. (a) How does Aquinas, as GK understands him, reconcile empiricism and rationalism in reconciling reason's receptivity, or its science, with its activity, or its art, without falling into either the materialism of the first or the subjectivism of the second (pp. 323–324)? (b) Is one of these two prior in authority? If so, which, and why (p. 324)? (c) Explain the relevance of GK's three anthropological analogies on p. 325.
37. Is a consequence of GK's personalism that psychology and sociology are not really sciences? (point 9 on p. 324)
38. If you think GK's defense of the uniqueness of Aquinas' common sense (point 10 on p. 324) is inaccurate, which modern philosopher do you think is more universally commonsensical than Aquinas and why?
39. If it is as obvious as GK says that "man does differ from the brutes in kind [essentially, substantially] and not in degree [accidentally]" (p. 325; cf. also p. 318), how and why can so many intelligent philosophers and scientists deny this? For GK the answer is obvious. What is it (point 2 on p. 325)?
40. Explain why "thoroughly worldly people never understand even the world" (p. 325).
41. If "the men who really believe in themselves are all in lunatic asylums" (p. 325), would GK say our modern pop psychologists fit there? If so, why are they so influential? If not, what mitigates their lunacy?
42. Explain and evaluate GK's explanation of humor by angels (point 2 on p. 325, last sentence).
43. Compare GK's division of people (p. 326) with Pascal's (vol. 3, pp. 32, 34).
44. Compare GK's philosophy of boredom (p. 3263) with Kierkegaard's (pp. 7–8).
45. Compare GK's philosophy of will and power (p. 326) with that of Bacon, Nietzsche, or Derrida.

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46. How does GK's point about "abnormalism" (point 6 on p. 326) explain why secularists like Mill do not understand natural moral law or the meaning of "human nature" because they do not believe in the fall.
47. (a) How does GK's analogy of the play as vs. the poem explain "the problem of evil" (p. 326)? (b) What are its limitations? (All analogies "limp" somewhat.)
48. (a) Does the mustard at p. 327 refute determinism? (b) If so, what is the unspoken assumption of GK's argument? (c) How would "compatibilism" try to explain this and keep determinism without denying the assumption?
49. (a) How many times, in these few pages, does GK explain or justify a mystery by the concept of drama or adventure (for example, p. 327 alone contains three). (b) Why? (c) What other philosopher is on this same "wavelength"? (d) Why do we find this rarity in GK especially in ethics (cf. points 5 and 7 on p. 332)?
50. (a) What is GK's (implicit) ontological argument against divorce (p. 328)? (b) Evaluate it. (c) What is his psychological argument (pp. 328–329)? (d) Evaluate it. (e) Which argument do you think is stronger? (f) Why? (g) The Catholic Church is the only institution in the world which does not believe in divorce. What Catholic, or Christian, or religious, or faith-based premise is assumed in GK's argument? (h) Why was that a trick question?
51. (a) How does GK's philosophy of women (p. 329) refuse to fit into either the egalitarian or chauvinist models? (b) How does it relate to question 49? (c) Evaluate this.
52. Is this philosophy of women compatible with women working outside the home? With restricting certain jobs to men only? Why or why not? How would GK "destroy the tyrrany" (p. 329)?
53. (a) What, for GK, is the greatest, most creative act, deed, or achievement any human being can ever make in this life? (No hint for this question; too obvious.) (b) If the answer to this question is as obvious and as irrefutable as it seems, why would most people today give a different answer to it than GK does?
54. Why did almost no one else in the world (except Huxley, who was not a Christian) have the prophetic insight to foresee, in 1908, one of the most radical and life-changing revolutions in all of human history (p. 330)?
55. Which of the following philosophers would agree, and which disagree, with what GK says in point 2 on p. 330? Thrasymachus, Plato, Euthyphro, Aquinas, Hobbes, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Comte, Levinas, Buber?
56. Moral laws, including the "natural moral law," are different than natural physical laws: How? How are they also the same, according to GK? (Explain point 3 on p. 330.)
57. GK explains, implicitly, why Freud, in his psychology of the "superego," does not speak of "conscience." Why does Kant, who contradicts Freud, also not speak of "conscience" in his ethics of duty? (This is more a question about Kant than about GK.) Hint: Why would

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Kant, like Freud and unlike GK, disagree with the assumption implied in the etymology of the word "conscience"? (The implicit answer to that question is in point 5 of p. 331, but the point is ontological rather than psychological.)

58. How do GK and Sartre agree about "progress" (p. 331)?
59. In light of point 8 on p. 331, what is the implicit assumption of the common modern idea (e.g., in Freud) that morality is "repressive"?
60. Apply GK's point 1 on p. 331 to Jesus (or any of the saints) and to Kant or the Stoics.
61. What consequences for children's books do you draw from point 3 on p. 332? Why would some draw opposite consequences from GK's premise?
62. How does GK make us see that we have seen the virtue of humility 180 degrees wrong, not just 45 or 90 (point 4 on p. 332)?
63. (a) Why does GK seem to take everything in life and turn what we think of it upside down? How does this explain why many readers passionately hate reading GK and why others passionately love it?
64. Is it possible to love without hating? Why or why not (point 6 on p. 332)?
65. What can we do about the fact that the more technological control we have, the more bored we are (p. 333)? Should we cultivate inconvenience? But wouldn't that make them part of control?
66. Why doesn't point 10 on p. 333 mean that vices are more common than virtues?
67. Does point 11 mean that motive is more important than deed? Why or why not?
68. Do you see any deeper reason why most people see suicide and martyrdom as more similar than the invisibility of the motive and the visibility of the result (p. 333)?
69. Do you think GK is exaggerating or even misunderstanding when he connects our culture with that of Carthage via abortion? Why or why not? ("Carthage" means literally "New town." I live in Newton, Massachusetts. Newton is 90 percent "pro-choice.")
70. Evaluate GK's argument vs. contraception in point 4 on p. 334.
71. (a) Is GK right about the relation between democracy and tradition (pp. 334–335)? (b) If not, why not? If so, why do most people instinctively see them as opposing forces? (c) Tradition and authority naturally go together; why does that not justify most people's mistake in (a)?
72. Essential to democracy is equality. Essential to hierarchy (e.g. kings and queens) is inequality. Can they be combined without contradiction or confusion (cf. 335)? How is p. 336 the primary example of this?
73. Reflection on p. 335: Philosophy is the love of wisdom. What is the word for a professional lover? What, then, are professional philosophers like this writer?

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74. What's wrong with capitalism, according to GK? What's wrong with socialism? What, besides anarchy, tyranny, and totalitarianism, is an alternative to both socialism (or communism) and capitalism (point 2 on p. 335)?
75. (a) Would GK say that the same arguments support both the separation of church and state and the separation of school and state (points 3 and 4 on p. 336)? (b) If not, why not? (c) If so, what are the arguments? And why is the separation of school and state almost never supported but the separation of church and state almost always is?
76. (a) What is the fundamental fact that grounds GK's conclusion that the family is superior to the state (p. 336)? (b) To look at the data, the "track record," contrast the longevity, peace, and happiness of states that revere the family (Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Confucian, Roman) and those that don't.
77. (a) Is GK a "liberal" or a "conservative" (pp. 336–337)? (b) Why is that a trick question? (c) What does it reveal about our present confusion in using those two terms? (d) How does GK see both as not merely imperfect but self-refuting, self-contradictory in their very essence? (e) Evaluate.
78. (a) Why does anarchy, and even libertarianism, make rebellion impossible (p. 337)? (b) Compare deconstructionism (p.285).
79. Why are traditionalists not aristocrats (p. 337)?
80. How does GK's example of the fence (p. 337) show the default position of the progressive and conservative?
81. Explain and evaluate why GK identifies anti-tradtionalists with barbarians. (337e)
82. What would be the consequences if we substituted concrete concepts (like "land") for abstract concepts (like "real estate") in all our social and political thinking (p. 338)?
83. (a) Why are we surprised by GK's refutation of "You can't put the clock back" (p. 338)? (b) How does this surprise explain why many people find the concepts of repentance and forgiveness (two things rather more important than clocks) suspicious or impossible?
84. Look up "chronological snobbery" in C.S. Lewis' *Surprised by Joy*. Why is it so popular if it is so irrational? Why is it attractive to tell the truth with clocks instead of with arguments? Why is "change" the most automatically and instinctively popular word in politics and "new" the most popular word in advertising (point 2 on p. 338)?
85. Explain GK's argument in the penultimate paragraph on p. 338.
86. Compare GK's three stages of history (p. 339) with Comte's, and with Ricoeur's three stages of conceiving evil.
87. Explain the first two sentences in the latter paragraph of the excerpt at the top of p. 339.
88. Evaluate GK's argument against the progressive view of history on p. 339.
89. Try to put the quotation in point 6 on p. 340 into logical form. Try to put the argument here into a syllogism. (It is more challenging than it seems.)

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90. If anarchy makes art impossible (p. 339) why do most artists have anarchic lives and politics?
91. Comment on the proposal to add one more example to the last sentence of point 3 on p. 340, viz. "*Orthodoxy* is only great because all life is paradox."
92. Is GK's example in point 5 on p. 340 the simple answer to the question that both Berkeley and Wittgenstein wondered about, whether it is possible to think without words? Why or why not?
93. Are there professions, groups, or activities that actually do the musicalization GK calls for in point 5 on p. 340? (N.b. this cannot be a group of musicians, for the one thing that cannot be musicalized is music itself, just as the one thing that cannot be personified is a person.)
94. How can beauty have the power to make us not only happy but also wise and good (p. 340)?
95. How can a poet like GK save a culture (p. 341)?

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